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Chapter One 
Introduction 
It is interesting how a specific date and month has come to define the world. In the 
dawn of the millennium, few people would have thought international politics would 
suddenly change. It was even harder to envisage that America would be a direct target 
of terror groups’ right inside their country in such a huge magnitude, in this age after 
the end of cold war when it was the only super power. 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 will forever remain entrenched in history and even 
more so the political events that followed after, since they have redefined the world 
and its political ideology. Different states have responded to the attacks differently, 
springing surprises, twists and turns that have shaped the agenda of the human rights 
discourse. The response to the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Centre has 
posed a dilemma to scholars in international human rights law, some of them whom 
have questioned if this is the end of human rights era.1 This is because of how the 
human rights discourse has been put at cross purpose with the anti-terror efforts that 
have been employed. 
 
After Al-qaeda operatives crashed three airlines into the Pentagon and World Trade 
Centre, while a fourth one crashed in a field in Shanksville, this was seen as a direct 
act of aggression on America and President George Bush vowed revenge. On October 
8th 2001, Bush launched a campaign to track Osama Bin Laden and followers of his 
Al-qaeda group, who were responsible for the attacks. The “war on terror” began the 
same day with the bombing of Afghanistan that aimed at toppling the Afghanistan 
government, which supported Al-qaeda. While doing this, Bush placed terrorism 
above any other global agenda. It is important to note that the toppling of the 
Afghanistan regime was through the UN Security Council. When a new government 
was set up after the regime was toppled, the “war on terror” entered new frontier. 
In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush declared that Iran, 
Iraq and North Korea were “rogue states” and alleged that the three countries were 
developing weapons of mass destruction.  Bush feared that terrorists would use these 
                                                 
1 Michael Ignatieff,  Is the Human Rights Era Ending?’ in New York Times, 5 February 2002 
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chemical and biological weapons to attack other countries, more so American 
interests and hence measures had to be taken before this happened. 
He next turned to Iraq which was suspected of having chemical and biological 
weapons and links with Al-qaeda. He vowed to topple the Iraq regime of Saddam 
Hussein on these pretexts.2 These actions led to a lot of international debate, with 
many countries urging America not to use force to push its agenda. Specifically, most 
countries were of the view that inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNIMOVIC) should be allowed to inspect 
Iraq to authenticate the claims.3 In addition, many countries felt that for such a war to 
happen, the UN Security Council had to pass a resolution allowing the attack of Iraq. 
Nevertheless, America and its allies went ahead with their plans of toppling Saddam. 
On April 9, 2003 the regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled and he was captured on 
December 14, 2003. However, Osama has not yet been caught.  
At the same time, the United Nations (U.N.) has passed various resolutions 
condemning terrorism and urging countries to enact anti-terror measures that do not 
infringe on the people’s human rights. Despite this, the anti-terrorism measures 
adopted by many countries have fallen short of the U.N. human rights requirements 
and have proved to be a challenge to internationa l human rights law and refugee law. 
This has led to various scholars arguing that the U.N. charter should be reviewed to 
adequately cater for the “war on terror” and the enforcement of human rights while 
engaging in these efforts. In any case, it is clear that legal safeguards that were once 
viewed as unchangeable are now being challenged. As David Rieff avers, “…the 
threat that internal war and terrorism poses to the edifice of international law would 
have become apparent sooner or later. If anything, September 11 only hastened and 
focused the process.”4 
 
                                                 
2 As the war on terror progressed, the reasons for attacking Iraq kept on changing from the issue of chemical and 
biological weapons to liberating Iraq people from Saddam. This was especially so when it was clear that Saddam 
did not possess any chemical and biological weapons or links with Al-qaeda. 
3 The United Nations Monitoring, verifications and Inspection Commission (UNIMOVIC) was created through the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999. It was to replace United Nations Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter’s mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons and missiles with a 
range of more than 150 km. At the same time, it was to continuously monitor and verify Iraq’s compliance with its 
obligations not to reacquire the weapons and missiles.  
4 Rieff, David ‘What is really at stake in the US campaign against terrorism,’ article posted on 
www.crimesofwarproject.org 
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This research report aims to study the implications of the “war on terror” for the 
protection of human rights in Kenya. In doing so, it is noted that even though Kenya 
has been a victim of terrorist activities, it was only after America began the “war on 
terror” in October 2001 that it started putting up structures to address terrorism. Thus, 
the main thrust of this research is to investigate the human rights dilemma that Kenya 
faces in these efforts includ ing interrogating the reasons for the tensions that resulted 
from the draft Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003 that was drawn up by the 
government in its effort to fight terrorism. In order to do this, several research 
questions inform the study. 
a) How has the “war on terror” shaped the understanding and practices of human 
rights in Kenya?  
b) How has the “war on terror” shaped Kenya’s approach to terrorism? 
c) How did the draft Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003 emerge? 
d) Was the draft bill a result of social struggles and history of the country as 
regards terrorism? 
e) What are the human rights concerns that have emerged from the draft bill? 
f) What are the tensions that have cropped up between protecting human rights 
and ensuring national security in Kenya? This will include a study of local 
campaigns by the Civil Society and Muslim community against the draft anti-
terror bill. 
g) Why have the tensions come up between the citizens and the government? To 
do this, the study will look into the human rights history of Kenya and 
relationship between the government and its citizens.  
h) What has been the impact of anti-terrorism measures on certain ethnic and 
religious groups? 
i) How have suspected terrorists in Kenya been treated while under custody? 
 
Human rights as applied in this research report refers to a set of internationally agreed 
upon principles which have been set down in the various declarations of United 
Nations human rights instruments, African Charter and other legal documents like 
Constitutions. Over the years, these principles have continuously been refined and 
extended to ensure that more people especially the minorities are catered for and have 
since been evoked when oppression occurs. 
 
  
 10 
1.1 Human rights as a point of departure. 
The U.N. has since its inception, enacted a body of human rights doctrine that is 
embodied in international law. It is these laws that have shaped the existence of 
human rights. However, the rights notion has been a point of contestation over what 
exactly are the rights to be protected? Who protects them? When are human rights to 
be derogated from? When do the rights trump over culture? Are human rights 
absolute and universally applicable? While answers to these questions will differ 
between various scholars, they are useful to understand the importance and growth of 
human rights. A point of departure in understanding the concept of human rights is to 
examine the various theories around human rights. 
 
Karl Marx argued that law is an instrument used by the bourgeoisie to oppress the 
proletariat.5 As such, the law was determined by the material conditions of the people 
and since the ruling class is the one which owned property, it served to cater for them. 
Marx thus viewed human rights as an edifice of the bourgeoisie who determined such 
virtues as liberty and freedom. Hence the only rights guaranteed are those that have 
been granted by the state and their exercise depends upon the citizens’ fulfilment of 
their obligations to the state. This meant that guaranteeing and protecting human 
rights was the duty of the state and other countries could not interfere with this 
arrangement. This is what enabled countries that adopted Communism to oppress 
their citizens and deny them human rights as it was treated as a domestic affair. 
However, this has changed over the years as human rights has become a matter of 
international concern, with international law giving the U.N. and international 
community right to intervene when there is gross human rights violations in a country. 
 
John Locke however was of the view that human rights are natural and the fact that 
one is a human being, entitled one to these rights, which he called natural rights.6 To 
this end, people were supposed to form a government that would enter into a social 
contract with them so that it could protect these rights from those who would want to 
trample on them. However, the people still retained their natural rights of life, liberty 
and property. In case the government did not honour the social contract, it ceased to 
                                                 
5 Cotterrel, Roger. The Sociology of law: An introduction, 2nd edition, Butterworths 1992 pg 109 
6 Shestack, Jerome, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights,’ in Human Rights Quarterly, Number 20 1998, 
pg 207 
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be valid in office. However, this theory has been criticised for its silence on what 
constituted the norms that are to be considered as part of the law of nature and 
therefore inalienable.7 Despite this, it should not be lost to the fact that Locke’s theory 
of natural rights was instrumental in the French declaration of rights and the U.S. 
declaration of independence as well as many states that fought against colonialism 
and totalitarianism. Of more importance is that it formed the principal building blocks 
of the U.N. charter. 
 
However, positivist theorists deny the conception of natural rights and argue that the 
source of human rights is found only in law that spells out the sanctions that emanate 
when it is not adhered to. In other words, positivists see law as the guarantor of 
human rights and it must be obeyed no matter how immoral it might be or even if it 
disregards the freedom of the individual. The apartheid regime in South Africa thus 
could have justified their actions since that is what the law of the land stipulated and 
the theorists’ blind justification of the law has been its criticism. This is because 
“unjust laws not only lack a capacity to demand fidelity, but also do not deserve the 
name of law because they lack internal morality.”8 Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that positivists have contributed to the growth of legal rights and international human 
rights law that provide a ground for rights protection. 9 However, they do not cater for 
the notion that society develops laws that are to be exercised by the people and human 
rights are considered as rights by virtue of one being a human being and are part and 
parcel of the integrity and dignity of the individual. Therefore law serves as an 
implementing organ but it is not the absolute source and cannot take the rights at will 
any time. 
 
From a sociological perspective, human rights go beyond the notion of natural rights 
and legal rights. It extends to the view that rights are a construction of the society and 
emanates from the social struggles among the people. In this regard, law is an avenue 
for social struggle that is a part of peoples’ lives.10 Since it emanates from a society’s 
history and struggles, this means that law is going to be interpreted in various ways. 
However, if the law does not reflect the society’s needs, it will not be applicable and 
                                                 
7 ibid pg 207 
8 ibid pg 209 
9 ibid 
10 Cotterrel, Roger opcit  pg 1-2 
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this is the dilemma that Kenya has been grappling with its anti-terror legislation. 
Furthermore, law expresses and regulates power relations.11 Thus, it is a field where 
power is exercised and the structures like Constitutional courts ensure that all in the 
arena are protected, especially the minority and the best way to guarantee this is to 
invoke the rights language. This is so because human rights are also a product of 
contestation, meaning that they exercise a particular form of power. Therefore one can 
say that constitutionalism and bill of rights provide law and courts with a big role of 
shaping power relations because they have been shaped into an arena of struggle. In 
the Kenyan context, they have been used to challenge arbitrary detentions and 
discriminative arrests of terrorism suspects. 
 
This research report extends Stephen Luke’s arguments on the notion of power12 and 
emphasises the ability of people to resist oppression and inequality. In this regard, it is 
argued that the rights language provides the best avenue for contestation of power 
since they can challenge or limit power relations. It therefore agrees with Foucault’s 
arguments that power is not individually possessed but exercised through small 
proportions and can be analysed from the bottom-up.13 
 
If human rights are a point of contestation, their application is different from region to 
region. After the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) was 
adopted in 1945, African nations were not present since they were being treated as 
extensions of the colonies. Hence the U.N. doctrine was seen as universal and 
absolute. However, after independence, African and other non-western countries 
started challenging the universality of the UNDHR. Their main problem was that the 
rights of minority and indigenous people had not been taken into account when it was 
being formulated, for example the right of self-determination. 14 Hence, Africans and 
other third world countries felt that the UNDHR reflected Western ideology, which 
only advocated individual rights and has no provision for group rights.15 Thus, they 
                                                 
11 ibid pg 74 
12 Luke, Stephen, Power: A radical view, Macmillan, 1974, pgs 52 – 56 in Torfing, Jacob, New theories of 
discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek, Blackwell publishers, 1999 pg 160 
13McGowen, Randall, ‘Power and humanity or Foucault among the historians,’ in Roy Porter and Colin Jones 
(eds), Reassessing Foucault: Power, medicine and the body, Routledge, 1994 pg 96 
14 Shestack, Jerome, ‘The philosophic foundations of human rights,’ Human Rights Quarterly, Number 20 1998, p 
205 
15 Cranston, Maurice, What are human rights?, New York: Taphinger, 1973 pg 70 
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started calling for rights to be implemented according to the cultural settings of the 
people. This is because the local traditions and settings dictate the growth of political 
structures, law and economics, which differ from place to place.  
 
The importance of cultural relativism is what Maurice notes, that a cultural context 
determines the amount of attention given to human rights.16 This varies from one 
region to another since, there is nothing like universal morality since the world has 
many cultures. Makau Mutua takes the discussion further when he warns that as 
currently constituted, the human rights movement will ultimately fail because it is 
perceived as an alien- ideology in non-western countries since it does not deeply 
resonate in their cultural fabrics. However, if it is to succeed, it must be moored in the 
cultures of all people.17 He argues that this is so because the human rights discourse is 
driven by what he calls the ‘savage-victim-saviour’ metaphor, in which human rights 
is a grand narrative of an epochal contest that pits savages against victims and 
saviours. As such, democracy and western liberalism are internationalised to redeem 
savage non-Western cultures from themselves, and to alleviate the suffering of 
victims, who are generally non-western and non-European. 18 
 
However, there are still those people who believe in the universalism of human rights, 
and sometimes argue that cultural relativism is an ideological tool to serve the 
interests of powerful emergent groups.19 Despite this, there is an emerging consensus 
that the U.N. charter and other international instruments provide standards of 
achieving rights in a society. They are always invoked when the people are struggling 
for their rights, enacting laws and other political institutions. 
 
In the same regard, some scholars have argued that the “war against terror” is a 
strategy by Western countries to propagate Western liberalism because Western 
countries are the ones who are spreading it and do not enquire the input of third world 
countries. Makau portends that the war targets non-Western peoples and their 
cultures, especially Muslims. Hence, the West uses the “war on terror” to construct 
                                                 
16 ibid 
17 Mutua, Makau Human Rights: A political and cultural critique, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2001 pg 14 
18 ibid pg 10 
19 Jhabala, farokh, ‘On human rights and the social-economic context,’ Netherlands International Law review 
XXX1, 1984 pg 164 
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and strengthen its cultural and political domination of the international legal order, 
including human rights.20 In post September 11, the savage has turned to be Muslim 
people who have been branded as terrorists, who hate the West for being free, liberal, 
and peace-loving.21 Consequently, the world has been divided between the West and 
many in the Islamic and Arab World. As such, the Muslim countries have to adopt the 
Western liberal democracy or be left out of the global political culture and free market 
economy.22 Therefore, terrorism and the “war against terror” emerge as a challenge to 
human rights, which advocate liberty, freedom and dignity. 
 
1.2 Rethinking terrorism 
Terrorism has been termed a political action that uses violence and fear against 
civilians and civilian infrastructure in order to revenge, influence behaviour or punish 
them.23  Acts of terrorism are a global threat to the rule of law, democracy and 
particularly to certain fundamental rights, including the right to life, to personal 
safety, and to freedom. They therefore pose a serious threat to national and 
international stability and security, making it impossible for a state to effectively 
protect its citizens or property in and outside the country. This is because terrorists do 
not respect national borders and regard a state, community, diplomat, business or 
property merely as a target. 
 
A major dilemma arises in defining terrorism and to date no standard definition has 
been outlined. This is because the term terrorism is very emotional and value loaded 
hence it differs from region to region. Consequently, it becomes hard to conclusively 
discuss the history of terrorism since what may be said to be terrorism by one group 
of people is not terrorism to the other group. At the same time, it should be borne in 
mind that over the years, terrorism has been manifested differently. Hence, its 
definition becomes more difficult. 
 
Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that the word ‘terrorism’ emerged during the 
French revolution in 1793-1794.  Originally an instrument of the state, terror was 
                                                 
20 Mutua, Makau, ‘Terrorism and Human Rights – Power, Culture and Subordination.’ A paper presented at an 
International Meeting on Global Trends in Human Rights before after and September 11. 
21 Ibid 
22 ibid 
23 Booth Ken, Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in collision: Terror and the future of global order, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002 Pg 8 
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designed to consolidate the power of the newly- installed revolutionary government, 
protecting it from elements considered ‘subversive.’  During this time, it was 
considered a positive term and French revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre 
saw it as vital if the new French Republic was to survive its infancy. He proclaimed 
terror as “nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, and inflexible...a virtue that was 
a consequence of the general principle of democracy.”24 It was not long before 
terrorism started being discussed and viewed in negative ways with political 
philosopher Edmund Burke popularising the term in the English language while 
demonizing its French revolutionary practitioners.25 
 
As Bruce Hoffman notes, one of the negative acts of terrorism were propagated by 
Carlo Pisacane’s who came up with the theory of ‘propaganda of the deed’, which 
essentially meant that terrorism can be used to deliver a message to an audience other 
than the targe t, draw attention to and support a cause.26 Modern day terrorists have 
extensively used this theory where they target civilians so that the government could 
recognise their grievances, for example Al-qaeda or Chechen rebels who abducted 
school children in Basra. 
 
In the 20th century, some liberation movements in the third world engaged in terrorist 
tactics to acquire independence. Such was the case in Kenya, Algeria among other 
countries. These nationalist groups who were commonly known as freedom fighters 
engaged in warfare that was aimed at enabling other countries recognise their plight 
under colonialism and successfully realise their goals of indepedence. As Hoffman 
notes, such groups “…were the first to recognize the publicity value inherent in 
terrorism and to choreograph their violence for an audience far beyond the immediate 
geographical loci of their respective struggles.”27 However, it should be noted that the 
liberation groups engaged in guerrilla warfare but they employed terrorist tactics. 
Their aim nevertheless was not to harm civilians who at most times helped them to 
collect intelligence and provide food and medicine. Their violence hence was directed 
at the colonisers and African collaborators. 
                                                 
24 Modern history source book, Maximilien Robespierre: Justification of the use of terror, in 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/robespierre-terror.html 
25 Center for defence information, ‘Brief History of terrorism,’ in http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm? 
26 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 pg 17. 
27 Ibid pg 65 
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Throughout history, the agenda of terrorist groups has evolved from being liberation 
movements to other groups either fighting for secession or they are motivated by 
ethnic and ideological agendas. For example the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), Basque ETA, and Irish Republican Army among others have engaged in terror 
campaigns for different political reasons. Their methods involve not only killing 
civilians and destroying their infrastructure, but they also use them to publicize their 
goals and accomplishments internationally. At the same time, they use recognised 
international forums like the U.N. for example the PLO uses the body to push for their 
agenda. 
 
This research report notes that there are various aspects of terrorism: state-sponsored 
terrorism, religious terrorism, trans-national terrorism, national terrorism. 
 
National terrorism takes the form of liberation movements most of which were 
employed during the struggle against colonial domination in Africa for example 
Kenya’s Mau Mau. Though they use guerrilla tactics, liberation movements engaged 
in terror tactics like bombings and kidnappings. So far, they have been the most 
successful groups in waging terrorism since they were able to get international 
attention for their plight and also induce colonial powers to withdraw from their 
countries. Liberation movements also managed to get the U.N. backing in their 
struggle when the U.N. gave consent to the principle of self-determination, which is 
outlined in the U.N. charter and endorsed in Resolution 1514 (xv) of 1960.28 Thus, the 
actions of liberation movements are seen as legitimate and “when legitimacy rests on 
such fragile grounds, the atrocities of the “weak” seem natural, inevitable responses to 
oppression, and the reactions of the strong…appear morally indefensible.”29 
Consequently, this makes it more difficult to define terrorism because many groups 
accused of terrorism insist that they are freedom fighters. Furthermore, some of those 
labelled terrorists like Nelson Mandela later became Presidents and respected 
international figures. 
 
                                                 
28 Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. 
29 Rapoport, David, C. ‘Terror and the messiah: an ancient experience and some modern parallels,’ in The Morality 
of Terrrorism: Religious and Secular justifications, David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), Pergamon 
Press, 1982 pg 17 
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Other nationalist terrorist groups have been involved in terrorism but their aim is to 
secede from their respective countries for example the Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
seeks to create a Basque homeland separate from Spain, and the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party, which seeks to create a Kurdish state independent from Turkey. At the same 
time, other nationalist groups resist foreign occupation and domination for example, 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fights against Israel occupation of its 
land. 
 
In the case of state terrorism, the state is the one that carries out terrorist attacks on its 
people. State terrorism can take forms of oppression and repression, where the 
government denies its citizens their rights and there is no space for political activity. 
State terrorism can also be instances when the state uses deliberate acts or threats of 
violence to create fear and compliant behaviour in the victims.30 Many governments 
have used state terror as an effective tool to shape the media, interest groups, and 
political parties and with this they influence the citizens to accept their policies. In 
Kenya, the former government of President Daniel Moi used state terrorism to 
influence elections when sponsored militia terrorised opposition candidates and their 
supporters. These militias unleashed violence in various parts of the country and the 
government explained that the violence was between different ethnic groups hence 
termed it as “tribal clashes” so as to hide the fact that it had sponsored them. 31 What 
consists of state terrorism depends on who wields the power and as Michael Stohl 
argues, “…by convention…great power use and the threat of the use of force is 
normally described as coercive diplomacy and not as a form of terrorism…though it 
commonly involves the threat and often the use of violence for what would be 
described as terrorist purposes were it not great powers who were pursuing the very 
same tactic.”32 Thus, though the Kenyan civil society viewed the violence as state 
terrorism, the government using its apparatus like the media portrayed the violence as 
“tribal clashes,” and it was able to influence the citizens who did not see the state’s 
hand in it. 
                                                 
30 John Richard Tackrah Encyclopaedia Of Terrorism And Political Violence, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987,  p. 
237 
31 For more information, see Human Rights Watch, Playing with fire: Weapons proliferation and human rights in 
Kenya, HRW, 2002; Republic of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic 
Clashes in Western and other parts of Kenya, Government of Kenya, 1993 
32 Michael Stohl, ‘States, Terrorism and State Terrorism,’ in Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, Current 
Perspectives on International Terrorism, London: Macmillan publishers, 1988 
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Religious terrorism is an old phenomenon and has taken various forms over the years. 
Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely 
commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring 
about sweeping changes according to the groups religious orientation. Religious 
terrorists come from many major faiths, as well as from small cults for example Aum 
Shinrikyo. Scholars explain that when faced with poverty, social injustice, political 
oppression among other problems, human beings seek solace in religion and divine 
intervention. The religious leaders thus look for solutions to the problems and this can 
be through educating and mobilising the people to agitate for their rights or engage in 
political violence to oust the authoritarian regime.33 Another way that the leaders 
address the problems is through prophesying the end of the world, such that the 
problems will end.  For example, the March 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo’s 
subway system by Aum Shinriyko was motivated by the group’s leader to help 
provoke a world-wide apocalypse.  
 
If religious terrorists do not resort to violence, they engage with the ruling elite since 
it is the one that controls institutions like schools, which can be used to propagate 
their message. They can also vie for office and slowly influence the government from 
within its ranks. Involvement and participation in politics marks a turning point for 
the group to embrace political ideals and thus use religion only as an ethnic identity. 
This mix of religion and secularism is what Mark Jurgensmeyer, calls ethnic religious 
nationalism34 and notes, “One of the greatest differences between the goals of 
religious nationalists is the degree to which religion is an aspect of ethnic 
identity…and the degree to which it is part of an ideological critique that contains an 
alternative vision of political order.”35 Thus, in the case of Northern Ireland, the 
conflict is divided along religious lines with Republicans (who seek to abolish the 
Northern Irish state and unify the north and south of Ireland) being Catholic, and 
loyalists (who seeks to maintain Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom) 
Protestant. Though both sides use religion to propagate their agenda, the conflict is 
                                                 
33 Pottenger, John, R. ‘Liberation theology: its methodological foundation for violence,’ in The Morality of 
Terrrorism: Religious and Secular justifications, David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander (eds), Pergamon Press, 
1982 pg 100 
34 Juergensmeyer, Mark, ‘The worldwide rise of religious nationalism,’ in Journal of International Affairs, 50 
Number 1, 1996 pg 2 
35 Ibid pg 4 
  
 19 
largely a political one. In this case then, religion signifies their membership in terms 
of geographical status rather than their motivations and though religion is important it 
is not the main motivation. It should however not be lost that there are other groups 
for whom the religious imperative is foremost, and thus can correctly be considered 
religious terrorists. 
 
It is noted that there is a blur between religion and politics and this is expressed in two 
different forms. In the first case, religion can be politicised, meaning there can be 
attempts to apply political solutions in the form of political violence through terrorism 
to religious problems. The second way is when there are attempts to apply religious 
solutions to political problems and this also can be through terrorism. Such attempts 
involve efforts to justify the violence, and attract and motivate terrorists, through 
religious rhetoric.36 One of the groups that has applied the second way is Al-qaeda 
which though having a political agenda of creating an Islamic state, it uses religion to 
motivate its adherents and engage in terrorism. It is through this way that Al-qaeda 
has been able to carry out trans-national terrorism. 
 
According to Kruger, transnational terrorism is when terroris t acts are carried out by 
individuals and organisations on their own initiative with or without the support of 
sympathetic states which they are citizens or not.37 Thus, it is propagated by citizens 
of one country on another country, making it trans-national. It is a higher projection of 
International terrorism and Al-qaeda has arguably popularised it in its operations. 
  
The September 11 attacks were a clear case of trans-national terrorism and they 
propelled U.S. to tackle the problem of terrorism as a priority. Previously, the group 
was attacking American interests in other countries and this was the first time that the 
attacks were carried out in America. The “war on terror,’ was a consequence of the 
attacks, and by engaging in it, America had two main purposes. One, it was revenging 
the attacks and subsequent deaths of Americans and secondly, it was driven by the 
fear that future terrorist strikes might be even more deadly and even employ weapons 
of mass destruction. The threat of terrorists possessing and using weapons of mass 
                                                 
36 Center for defense information, ‘Explaining religious terrorism part 2: Politics, religion and the suspension of the 
ethical,’ in http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2384#_ednref11 
37 Kruger, T. J. ‘Responding to terror – International Law under attack?’ A paper presented at Pretoria University 
during on a discussion on ‘Terrorism and counter terrorism in Africa.’ See http://www.up.ac.za/academic/cips/ 
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destruction is the primary issue that made President George Bush and his coalition of 
the willing engage in the “war on terror.” Hence, the war intended to dismantle the 
terror network and cripple terrorist operations. 
 
1.3 Addressing human rights and terrorism in Kenya 
Kenya has been hit thrice by acts of terrorism - in 1980 when a bomb destroyed the 
ballroom of the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel in Nairobi; August 7 1998 when the U.S 
Embassy was bombed; and November 28, 2002 when terrorists attacked the Israel 
owned Kikambala Paradise hotel in the Coast Province. In all the cases, most of the 
casualties were Kenyans. Thus, it is correct to say that Kenya has borne the brunt of 
terrorism. Even though various reasons have given to explain the attacks, it is noted 
that terrorist cells exist especially in the coastal part of Kenya. This is mainly seen as 
being an impact of Kenya neighbouring those States that habour terrorists. 
 
This study notes that Kenya is in a very strategic place as regards the “war on terror.” 
In the Great Horn of Africa, Kenya is the regional power broker, and has an influence 
over countries that U.S regards as harbouring terrorists. It is has successfully mediated 
the Sudan and Somali peace processes, countries which have been housing terrorists. 
The problem of state failure has been of outmost importance in the age of terrorism as 
failed states have conditions that give rise to both ‘in-house’ terror and international 
movements.38 As is noted, “The absence of local authority not only allows use of 
African territories by external actors, but permits the activities of paramilitaries in 
terrorising local populations.” Thus, while discussing terrorism in Kenya, it is vital to 
note the impact of Sudan and Somalia as weak and failed states respectively and how 
easy it is for terrorist cells to grow in those countries. The research notes that this has 
had an impact on terrorism efforts in Kenya and hence it is vital that Kenya tries to 
find lasting peace in the two countries. 
 
Since independence, Kenya has been ruled by autocratic leaders who have twisted the 
Constitution to favour the ruling elite and people from their ethnic groupings. Until 
1991, Kenya was a single party regime and there was no clear separation of powers 
between the three arms of government. In the same year, the constitution was 
                                                 
38 Herbst, Jeffrey and Greg Mills, ‘Africa and the War on Terror,’ South African Journal of International Affairs, 
Volume 10, Issue 2, 2003 pg 31 
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amended to allow the country to return to a multi-party system of governance. After 
that, there have been several Constitutional amendments aimed at removing 
oppressive laws that had been enacted over the years for example sedition and 
detention laws. However, these reforms were no t adequate to cater for the human 
rights void that was present in governance and the civil society urged for a complete 
constitution review. This started in 2001 when the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission was established mandated to come up with a new constitution. 39 
 
It should be noted that in the 2002 general elections, Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) that had ruled since 1963 was ousted from power and an opposition 
coalition, National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) took power. The elections were hailed 
by the international community as free and fair and they represented an opportunity 
for the country to consolidate its human rights gains and build democratic structures. 
This hope of democracy was further expounded by members of NARC who 
campaigned and voted for under the banner of human rights, good governance and 
fighting corruption. It should also be emphasised that the leadership of the coalition 
was made up of human rights lawyers and activists who had for long fought for 
human rights and democracy in Kenya and thus, it was widely believed they would 
ensure the country was ruled in a just manner. However, as the research findings 
show, human rights in Kenya are being sacrificed in the country’s fight against 
terrorism. 
 
This study also notes that Kenya is influenced by world politics and by drafting the 
Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003, Kenya was adhering to the U.N.’s call for nations 
to enact measures including legislation that address terrorism. The government 
however has shelved the draft bill after it drew outrage from the civil society and 
Muslim community who alleged that it was discriminatory against Muslims and 
curtails the political and civil rights of Kenyans. Due to this outrage, the Law Society 
of Kenya and Kenya National Commission on human rights have each drafted 
different bills in the context of the human rights issues raised by the Muslims and 
civil society. This is my point of investigation, which is guided by the premise that to 
                                                 
39 The draft constitution is being debated due to various contentious issues especially to do with Presidential 
powers. 
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cope with terrorism, the nature of response by society and by the authorities is of 
paramount importance and issues of human rights top the agenda. 
 
Available literature on terrorism in Kenya has mostly focused on the effects of 
International Relations after September 11 and little attention has been paid to the 
impact on human rights in Kenya. My study seeks to fill this vacuum. I intend to 
make one of the first contributions to study the impact of the “war on terror” on 
human rights especially on emerging democracies like Kenya. Hence, I hope to make 
my own contribution in the academic debate of how to resolve the dilemma that has 
emerged in fighting terrorism and protecting human rights, especially in Kenya. It is 
my hope that this study will contribute and shed some light in finding a way in which 
the Kenyan government can put in place measures to curb terrorism and at the same 
time respect human rights. In a wider scope, my study will make an addition to the 
limited but growing body of literature on terrorism and human rights. 
 
The fieldwork conducted presents new data and information of the dilemma that 
Kenya faces in ensuring national security and protecting human rights. It is my hope 
that ideas generated by this research will prove valuable in providing sufficient 
knowledge and forum for scholarly debate that can help the Kenyan government as 
well as other governments and affiliated institutions to curb terrorism as well as 
promote, protect and advance the enjoyment of human rights. 
 
1.4 Chapter outline  
This research report makes its arguments over several chapters. The following chapter 
outlines the methodology used to obtain data and analyse it. It discusses the 
importance of using qualitative research and also the problems that manifest 
themselves in the doing the research. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a background for the main argument presented in this research 
report. It discusses the arguments that have been forwarded to explain the September 
11 terror attacks and the human rights concerns that have arisen due to the “war on 
terror.” In addition, it theoretically engages in interrogating the various U.N. 
resolutions and other documents that have been enacted to address terrorism.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 give the contextual background that informs this research. In chapter 
4, the Kenyan context as regards terrorism is addressed when various factors that led 
to the 1998 and 2002 bombings are explored. It then proceeds and lays out how the 
bombings occurred and the national as well as international response to them. Chapter 
5 elaborates how the September 11 attacks occurred and how America and Kenyan 
governments responded to them. It then outlines the onset of the “war on terror,” that 
has greatly informed this research report. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 are an analysis of the field research findings. They focus on how the 
“war on terror” as discussed in chapter 5 has had an impact on human rights in Kenya. 
To do this well, Chapter 6 gives a background to the human rights gains that Kenya 
has made over the years. In doing this, it notes that after the 2002 transition in Kenya, 
it was widely believed that it was an opportunity for the country to consolidate its 
human rights gains. This is contrasted with the various methods that the government 
has employed to address terrorism and how they have impacted on the human rights 
situation in Kenya. To continue the debate, chapter 7 analyses the draft Suppression of 
Terrorism bill 2003 that is supposed to legislate against terrorism and analyses the 
human rights concerns arising from it. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the arguments presented by noting that the human rights gains 
made in Kenya throughout the years are in the danger of being eroded by the anti-
terrorism campaign since it is disregarding them. The research report then makes a 
case for the observance of human rights in Kenya while the government is tackling 
terror since the language of rights is the only “universally available moral vernacular 
that guarantees the oppressed a right to exist”40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Ignatieff, Michael ‘Are human rights defensible?’ Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2001 Vol 80 Number 6 pg 116 
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Chapter two 
\Methodology 
 
2.1 Conceptual context: locating “war on terror” in the Kenyan setting. 
 
Qualitative rather than quantitative methodology was extensively used in the 
collection of data and analyzing it for the purposes of this study. While discussing the 
place of qualitative research in social science, Lawrence Neuman noted that the 
context is critical for understanding the social world.41 This means that the importance 
of meaning of a social action depends on the context in which it appears. In other 
words, parts of social life are placed into a larger whole picture that forms the context. 
Thus, when the action is removed from the context, the social meaning and 
significance attached to it are distorted. The field work employed in this research 
report stems from that point of the context being critical and thus interrogates Kenya’s 
anti-terrorism efforts in the larger picture of the “war on terror”, while focusing on the 
distinct nature of the Kenyan context. 
 
Qualitative research involves the use of data where the researcher records real events, 
what the people say, observes their behaviour and studies written documents and 
visual images. He then proceeds and places this findings in the larger context that they 
occurred.  This is what has been referred to as ethnomethodology. 42 In essence it 
means that the researcher studies the everyday reasoning of the people, empathizes 
with their plight and gets to know why they act in a certain way. It is only by doing 
this that he can be able to deduce correct conclusions in the study. As it is noted, “the 
researchers mind is open to absorb everything inherent. It allows one to get untapped, 
rich resources of data and also provides for multiple interpretations of reality and 
alternative interpretations of data.”43 The researcher hence is able to get these data by 
studying the written documents, interviewing people, observing them, among other 
things. In this study, the researcher in discussing Kenya’s draft anti-terror bill and 
anti-terrorism measures did so with the understanding that they are influenced by the 
U.N. resolutions and its charter that call upon States to legislate against terrorism but 
                                                 
41 Neuman, Lawrence, Qualitative and quantitative approaches, Allyn and bacon, 2nd edition 1992 pg 331 
42 Blaikie, Norman, Approaches to social enquiry, Polity Press, 1993 pg 208 
43 Maxwell, Joseph, ‘ Designing a qualitative study,’ Handbook of applied social research methods, Leonard 
Bickman and Debra J. Rog, (eds), sage publishers, 1998 pg 474. 
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to ensure human rights take precedence in these efforts. At the same time, Kenya’s 
draft bill and anti-terror measures are placed in the wider context of the “war on 
terror”, which necessitated the actions. In interrogating these efforts, this study locates 
them in Kenya’s context of its experience with terrorism as well as its struggle for 
democracy. 
 
In analysing data, qualitative research takes assumptions about social life and thus 
research that employs this method gives a reader a feel of particular people and events 
in concrete settings. This is because the data gathered focuses on subjective meanings, 
metaphors and symbols as well as description of specific cases.44 In other words, it is 
an attempt of capturing aspects of the social world, which can be difficult to be 
expressed as numbers. This is done by finding out the views of the people being 
studied, how they define and understand their situation and what it means to them. 
Through understanding these personal reasons one can be able to understand the 
reasons for the social actions taken by the people. After understanding the reasons for 
their actions, this is placed in the specific context. In this research, the study of 
Kenya’s road to democracy was important in evaluating the people’s opposition to the 
draft anti-terror bill. This is because the draft bill is being viewed by Kenyans in the 
context of the struggle for human rights and democracy that they feel is under threat 
from it. 
 
As earlier noted this study argues that human rights can be used to challenge power 
relations and thus resists oppression and inequality. Neuman still discusses the role of 
qualitative research in power relations arguing that research findings may raise 
questions regarding power and inequality. 45 This is because when the people being 
studied are oppressed, they tell the researcher their plight and the researchers then can 
translate these stories into action oriented reports.46 When the reports are put into the 
public domain, the issues can be debated and causes the government to act and in this 
way, the research findings have challenged power. At the same time, it can be argued 
that the findings may sustain power relations in that they may favour the status quo 
arguing that changing or altering it will not be viable. 
                                                 
44 Neuman, Lawrence opcit, pg 329 
45 ibid pg 330 
46 Hammersley, Martyn, The politics of social research, Sage publications, 1995 pg 107 
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This study was motivated by the challenge that the Kenyan government faces in its 
quest of protecting human rights while ensuring national security. It noted how 
globally the “war on terror” has been defined and shaped by America and many 
countries have been pressurised to conform to the U.S. way of dealing with terrorism. 
However, this poses a problem since terrorism is unique to different countries hence 
anti-terror techniques are context specific. In this regard, Kenya is no exception as it 
will be later seen in the study from the tensions and controversies that have arisen due 
to the publication of the draft Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003 and other anti terror 
measures that the government has adopted. This study thus was motivated by the 
researcher’s premise that to protect national interests in the “war against terror,” 
protection of human rights is paramount. This approach arises from the fact that 
researchers using ethnomethodology research construct the social world through their 
interpretation of data and this influenced by their social settings and values. In this 
regard, it is noted that the data gathered and analysed in this research report provides 
an argument on how Kenyans thorough invoking the rights language have been able 
to challenge power relations and force the government to redraft the anti terror draft 
bill. 
 
One of the hallmarks of qualitative research is that it uses a case study approach 
where information on one or several cases are studied and then interrogated. The use 
of a case study enables the researcher to deeply know the society under study since he 
is involved with it in the people’s lives and actions and thus is able to locate their 
daily lives in a larger context. Hence, using the case study design, both primary and 
secondary sources of data were extensively utilized to gather data. According to 
David de Vaus, the task of the case study researcher is fundamentally theoretical. 
Collecting and analyzing information must be guided by theory. 47 In this instance the 
debate that there is tension between protecting human rights while ensuring national 
security in the “war on terror” is the basis of the research. Using Kenya as a case 
study, this argument is tested by the field research findings and also compared to 
other theories so as to give it meaning. Case studies can involve the collection of a 
vast amount and this information must be carefully processed and distilled before it is 
                                                 
47 Vaus, De, Research design in social research, Sage publications, 2001 
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presented. This applies to the case study being undertaken. Different data collection 
methods were used and because of this, there generated several different results. 
However, these differences were used as valuable sources of information about social 
life that needs to be differently analysed. 
 
This research report takes the transcendental approach of qualitative research, 
meaning that its research questions emanated from the people being studied and thus 
treats them as creative and independent human beings, who can make sound 
judgments.48 It thus holds that people create and define the social world through their 
interactions hence their social actions “have a bearing on the everyday social process 
of constructing meaning”49 because meaning is socially constructed. Thus, the 
research observes that Kenyans in their opposition to the government’s anti -terrorism 
measures is shaped by their world and thus they can be able to deduce what the 
measures mean to them for example various articles in the draft bill are seen as a 
return of provision for human rights abuses that were rife in the 1980’s. This means 
Kenyan’s experience of the oppression in the 1980’s shaped their understanding of the 
draft bill. However, this does not mean that it is only the immediate surroundings and 
history that influence the people, but also other world affairs have a bearing on how 
Kenyans interpret and act on various issues. 
 
One of the key elements of qualitative research is that it does not assume a single 
view of reality, and this means that the researcher does not follow a set path of 
collecting data. Thus, he is allowed to go forward or backward, in circles gathering 
data and gaining new insights. In the end, there emerges a sequence or correlation of 
information and data from which sound conclusions can be made. This means that the 
researcher interacts different research components of the study in a way that they 
harmoniously affect each other and the advantage of this is that it allows the 
researcher space to modify research questions in response to the data gathered or 
changes in the area under study. 50 In this report, the data collected was not done in a 
rigidly structured process but was dictated by what was happening in the field. In this 
regard, the amount of data collected to a large extent depended on its availability as 
                                                 
48 Neuman, Lawrence, opcit pg 229 
49 ibid pg 346 
50 Maxwell, Joseph, opcit, pg 70 
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well as accessibility. This ranged from the documentary evidence to interviews 
conducted. 
 
Although case studies are useful in generating qualitative information that enables 
researchers to understand a process in greater detail it is difficult to generalise the 
findings.  This is particularly the case when only one case study is undertaken. In this 
case, the study specifically looked at anti-terror efforts in Kenya and its human rights 
situation. Thus, the findings are very context specific and cannot be used to refer to 
another country other than Kenya at the time that the research was done. However, the 
findings of this case study can be used in comparative studies with other countries in 
the world 
 
2.2 Data collection 
a) Documentary research 
The Kenya Human Rights Network, (KHURINET) which is the umbrella that human 
rights NGO’s rally under, has been carrying out a campaign against the draft anti-
terrorism bill. The researcher obtained press releases, published and unpublished 
papers, memo’s and letters presented to the government. This data helped to show the 
concerns raised by K-HURINET as regards the draft bill and treatment of suspects. 
The documents also served to highlight the tensions that have cropped up with the 
publishing of the draft bill. 
 
People against Torture (PAT), a non-governmental organisation in Kenya has been 
documenting the treatment of terrorism suspects since 2003. The researcher was able 
to access written statements from suspects detailing their treatment while in custody. 
The statements used are for Mr. Feisel, Abdul Rogo, Omar Said,Salmin Mohamed 
Hamis, and Mohamed Sadi Odeh. 
 
Policy documents like draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003, U.S. National security 
strategy, 2002 which is the blueprint of America’s “war on terror” also formed part of 
the documentary data as they provide the official communication as regards the war 
on terrorism. These official documents have been analysed and treated as social 
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products51 emanating from a particular social setting and not relied on uncritically as 
sources of information. 
 
Other documentary materials used in this study include newspapers cuttings, 
magazine articles published that show the concerns of people as regards terrorism in 
Kenya and the measures taken by the government. The newspaper cuttings and 
magazine articles also give a clear picture of how the “war on terror” is being carried 
out internationally. In addition, the researcher has used written statements from the 
suspects that were submitted to the human rights NGO’s detailing their treatment 
when arrested and interrogated by police. 
 
b) Interviews 52 
Primary data was obtained from the field through semi-structured conversations and 
carrying out interviews with people suspected of being terrorists’ but were released 
after the State dropped their cases. The use of unstructured interviews was an 
approach that enabled the researcher to cover sensitive matters and get detailed 
responses from the interviewee. This was through the ability of the researcher to have 
space for asking extra relevant questions not planned for but arose as the interview 
progressed. 
 
The people interviewed detailed their experiences when they were arrested and 
provided further insight into how security agents in Kenya are treating terrorism 
suspects and whether the suspects’ rights were abused or the due process of arrest and 
interrogation was followed. A total of four suspects were interviewed but only 
Akhmed Mohamed Surur agreed to be identified by name. 
 
The interviews began with questions about identity. The questions then asked 
informants about their religion, their language and the crime for which they were 
arrested and charged as well as their treatment when they were in police custody. The 
personal details like religion and ethnic identity helped to trace a pattern of the 
various groups targeted for arrest in suspicion of being terrorists. In addition, the 
                                                 
51 Hammersley, M and Atkinson, P, Ethnography: principles in action . 1995, London, Routledge pg 168 
52 All the interviews were done in Nairobi by the researcher in July 2004. 
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questions were structured in a way to obtain data that reflect their social mobility, and 
education to get the holistic idea of their treatment while in custody. 
 
Problems however arose when interviewing the suspects. Some of them told 
exaggerated stories or had some details missing out. This anomaly was corrected by 
going thorough the contentious statements again, checking where there are 
contradictions and clarifying issues with the informants. At the same time, some could 
not remember or feared saying what exactly happened due to fear of retribution from 
the security forces. Nevertheless, these gaps were filled by the researcher being able 
to pick out the consistencies in the various testimonies thus highlighting them as clear 
examples of human rights violations. In other words, the testimonies were evaluated 
on their basis of fitting to the larger picture of the study. At the same time, the 
researcher guaranteed confidentiality in situations where the people did not want to be 
identified by name. 
 
Officials from the human rights NGOs and lawyers representing suspected terrorists 
also formed part of the interviewees and apart from trying to correspond what the 
suspected terrorists said they provided an insight into the legal mechanisms of dealing 
with terrorism in Kenya. The questions asked were both open ended and closed and 
addressed the dilemma of balancing between respecting human rights while at the 
same time preventing terrorism in Kenya. Those interviewed included Beatrice 
Kamau who was coordinating the campaign against the draft Suppression of terrorism 
bill 2003, Miriam Kahiga (Co-ordinator of Amnesty International, Kenya Chapter), 
and Al Haj Ahmed Isaack Hassan (an advocate of the High Court of Kenya). 
 
Government agencies formed a substantial part of the interviews as they make policy 
regarding terrorism. Drafts people from the Attorney General’s office were 
interviewed so as to get information on the origins of the ant i-terror bill, how it was 
drafted, and the concerns they had when they came up with it.53 The questions were 
open ended and sought to find out whether the draft bill was a result of social 
struggles and Kenya’s experience with terrorism or it was a result of other 
                                                 
53 They requested that their names be withheld for legal reasons. 
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international forces. In addition, they sought to try and find out the government 
position regarding the draft Suppression of terrorism Bill 2003. 
 
At the same time, the researcher interviewed Andrew Kabetu, the head of the anti-
terrorism unit, which is the police organ that principally deals with terrorism. This 
sought to corroborate what the suspects said regarding their treatment while in 
custody and at the same time get to know the difficulties that the unit has while 
carrying out its duties. 
 
Interviewing the above people is what Neuman calls “elite interviews,”54  and some 
problems arose. On of them is that most were unavailabe due to tight work schedules 
so they kept on rescheduling interview times and dates time and again. On other 
times, it was hard to get access to them due to bureaucracy and many gate keepers in 
their respective organizations. 
 
Nevertheless, the information obtained from the government organs, NGO’s, lawyers 
representing suspected terrorists provided a layout on how the “war on terror” has 
impacted on the protection, promotion and preservation of human rights in Kenya. In 
addition, the researcher benefited from attending a colloquium of Eastern and 
Southern African countries on measures to combat and eliminate terrorism that took 
place in Nairobi, Kenya on 4th-6th July 2004. The colloquium was organised by 
L’etwal International, a foundation for Law and Policy for contemporary problems. 
All the information obtained during the research aimed at answering the key question, 
that is, how has the “war on terror” shaped human rights in Kenya? 
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Chapter three 
In the trail of terrorism 
Terrorism is an old phenomenon but its manifestations and tactics have changed over 
the years. The word terrorism originated during the French revolution which began in 
1789 and the Jacobin reign of terror in France (1792-1794).55 Today, terrorism is 
often used as a political weapon to bring attention to a group’s goals or to gain those 
goals. The statement, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” 
summarises the obstacles of coping and defining terrorism. The matter of definition 
and conceptualization is usually a purely theoretical issue but due to the different 
manifestations of terrorism over time, it has been difficult to find a standard definition 
of the term ‘terrorism.’ Any effort to formulate to do so has been fraught with 
historical, political, religious and ideological biases. 
 
This chapter reviews the problem of defining terrorism and interrogates the U.N. 
resolutions and provisions of the African Charter that have tried to address this 
problem. It at the same time looks at the reasons that have led to the growth of 
terrorism and terrorist activities and trace the growth of Al-qaeda, which arguably is 
the most visible and active terrorist group today. To do this, the chapter locates Al-
qaeda as an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group whose influence has been felt 
worldwide. However, it is noted that there are several forms of Islamic 
fundamentalists. There is the institutionalised ruling Iranian hierarchy, the pre-
emptive Saudi fundamentalists and finally the Al-qaeda network56.  
 
The place of human rights in the “war on terror” has also informed this chapter when 
it addresses the importance of human rights in combating terrorism. To effectively do 
this, it is noted that there is a tension between protecting human rights and ensuring 
national security. This is because terrorism is a violation of human rights and hence 
some governments may be tempted to limit the rights, which enable terrorists to 
operate for example freedom of association. However, the chapter also observes that 
the best guarantor of national security is protection and respect of human rights. 
                                                 
55 Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty –First Century (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1997) and Andrew 
Sinclair An Anatomy of Terror: A History of Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 2003) P 71-72 
56 Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy terror, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003. pg 107 
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3.1 A question of definition 
During the colonial rule, some colonial powers used the term to describe liberation 
movements that were against colonialism. In Kenya, the Mau Mau was described by 
Britain as a terrorist organisation and its leader Dedan Kimathi was hanged by the 
British. As late as the 1990s, the U.S. listed the African National Congress (ANC) as 
a terrorist organisation. Nelson Mandela, its leader and later a Nobel Peace laureate, 
was once on the U.S. State Department’s list of international terrorists. At the same 
time, former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, thought that the late Jonas Savimbi and 
Unita were freedom fighters, despite the terror they inflicted on Angolans over the 
years. Hence, the old adage that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom 
fighter. 
 
When the Bush administration began the “war on terror”, definition of a terrorist has 
become loose with Bush calling countries that opposed the war as being part of the 
terrorist groups. This, according to Makau Mutua has made non-western people, 
cultures and those who stand up against western subordination be regarded as 
terrorists.57 This is mainly on certain Islamic traditions and political projects. 
Recently, African countries that have put up anti-terrorism measures have come to 
regard dissenting groups as terrorist organisations and have severely repressed them. 
As I will show later, Kenya’s draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 has given the 
government provision to label dissenting groups as terrorists. 
 
All this shows that definition of a terrorist is ideologically and politically subjective 
and very partisan to whoever is defining it. Since the task of coming with an objective 
definition is elusive, scholars have to do with what Lacquer calls a “minimum 
theory”58 which involves outlining the characteristics of terrorism and terrorist 
activities according to the terrorist event. The lack of a standard definition has been 
blamed for the slow pace of tackling terrorism and thus it is imperative that the search 
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for a definition continues. This will avoid the simplification of the term to a point 
where a terrorist is one who commits violence ‘that we do not approve.’59 
 
The U.N has been caught up in this quagmire and despite concerted efforts, it has not 
been able to formulate a standard definition but it has defined what constitutes a 
terrorist activity. 
 
The General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 on the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
addresses terrorism when it urges states to’ refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.’60  It further asks states not to ‘organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or 
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent 
overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state.’61 
A clear milestone in formulating anti- terrorism conventions came in 1972 after the 
kidnapping and killing of 11 Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games at Munich. 
Then U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim requested that the General Assembly 
include in the agenda of its 25th session an additional item of an important and urgent 
character, entitled ‘Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which 
endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms’.62 As a 
result of the convention, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 
18 December 1972, providing for the setting up of an ad hoc committee, consisting of 
35 members, to study issues relating to international terrorism and to report to it.63 
The work of the committee enlisted debate about terrorism and this led to the General 
Assembly adopting four international conventions that address crimes associated with 
terrorism. These were the convention on the safety of United Nations and Associated 
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Personnel, Convention for the suppression of Terrorist bombings, Convention against 
taking of hostages, Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
internationally protected persons including diplomatic agents. 
 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons (1973) outlawed attacks on senior government officials and 
diplomats terming them as terrorist activities. These were acts that constituted 
intentional murder, kidnapping, or other attacks upon the person or liberty of an 
internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the 
private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person. In addition, 
threats, attempts or being accomplice to commit such attacks were also defined as 
being terrorist activities. The defining characteristics of terrorism were taken further 
when it was passed that any person “who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to 
injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party,” so as 
to gain release of a hostage was committing terrorist activity. 64 In 1980, the unlawful 
possession, use, transfer, of nuclear material, theft of nuclear material, and threats to 
use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial 
property damage was made a criminal activity. This was after realising the potential 
of terrorists coming into possession of nuclear materials that they could use.65 
 
In 1988, hijacking an airplane or a ship by force, threat, or intimidation or performing 
an act of violence against a person on board a ship or airplane was categorised as a 
terrorist activity.66 In addition, placing a destructive device or substance aboard a ship 
or airplane and any other acts going against their safety was defined as an act of 
terrorism. In 1985, the U.N. condemned international terrorism as criminal as well as 
all acts, methods and practices of terrorism no matter where they are committed and 
whoever committed. After September 11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council 
unanimously adopted a resolution on the terrorist attacks in the United States of 
America.67 The resolution condemned the terrorist attacks and called on States to 
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work together to bring justice to the perpetrators of the terrorist activities. At the same 
time, the Security Council committed itself to take any necessary steps to combat all 
forms of terrorism in accordance with the charter. 
 
In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)68 on 14th July 1999 adopted the 
Convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism and the convention came 
into force in December 2002. The OAU convention in its definition of terrorism 
greatly borrows from the U.N. resolutions and conventions. However, in Article 3, the 
convention says that ‘acts that are in accordance with the principles pf international 
law for the peoples liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against 
colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be 
considered as terrorist acts.’69 Africa’s experience with colonialism and foreign 
domination was a huge factor in shaping Article 3 since when the UN charter was 
being formulated, African countries were considered part of the colonial metropolis 
and there was no provision in the charter for self-determination and struggle from 
colonial rule. 
 
Africa has played a crucial and active role in the global fight to combat terrorism. In 
addition to adopting the anti-terrorism convention, the AU has taken steps to establish 
the Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism, which is supposed to come up with 
ways that Africans can use their resources to fight terrorism in the continent. This is in 
the understanding that terrorism manifests itself in its unique way in different places 
and thus the mechanisms for fighting terrorism differ regionally. 
 
The characteristics of terrorists as outlined in the various U.N. conventions and the 
OAU convention are the ones employed in this study in defining terrorism and 
terrorist activities. At the same time, the research notes as Walter Eugene (1969), 
Michael Stohl (1983) and Graham Benton (1982) explain that a terrorist activity is 
characterized by loss of innocent lives, evokes emotional reaction from the victims 
and there are profound political and social effects from the terrorist activity. 
Terrorism forms what Cindy Combs calls ‘a synthesis of war and theatre, a 
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dramatisation of the most proscribed kind of violence that is played before an 
audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear for a political purpose.’70 
 
On the same note, there are different kinds of terrorism i.e. state sponsored terrorism, 
religious terrorism, domestic terrorism, nationalist terrorism and transnational 
terrorism. I will dwell on transnational terrorism, which is terrorism based on the 
principle of non-state-subsidised acts of terror perpetrated by individuals and 
organisations on their own initiative with or without the support of sympathetic states 
which they are citizens or not.71 Thus, it is propagated by citizens of one country on 
another country, making it trans-national. Kruger argues that trans-national terrorism 
is a recent phenomenon and is a higher projection of international terrorism, a view 
also taken by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler (2001). 
 
Terrorism thus is an old phenomenon and though its definition is loaded with 
emotions, the U.N. and A.U. have provided guidelines to combat it. However, it 
emerges that terrorists are motivated by political and social factors that are discussed 
in the next section. 
 
3.2 Reasons for terrorism 
The reasons behind terrorism are diverse and mostly depend with the group involved 
but there are general reasons why terrorist groups commit the acts. It should be noted 
however, that the ultimate aim of terrorists is to pass a message that the group exists, 
it must be heard and the government may ignore it at its own peril.72 
 
For maximum success, terrorists target civilian population so that the government at 
hand is compelled upon by the ir citizens to adhere to the terrorists demands or deal 
with them.73 Together with this is the terrorist’s ability of shocking, instilling fear and 
surprising the government with their activities and usually when a terrorist activity 
takes place a group claims responsibility and sometimes it is a new group unknown by 
the government. Fear is especially employed by terrorists for their own interests. It is 
politically constructed and deployed at different levels to reinforce divisions between 
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nations and communities as well as control and manipulate social and political 
discourses.74 Through their actions, Al-qaeda has created fear and mistrust between 
Muslims and Western liberal democratic countries and statements given by Osama 
have further reinforced the fear e.g. in an audiotape released in October 2002, Osama 
said, “…the young men of Islam are preparing for you something that will fill your 
hearts with terror and will target the nodes of your economy until either you cease 
your injustice and aggression or the quicker of us dies.” Fear has also forced countries 
to change their styles of governance75 by limiting some human rights thus changing 
the lifestyle of people e.g. in the airports one has to be thoroughly checked and 
sometimes it takes a lot of time. Travellers thus have to check into the airport many 
hours before boarding to give time for the checks, something that was not being done 
before the September 11 attacks. At the same time, fear can bring individuals and 
communities together to employ different strategies in response to it.76 This can be 
seen in the many initiatives that countries and individuals have created in response to 
the fear posed by terrorism worldwide. Thus, one can say that fear can be employed in 
a positive manner to bring people together and fight injustices as well as a negative 
manner in which the people’s fears are manipulated for political reasons. 
 
Furthermore, terrorists’ activities aim at winning concessions from the government 
through coercive bargaining characterised by threats, bombing, and kidnappings 
among other tactics.77 Terrorists’ have justified their actions by saying they have 
exhausted all other means available for their grievances to be heard. However, this 
reasoning depends not only on the goals of the movement but also the success of 
different tactics.78 It should be noted that these reasons and tactics used by terrorists 
have also over the years also been used by other groups like guerrilla movements and 
this has made it hard for a distinction to be made between the terrorists and freedom 
fighters. 
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Due to the contestation of who is a freedom fighter or a terrorist, many freedom 
fighters have been branded terrorists but the two are different. In the 20th century, 
guerrilla movements have featured in the struggle against colonialism or against an 
oppressive government. International law recognizes the rights of citizens to oppose 
an existing government militarily to protect human rights, overthrow a dictatorship, or 
establish self- rule.79 Sometimes citizens can only achieve self- rule and enact 
democracy by waging guerrilla warfare against the government e.g. Museveni used 
guerrilla warfare to get to power and instil democracy in Uganda. Though guerrilla 
movements use terrorist tactics, their aims are different but they all seek to induce an 
effect on international and domestic opinion that will be favourable to them. 
Nevertheless, there is still a blurred distinction between the two groups as their 
actions sometimes overlap for example Chechen guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev took 
responsibility for organising the September 1, 2004 Russian school siege in which at 
least 320 hostages were killed, many of them children. This action seems to dispute 
the fact that guerrillas do not target civilians since they depend on them for moral 
support or sometime gathering intelligence, food and weapons supplies among other 
things. 
 
While terroris ts aim at maximising the damage, guerrillas engage legitimate military 
targets while limiting collateral damage to the minimum, including civilian casualties. 
At the same time, guerrillas do not kidnap people for cash ransoms though they can 
kidnap certain personalities for strategic reasons that will serve their ultimate aim. At 
the same time, while terrorists recognise terrorism as the final tool to achieve their 
goals, guerrillas regard terrorist activities as a tool to be discarded or taken up at will, 
as circumstances demand.80 That is why it is easier to negotiate with guerrilla groups 
than terrorist groups. South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) abandoned its 
military campaign and went for negotiations with the apartheid government, a gesture 
that paved way for elections and inception of democratic rule.  
 
It should be noted that it is hard to identify terrorists since they do not have uniform 
or place of operation. However, guerrilla forces mostly have an identifiable badge or 
uniform and their areas of operation are clear. Terrorist groups grow from a small 
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group of insurgents who mobilise, organise and recruit members whom they share the 
same plight. For the group to survive, it has to have the ability of getting popular 
support from the population, capable leaders who can inspire and sustain the members 
and lastly sufficient weapons and money for the activities.81 
 
3.3 Terrorism and Human Rights 
Terrorists engage in violence and cause fear to civilians and destroy civilian 
infrastructure in order to revenge, influence behaviour or punish them. 82 Terrorist 
activities are thus an international threat to the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights. They therefore pose a serious threat to national and international stability and 
security, making it impossible for a state to effectively protect its citizens or property 
in and outside the country because terrorists respect no national borders and regards a 
state, community, diplomat, business or property as potential targets aimed at 
furthering their agenda. 
 
After a terrorist activity has taken place, what matters thereafter is how a government 
reacts in order to prevent further terrorist activity. Governments are tempted to curtail 
most of the human rights and basic freedoms arguing that it is these freedoms that 
enabled the terrorists to operate or they are doing so for the sake on national interest. 
Balancing measures to address terrorism and human rights is the challenge of 
governments, especially in post-September 11. Governments have moved to hastily 
enact emergency legislation after the attacks and this has most of the time overridden 
both established process and rational action, having a negative effect on the 
vulnerable and disenchanted sections of society. 83 
 
The dilemma of balancing between curbing terrorism and ensuing national 
security without infringing on human rights is a challenge facing many 
governments. This dilemma arises from the fact that human rights are a 
construction of the society and they emanate from the social struggles among 
the people. In this regard, they address different power relations and interests in 
society. Since targeting civilians for violent attack is a human rights violation, 
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those who believe in human rights have a direct interest in the success of anti-
terrorism efforts. However, most governments have tended to ignore human 
rights in fighting terrorism. As Kenneth Roth avers, “tendency to ignore human 
rights in fighting terrorism is not only disturbing on its own terms; it is 
dangerously counter-productive. The smouldering resentment it breeds risks 
generating terrorist recruits, puts off potential anti-terrorism allies, and weakens 
efforts to curb terrorist atrocities.”84 It is definite that there is tension between 
human rights and counter-terrorism measures since human rights seeks to ensure 
individual freedom while counter-terrorism measures give power to the security 
agencies over the citizens.85 In order to guarantee national security, protection of 
human rights and continued vigilance is paramount as it will serve to drain the 
energy of terrorists.86 
 
Human rights are a weapon of the weak against the strong and they can challenge and 
sustain power relations since they are socially constructed. This is because the rights 
language is what Ignatieff calls the only “universally available moral vernacular that 
guarantees the oppressed a right to exist.”87 At the same time, it gives the minimum 
standards that a government must hold to in constraining the lives of individuals. Neil 
Stammers argues that over the years, human rights have challenged power right from 
the civil rights movement, 20th century agitation for labour rights and Africa’s quest 
for self determination. 88 Thus, for any struggle to succeed, it must evoke the rights 
language since rights are linked to power through agenda setting, fighting for power 
and shaping beliefs and opinion of people. It is because of their virtue of emanating 
from a struggle that rights have the capacity to be elements of emancipation and can 
advance political aspiration and action. It is vital that anti-terrorism efforts and 
legislations should reflect these struggles. In countries like Kenya which have 
suffered terrorism attacks, the anti-terror tactics should reflect the people’s pain and 
struggle over terrorism and this can be through agitating for laws reflecting their 
experiences as well as their political aspirations. 
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Over the years, it has emerged that governments cannot be left alone to guarantee 
human rights since they have emerged also as rights violators. That is why there is a 
need for constitutionalism and democratic culture to be embedded in a country. 
Constitutionalism limits state power and institutions like courts that are not caught in 
the political struggles ensure that human rights are respected and protect the minority 
from majority rule. Human rights thus are what Mahmood Mamdani calls a ‘legal 
umbrella’ under which minorities seek protection. 89 In post-September 11, the 
challenge of Constitutional institutions to guarantee the rights of minority groups 
cannot be gainsaid. This is so because most anti-terror laws and tactics have geared 
towards certain minority groups and ethnic groups. 
 
Terrorist activities are clearly human rights violations as they undermine 
democratic values and process, rule of law, democratic institutions as well as 
scaring investors thus disrupting businesses and infringing on the peoples 
economic rights. When acts of  terrorism occurs, people’s way of life 
momentarily stops as they have to deal with the casualties and trauma associated 
with the act and sometimes it may take a long time before normal life continues.  
 
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) affirms that “acts, 
methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as well as 
linkage in some countries to drug trafficking are activities aimed at the 
destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening 
territorial integrity, security of states and destabilizing legitimately constituted 
Governments.”90 The declaration thus called upon states to engage in measures 
curbing terrorism in accordance with the charter and respect of human rights. 
 
After the September 11 attacks, the U.N. termed terrorism as a crime against 
humanity. 91 This was a departure of previous arguments that due to lack of standard 
definition of terrorism, it would be hard to categorise terrorism as a crime against 
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humanity. 92 That is why national courts and domestic legislations were left to deal 
with terrorism. While characterizing the September 11 attacks as a crime against 
humanity, the then United Nations High Commissioner for human rights Mary 
Robinson was of the view that this labelling "puts a clear respons ibility on all 
governments to seek out the perpetrators and hand them over to justice, that could be 
through the domestic courts or there could be some kind of tribunal.”93 At the same 
time, the UN passed resolution 1373 (2001) that called upon states to submit their first 
report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), within 90 days and thereafter 
according to a timetable proposed by the committee on steps state parties have taken 
to implement the resolution.94 These measures include enacting anti-terrorism laws, 
tackling money laundering, establishing counter-terrorism bodies in their respective 
countries and ratify anti-terrorism conventions. All these efforts however, have to 
conform to the UN charter and International human rights law. It should be noted that 
the CTC is not a sanctions committee and does not have a list of terrorist 
organisations or individuals but merely guides states in preventing terrorism as well as 
respecting human rights while doing so.  
 
The events that followed after the resolution was passed with countries trying to 
conform to the demands of the UN resolution have made some people argue that the 
events of and after September 11 marked the end era of human rights.95 At the same 
time, the “war on terror” has emerged as the greatest threat to human rights in the 
world as it has been accompanied by large scale violations of human rights.96 Many 
governments in post September 11 have been faced with the dilemma of fighting 
terrorism and ensuring human rights and they have enacted legislation that has 
curtailed civil and political liberties. According to a study done by the Human Rights 
Watch, it has become a common feature for countries to use anti-terror laws to fight 
political dissidents through branding them terrorists.97 By doing this, governments 
have arrested terror suspects, held them indiscriminately at the same torturing them. 
Foreigners are quickly deported back to their home countries after being detained for 
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a long time.98  As Makau notes, the war against terrorism allows states and powerful 
interests to re-define the legitimacy of any struggle, and cast it, if they wish, in an 
unfavourable light, and therefore justify the most extreme measures against it.99 
 
Roger Cotterrel argues that law is an avenue for social struggle that is a part of people 
lives.100 Since it emanates from a society’s history and struggles, this means that it is 
going to be interpreted in various ways according to the society it is being applied. 
However, if the law does not reflect the society’s needs, it suffices that it will not be 
applicable and as it is discussed later, this is the dilemma that Kenya has been 
grappling with its anti- terror legislation. 
 
Furthermore, law expresses and regulates power relations.101 Thus, it is a field where 
power is exercised and the structures like Constitutional courts ensure that all in the 
arena are protected, especially the minority and the best way to guarantee this is to 
invoke the rights language. Human rights provide the best protection for minorities 
because rights are also a product of contestation, meaning that they exercise a 
particular form of power. Thus, one can say that constitutionalism and bill of rights 
provide law and courts with a big role of shaping power relations because they have 
been shaped into an arena of struggle. In the Kenyan context, they have been used to 
challenge arbitrary detentions and discriminative arrests of terrorism suspects. 
 
The UN argues that in times of an emergency that threatens the life of a nation - and 
the existence of such an emergency is officially proclaimed - States can, under Article 
4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the covenant "to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with 
their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin". 102  
However, Article 4 does not allow derogation of certain fundamental rights including 
freedom from being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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punishment.  The recognition in the charter of the United Nations of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all member States is the foundation 
of freedom and justice. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and 
freedom from fear can only be achieved if conditions are created where everyone 
enjoys civil and political rights and this should be the guiding principals in the fight 
against terrorism. 
 
The African Charter on Human and People’s rights like the UN charter also spells out 
the fundamental human rights. However, it defers with the UN charter in that it does 
not give provision for derogation of rights in emergency cases. Nevertheless, rights in 
the African charter are limited through ‘claw-back-clauses’.103 In case of any 
derogation and limitation of rights, this is supposed to be in direct proportional with 
the situation at hand. 
  
As Makau argues, the “war on terror” has had a detrimental effect on human rights. 
Tactics employed in the terrorism war crushes dissent and virtually eliminates any 
opportunities for a robust dialogue on the scope of human rights, their cultural 
relevance, and the strategies for their enforcement.104 This is because America and its 
allies are defining which rights to exclude and narrow. At the same time, it allows the 
United States to define the opponents of its version of human rights as enemies or 
supporters and sympathisers of global terrorism. 105 So, those who are against 
curtailing civil liberties in the pretext of fighting terror are seen as against America, 
and thus supporting terrorists. In addition, this does not give room for cultural 
relativism of human rights in the respective countries since they will have aligned 
themselves in the dichotomy and not find anti-terror solutions that are relevant to the 
country. 
 
The challenge of upholding human rights in the “war on terror” is as uphill task that is 
fraught with tensions and emotions. However, it is from these contestations that 
individual countries can be able to enact sound legislations that reflect their social and 
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political struggles as well as protect minorities and the vulnerable groups. 
Nevertheless, countries have found themselves unable to balance the challenges of 
national security and respecting human rights. 
 
3.4 In the trail of Al-qaeda 
Every ideology, whether economic, political, or religious, is based on certain features 
that characterise it, which form the fundamental principles of the organisation. For 
example, the fundamentals of modern capitalism are a free market economy and 
private ownership of property; democracy’s fundamental principles are a government 
of the people, for the people and by the people among other things. Hence, 
fundamentalism arises when members who adhere to their fundamental principles 
propagate them while allowing little space for other people to express their views. 
However, the term fundamentalism is almost exclusively used in the context of 
religion and in the 21st Century, there has been a rise in religious fundamentalists. 
Through their actions, fundamentalists aim to reform the society in accordance with 
their religious tenets, change the laws of morality, social norms and political 
configurations.106 In essence, they aim to wholly change the society according to their 
religious whims. 
 
Fundamentalism has been termed a popular religion, 107 where fundamentalists offer 
alternatives to modern life, usually by desiring to achieve a religious, social and 
political agenda that is not being propagated by policy makers and which they feel is 
against their beliefs.  In order to create this alternative society, fundamentalisms 
agenda has been termed as narrow, aiming for maximum effect and minimum 
compromise.108 
 
Religious fundamentalism has three main features. The first is that fundamentalists try 
to control women bodies since women reflect the morality of society. For example, 
the growth of women rights movement has led to the fore issues that empower women 
to choose decisions over their bodies e.g. women now have the right to choose 
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whether to have an abortion or not. However, this has not been taken kindly by some 
fundamentalist groups like the Christian Coalition in the U.S. that is totally against 
women’s right to choose whether to have a baby or not. The same can be said about 
Muslim women wearing veil all the time and their faces are not supposed to be seen 
by other people.109 Thus, by confining women to ‘traditional’ spheres of life where 
they are subordinated is one of the hallmarks of fundamentalism. Secondly, 
fundamentalists most of the time reject political pluralism and want the government to 
rule using the Bible.110 Thus, any decision made has to have religious undertones and 
appointments made are said to be divine. Consequently, there is little chance for 
opposition to grow as it will be interpreted as going against God’s will. Thirdly, 
fundamentalists create links with governments since they realise that it holds over 
institutions which they believe are integral to their campaign to change society e.g. 
schools, parliament, courts. 
 
Hayness notes that the rise of fundamentalism is a response to insecurities posed by 
the post-modernist era. Many people, especially in the third world, view post-
modernism as being synonymous with poverty and high rate of unemployment hence, 
they are receptive to fundamentalists arguments, ‘who have a mobilising ideology.’111 
Within the Christian fundamentalists, they seek to reverse what they see as excessive 
liberalisation and relaxation of social and moral mores. They are normally associated 
with conservative political forces.112 At the same time, Islamic fundamentalist groups 
seek to overthrow the political and social order through violence and establish Islamic 
states.113 Terrorism therefore reflects a pattern of violent action that seeks to disrupt 
the effects of modernisation process and return to the religious set-up. However, it 
should be noted that not all fundamentalists are terrorists since some of the 
fundamentalists groups aim at changing the society through legal means and engaging 
with the government. 
 
For the purposes of this study, we are going to deal with Islamic fundamentalism. At 
the same time, the study notes that is not right to equate mainstream Islamic religion 
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with terrorism committed by extremist groups acting in the name of Islamic beliefs 
since this will further perpetuate prejudice and marginalisation of the whole Islamic 
community. 
 
The 1980’s saw emergence of extreme Islamic movements who were commonly 
inspired by the success of Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 led by Ayatollah 
Khomeni. Khomeni was able to establish the Iranian Islamic state and has been 
accused by Western countries of supporting Islamic fundamentalists who have a 
similar goal. Thus over the years, Islamic fundamentalism has become the biggest 
threat to Western liberal democracy as it directly, ideologically and morally 
challenges it. However, Western governments had a reserved and cautious attitude 
towards Islamic fundamentalism and none wanted to be caught up in its struggle 
against western liberal democracy. 114 Various countries kept a distance hoping the 
heat will subside, while taking minimal measures to keep the situation at bay. This 
was to change on September 11 2001 when Al-qaeda attacked the twin towers. In 
reality, it attacked the epitome of western liberal democracy, signified by the 
Pentagon (Military) and World Trade Centre (trade).115 
 
Al-qaeda is led and financed by Osama bin Laden, who was born to a Syrian mother 
and Yemeni father. Al-qaeda was formed in 1988 to fight alongside the Mujahidin, in 
their war against the Soviets and its motive then was to provide a base for the 
recruitment of Arabs. Osama was able to organise and recruit a lot of Arabs to join the 
war. The Mujahidin and consequently Osama received significant financial and 
military support from various nations and individuals. The United States supported 
the Mujahidin primarily through the CIA by giving them weapons and money. This 
was not controversial since it was during the cold war and compared to the Soviet 
threat, “the relatively new threat of Islamic fundamentalism” was inconsequential, and 
“fighting communism was still first and foremost in the minds of U.S. 
policymakers”. 116 Consequently, “The U.S. ignored the threat of Islamism and used it 
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as a bulwark against communism and revolution” in Afghanistan. 117 In the end, it is 
estimated 35,000 Islamic fundamentalists from 40 Muslim countries came to 
Afghanistan and joined the jihad, contributing to the long-term development of “a 
radical Islamic foreign legion.”118  
 
After the defeat of the Soviets, Osama went to Sudan where with his experience, 
money and weaponry he had got, developed a possibility of waging jihad on America 
and Western interests all over the world. His mission was to establish Islamic law in 
societies, have religious authorities and ideologies play a larger role in governmental 
decision making processes, oppose the secularization of society as well as promote 
sharia law in every sector of society, “with little concern for the religious freedom of 
non-Muslims.119” It was in Sudan that Osama established Al-qaeda and he opened 
businesses in Khartoum to finance Al-qaeda and at the same time recruited many 
followers. By the time he left Khartoum for Afghanistan in 1996, Osama had 
established an Al-qaeda network not only in Sudan but also in neighbouring 
countries.120 
 
Though Osama is the de-facto leader, the Al-qaeda network has four committees: 
military, religious-legal, finance and media.121 These committees co-ordinate the 
people involved in setting up the targets and they do this through four stages. The first 
stage involves surveillance or intelligence gathering, then from the information got, 
the leadership can undertake the next step, which is deciding whether to conduct the 
mission or not.122 Third stage is where the group will gather materials needed for the 
attacks and the last stage is where the team that will actually carry out the attack 
arrives. The network is complex and its terrorist cells are autonomous though they 
have personal links.123 
 
At the same time, Osama has managed to convert domestic terror groups to be wholly 
on its side and wage the Jihad. This is what happened to the Jemaah Islamiya group in 
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South East Asia and it is now seen as part of the Al-qaeda network.124 In addition, 
Osama has co-opted some of the groups and he shares with them intelligence, money 
among other things. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has accused Al-qaeda 
of supporting terrorist groups like HAMAS and Hezbollah in the Middle East or the 
Al- lttihad in Somalia. The linkages and sharing of intelligence is vital for the network 
and its success. At the same time, the terrorist network as a whole has little hierarchy 
and decision making is decentralised allowing local initiative and autonomy125  hence 
the attacks will get the authorities by surprise as only a few people know about the 
mission. Another hallmark of the Al-qaeda is that information is disseminated 
promptly and broadly as desired within the network and to relevant audiences.126 This 
is through the media and it was especially employed during the September 11 attacks. 
Thus, through the media, Al-qaeda is able to gain pub licity and instil fear to the 
public. Another key factor of Al-qaeda is that its operations are properly planned and 
executed and they strike only when they have a high degree of success.127 The Nairobi 
and Tanzania bombings were being planned as early as 1993 but were only executed 
in 1998. 
 
Al -qaeda has changed the way terrorist organisations operate. The use of suicide 
members against political targets has set a new precedent for terrorist operations in 
modern warfare.128  Terrorist attacks committed by suicide bombers are incredibly 
difficult to defend against and are always successful since they have an element of 
surprise. In addition, from the events of September 11, Al-qaeda showed how it is 
ready to use western technology for terrorist purposes. 
 
Since the onset of the war on terror, the Al-qaeda has diversified to other areas since 
its operating base in Afghanistan was destroyed with the toppling of the Taliban 
regime. However, it is clear that the network is still alive with active and sleeper cells 
operating in various countries as seen with the bombings of Madrid in March 2004 
and Kikambala in November 2002. At the same time, the war on terror has enabled 
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Al-qaeda to become an ideology and not just an organisation. 129 Many radical Islamic 
groups have emerged that have aligned themselves with Al-qaeda’s jihad even though 
they are not directly linked with the network. 
 
3.5 Clash of civilisations or clash of fundamentalists? 
Since the attacks of September 11 and the start of the “war on terror,” there has grown 
a body of literature and scholars who argue that the events marked the expected clash 
of civilisations. It is this group of scholars who subscribe to the notion of the clash of 
civilization as propagated by Samuel Huntington. Huntington argues that with the end 
of the cold war, culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are 
civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and 
conflict.130 He notes that after the cold war, conflict between groups in different 
civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts 
between groups in the same civilization. These conflicts are most likely and most 
dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars and the paramount axis 
of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest". 131 In addition, 
he notes that the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their 
countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing 
this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future thus will be between the West 
and several Islamic- Confucian states.132 Thus, the attack on the twin towers 
according to those who subscribe to the notion of ‘clash of civilizations ’ was the 
culmination of the conflict between Western identity and Islam. This has been further 
expounded by the Bush doctrine of dividing the world into two when he said either 
countries join America in the terrorism war or they be branded as supporting 
terrorists. By this, he literally divided the West, this being those who formed the 
coalition of the willing as well as their supporters and the rest of the world who were 
opposed to the war. 
 
However, the notion of ‘clash of civilisations’ has come under stiff resistance from 
other scholars who argue that America is trying to forcefully spread western liberal 
democracy and this is what led to the September 11 attacks. Western liberal 
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democracy is what Tariq Ali calls the “new religion” and he faults America for trying 
to force it on different countries thus propagating what he terms as ‘American 
Imperialism.’133 He argues that even if most Muslim countries are authoritarian and 
are supposed to democratise their countries, they should do so in their own ways and 
not be forced to adhere to America’s western liberal democracy. Hence, this will 
mean ‘opening up the world of Islam to new ideas which are seen to be more 
advanced than what is currently on offer from the west.134 Tariq’s view of ‘American 
imperialism’ is shared by Zarina Patel, who argues that ‘U.S. fundamentalism in all 
forms – military, strategic and economic – is the greatest source of terrorism on 
earth. 135 
 
Another group of scholars like John Gray are of the view that the September 11 
attacks were a manifestation of the failure of Western liberal democracy and not 
actually a clash of civilisations. John Gray argues that the attacks did not only destroy 
the world trade centre and pentagon and killed thousands of people, but it destroyed 
the West’s ruling myth.  136 He sees the war on terror as a pretext of America to create 
hegemony of Western liberal democracy, denoting a complex of political, cultural, 
and economic arrangements which are rooted in liberal theory and philosophy. 137 This 
civilisation requires some form of political democracy and a free-market system. Gray 
warns that Al-qaeda is a manifestation of the rejection of individualism that comes 
with liberal democracy. That governments have started surveillance over their 
populations as a strategy to counter terrorism has led to loss of individualism and civil 
liberties that liberalism professes to protect, thus the Al-qaeda is in a way winning the 
war.138 
 
Makau Mutua takes the debate further when he warns that the “war on terrorism” 
“targets non-Western peoples, cultures…and is mainly focused on certain Islamic 
traditions and political projects.”139 This, according to him is particularly the case 
when some Arab and Muslim political actors and movements deem American policies 
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in the Middle East and the Muslim world detrimental. He warns that the “war on 
terror” has exposed a deep cultural divide between the West and many in the Islamic 
and Arab World since the West has emphatically put it that “the summit of human 
civilisation can only exist within the perimeters of liberal theory and philosophy.”140 
Hence, “It seems a foregone conclusion: Muslim societies, like all other non-Western 
societies, must modernise, democratise, liberalise, and adopt open, free market 
systems. The message is loud and clear. Islamic societies must Westernise or 
perish.”141 
 
It is a contestation on whether the events of September 11 and thereafter were a ‘clash 
of civilisation’ or ‘clash of fundamentalists.’ What however is clear is that the “war 
on terror” has completely changed the global political landscape. Kenya as part of the 
global system has been influenced by the “war on terror” and it has been a victim of 
terrorist attacks. 
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Chapter four 
Darkness at noon: the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Kikambala 
hotel 
4.1 Introduction 
Kenya has been hit thrice by acts of terrorism. In 1980, a bomb wrecked the ballroom 
of the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel in Nairobi, killing 15 and wounding more than 80 
people. In August 1998, the U.S Embassy was bombed killing 247 people and many 
more were injured. In November 28, 2002 the Israel owned Kikambala paradise hotel 
at the Coast province was bombed and at least 15 people died. Though the targets 
were Western interests, Kenyans bore the brunt of the bombings and questions were 
raised on why the country was a target for terrorist activities. 
 
It has been argued that Kenya has become vulnerable to terrorist activities due to its 
“wait and see” foreign policy. 142 Willy Mutunga notes that Kenya has no official 
foreign policy and it waits for the President to give directions on matters touching on 
foreign policy instead of the Ministry of foreign affairs formulating them.143 This 
leads to government officials making statements or carrying out actions that have led 
to Kenya being viewed as an ally of Western countries. For example, in 1976 
members of the Baader-Meinhof group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Air-France Airliner and its 258 passengers forcing it to 
land in Uganda. Israeli army used Kenya as their operating base in rescuing the 
passengers. During the rescue mission, 20 Ugandan soldiers and all seven hijackers 
were killed alongside three hostages. Four years later, the Israeli owned Norfolk hotel 
in Nairobi was bombed in an action that was seen as a punishment to the country’s 
role in the Entebbe crisis.144 
 
Since 1970, the U.S. has maintained military access agreements with the Kenyan 
government that permit the U.S. military to use Kenyan sea and air bases. During the 
Gulf War, the port of Mombasa was extensively used by the U.S. marines as well as 
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during the U.S. intervention to Somalia in 1992 and the Rwanda humanitarian 
assistance after the genocide. In case of any military activity in the Horn of Africa by 
the U.S., this base will be a centre field. 
 
In addition, Kenya is in a strategic position in East and the horn of Africa. Being the 
regional power broker, it has immense influence over countries that U.S regards as 
habouring terrorists mainly Sudan and Somalia. In geo-political terms, Kenya 
emerges as a relatively stable country and has recently successfully mediated the 
Sudan and Somalia peace processes. Both Sudan and Somalia have been severally 
accused of being hubs for terrorists145 and this has had an impact on Kenya. 
 
This chapter discusses the reasons why Kenya has been a target for terrorist activities. 
To do this, it interrogates the impact of failed and weak states surrounding Kenya 
which have harboured suspected terrorists who are alleged to have build terror 
networks in Kenya. The chapter also establishes the treatment of Muslim population 
in the country by the government and why it could be easy for terrorist networks to 
recruit members from the Coastal region. Lastly the U.S. embassy and Kikambala 
hotel bombings are analysed with a view of establishing how Kenyans reacted to them 
as well as the local and international response. 
 
4.2 Impact of failed and weak states 
a) Sudan 
Since it became independent as a unitary state on 1st January 1956, Sudan has been 
involved in an internal conflict that has made the process of nation building 
impossible. It is a conflict that has claimed more than two millions lives and to some 
extent has destabilized the Horn region. 146 The Khartoum Islamic government 
controls the Northern region while the South is in the hands of the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), successor of Anya Nya II movement. This chronic conflict 
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between the Muslim North and Christian South has led Sudan to be classified as a 
weak state and has given ground for growth of terrorist cells in the country. 
 
In 1993, the U.S. placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism with Osama 
bin Laden having used Sudan as his operating base until 1996 when he went to 
Afghanistan. Osama played the role of both an investor while at the same time 
recruited and trained Al-qaeda members147. Osama had been invited in 1991 to 
Khartoum by the country’s ruling Islamic fundamentalist party, the National Congress 
Party (NCP)148 under its spiritual leader Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. While in Sudan, Osama 
and his agents rented farms and homes that were used to accommodate them and also 
as training grounds for Al Qaeda members.149 The U.S. government later bombed 
Khartoum after the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998 due to this interaction with 
Osama. 
 
In June 1995, members of an Egyptian Islamic group attempted to assassinate 
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt while he was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 
assassination squad was reportedly to have been given safe haven in Sudan where 
they prepared for the assassination and some of the members were also identified as 
Sudanese. In addition, the weapons were flown into Ethiopia by Sudan Airways. 
However, the assassination was unsuccessful, and five of the assassins were captured 
while one fled back to Sudan. The government of Sudan did not deny nor confirm the 
presence of the suspected group and the U.N. Security Council passed three 
resolutions demanding the extradition of the suspects.150 
 
The U.S. State Department report of 1999 accused Sudan of continuing to serve as a 
central hub for terrorist groups and radical Islamist groups including Al-qaeda, 
Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Islamic group, HAMAS and the Abu Nidal 
organisation. 151 It also accused Sudan of supporting other terrorist groups in Algeria, 
Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.152 
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b) Somalia  
In Somalia, since the ouster of the government of Siad Barre in 1991, the country has 
been without a central government and has been declared a failed state.153 Warlords 
and political factions control various territories and factional fights are a daily 
occurrence. In 1991, the Somali National Movement declared the north-west region 
independent and renamed it Somaliland. In the northeast, in Puntland, another group 
is in charge while in the south a number of political warlords claim legitimacy but no 
single group controls it. In 2000, a transitional government was formed but it has not 
been recognised by the international community. In essence, Somalia is a country 
divided along clan lines, and armed factions.  
 
At the same time, there is spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. In mid 
1990’s, Islamic courts that functioned as the government began to emerge in parts of 
the country and governed using the sharia law.154 Al- lttihad Al Islamiya is viewed as 
the most active of all the Islamic groups to integrate into the courts, with its principal 
objective being to establish Somalia as an Islamic state.155 However, the U.S. in 
September 2001 placed the group in its list of terrorist groups and said it had links 
with Al-qaeda. 
 
In early December 2001, the U.S. government raised concerns over the instability of 
Somalia and feared that Al-qaeda operatives would flee into the country from 
Afghanistan. 156 The Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner, stated 
the U.S. has three objectives as regards Somalia.157 First, the U.S. will work with 
neighbouring countries to make Somalia “inhospitable” to terrorist groups and 
secondly, it will ensure that any activities in Somalia would not affect its 
neighbouring countries. Thirdly, the U.S. will work towards a lasting peace and 
economic development in Somalia. This clearly shows the seriousness that U.S. takes 
as regards Somalia and its relation with terrorist activities. 
 
 
                                                 
153 Rotberg, I Robert, ‘Failed states in a world of terror’ in Foreign Affairs Vol 81 July-August 2002 Council on 
Foreign Relations pg 127 
154 Dagne, Ted, opcit, pg 10 
155 ibid 
156 ibid pg 16 
157 ibid pg 16 
  
 58 
4.3 Failed and weak states in the war against terrorism  
Even though the phenomenon of weak and failed states is not new, it has become 
more relevant and worrying with the growth of trans-national terrorism. Robert 
Rotberg argues that failed states are incapable of projecting power and asserting 
authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. 158 
This leaves the country open to any transactions and flow of all manner of illegal 
goods through the porous borders, endangering peace not only in the region but also 
internationally. This is so because international security depends on national 
governments to be stable and authoritative at home as well as deliver what Rotberg 
terms as “political goods.”159 
 
This is the situation that Sudan and Somalia find themselves. Due to the lack of stable 
government and porous borders, illegal arms flow through the borders into Kenya and 
other neighbouring countries, also threatening their stability. The state capacity is 
weak and key interests groups like warlords emerge and are less loyal to the State. 
Consequently, the people are aligned to the different warlords since the social contract 
binding the people and government in non-existent. In the case of Sudan and Somalia, 
it has not helped with the existence of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the country, a 
situation that gives rise to terrorist groups. 
 
For a country to offer a terrorist group protection and operation base, it means there 
are favourable conditions for cells to grow and training of terrorists to take place. The 
government must be willing to protect the terrorists and give them opportunity to 
recruit and train members. At the same time, the terrorist group will need space to 
establish physical infrastructures, develop financial support, and be able to command 
and control operations. The government must be willing to facilitate these activities 
either because they are compatible with its own foreign policies or because the 
terrorists are paying the government for protection. 160 The Sudanese government 
supported Osama’s ideals of bombing Western interests and some Somali warlords 
are sympathetic to Al-qaeda. 
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Another condition for terrorist cells to operate is that the country harbouring terrorists 
must be free of foreign agents who are capable of detecting and challenging the 
terrorist organization and its protectors. The government can do this by cutting off 
relations with other countries, muzzling the press and if the country is a weak or failed 
state the conditions for terrorist cells to grow are very apt.161 In addition, the host 
government must be willing to suffer some measure of isolation, economic and 
political sanctions from other governments wanting to destroy the terrorist network.162 
Both Sudan and Somalia fulfil these conditions as they have poor human rights 
records and have been isolated by the International community through sanctions. 
 
Thus, Kenya has suffered the consequences of being surrounded by Sudan and 
Somalia. Illegal arms are rife in North Kenya, which borders the two countries and 
Kenyans living along the border are constantly attacked by militias from Sudan and 
Somalia. Over time, the illegal arms have found their way into other parts of the 
country resulting to an increase in urban crime. Kenya has a large number of Somali 
populations and is already housing many other refugees from both Somalia and 
Sudan. The country has poor refugee screening mechanisms and terrorists have 
utilised this loophole. It is suspected Al- lttihad has been able to infiltrate some of the 
refugee camps in North Kenya bordering Somalia and established cells there and 
some of the terrorists have consequently made their way into Mombasa.163 
 
Due to the concern of security in the region and threat of terrorist cells growing in the 
country, Kenya has continuously been invo lved in brokering peace in the two 
countries under the auspices of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD). IGAD was founded in Djibouti in 1986 by six African countries: Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda while Eritrea joined the organization in 
1993 after achieving independence in the same year. IGAD has three priority areas: 
food security and environmental protection; political and humanitarian affairs, 
including conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution; and regional economic 
cooperation. 
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IGAD’s search for peace in Sudan dates back to 1993 when the Sudanese government 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed that IGAD 
should assume the task of mediating the peace process. Thereafter, IGAD established 
a Peace Committee under the chairmanship of former Kenyan President, Daniel Arap 
Moi which also had representatives from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda. In 1994, the 
warring parties accepted the Declaration of Principles (DOP) as the basis for 
negotiations. The DOP covers a broad range of areas, including state and religion, 
self-determination, and interim arrangements. It in essence gave the unity of Sudan a 
chance but also allowed the people of south Sudan to opt for autonomy should it 
become necessary. However, the Government of Sudan refused to accept the right of 
South Sudan to pursue self-determination and the peace talks failed. The stalemate 
continued until 2001 when former President Moi appointed Retired General Lazarus 
Sumbeiywo to spearhead the initial IGAD initiative. This led to the signing of the 
Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002 which defined the relationship between State and 
religion and provided for self-determination exercisable through a referendum. 
 
After the signing of this protocol, other protocols and agreements followed, which 
effectively ended the 21-year war in Southern Sudan through a promise of more 
inclusive government. These included the adoption of the agreement on security 
arrangements during the interim period which was signed on September 25th 
September 2003; the agreement on wealth sharing during the pre- interim and interim 
period signed on 7th January, 2004. Protocols between the Government of Sudan and 
SPLM/A touching on power sharing, resolution of conflict in Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States and on the resolution of conflict in 
the Abyei Area were all signed on 26th May, 2004. In January 2005, the Government 
of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed a memorandum of a New Sudan in Nairobi, where 
John Garang was installed as the first vice-president of New Sudan and the President 
of South Sudan. 
 
As early as 1999, the U.S. government had an interest in the Sudan peace talks when 
then President Bill Clinton appointed former congressman Harry Johnston as Sudan’s 
special envoy. The envoy made several trips to Sudan to rally support for the IGAD 
initiated peace process and by early 2000, serious talks between the government of 
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Sudan and the Clinton administration had began to take place.164 America’s interest in 
finding peace in Sudan continued with the new regime of George Bush who in 
October 2001 appointed Senator John Danforth as special envoy to Sudan. It should 
be noted that the U.S. continued imposing sanctions in the government of Sudan but it 
however embraced more dialogue with the warring parties.165 During the signing of 
the final protocols, the U.S. was represented by Secretary of State Colin Powel who 
travelled to Kenya to witness the signing ceremony. However, the comprehensive 
peace settlement has been threatened by the conflict in the Darfur region where an 
estimated one million people have been made homeless by fighting between mainly 
African rebels and Arab militia. If peace is finally realised in Sudan, it will ensure 
Kenya’s safety from terrorism as the country will have a stable government that will 
be able to police its borders and ensure there is no flow of illegal arms. By ensuring 
stability and a central government as well as democratic institutions, it ensures that it 
will be hard for terrorists to operate from there.  
 
Somalia’s torturous peace journey began in 1991 and has been riddled with many 
hurdles. In mid-1991, the Djibouti government hosted two conferences aimed at 
establishing a government of national unity for Somalia and preventing the country 
from sliding into civil war. However, the talks concluded with the declaration of a 
new national government and this only aggravated a political split within the United 
Somali Congress (USC), a faction based on the Hawiye clan, which had seized 
control of much of south central Somalia, including the capital. 166 The two sides of 
the USC were the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Aidid, and the 
Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) headed by the businessman Ali Mahdi Mohamed 
who then started fighting for control of the capital, Mogadishu. In 1993, the UN tried 
to mediate and congregated Somalia's major faction leaders in Addis Ababa with the 
aim of establishing transitional institutions but this led to more violence with the 
militia of General Aidid fighting with international forces. This violence led to death 
of 18 U.S. forces and the rest of them were withdrawn from Somalia in 1994, 
followed by the UN peace keeping force in 1995.  
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The 1996 Ethiopia conference and another one held in Cairo in 1997 only generated 
transitional national charters but failed to enact institutions to implementing them 
hence did not offer any realistic peace prospects.167 In August 2000, a conference 
convened by Djibouti at the resort village of Arta gave rise to a Transitional National 
Government (TNG) headed by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, a former minister. The TNG 
failed to establish its authority beyond parts of the capital, and in 2001 a coalition of 
Somali leaders called Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) and 
backed by Ethiopia was established as an opposition to the TNG.168 Thus, violence 
continued and peace talks collapsed until October 2002 when Kenya hosted the peace 
talks in Eldoret town. These talks were landmark since they brought together 22 key 
Somalia leaders and consequently on 27th October 2002, some of them signed a 
cessation of hostilities agreement. The leaders then on 15th September 2003 approved 
a draft transitional charter and on 29th January 2004 endorsed a revised transitional 
charter, known as the Safari Park Declaration after the Nairobi hotel which it was 
agreed. Through the declaration, Somalia leaders agreed to end hostilities, a 
transitional charter, and formation of transitional national institutions for five years. It 
is on this basis that a transitional federal parliament was elected in August 2004. The 
following month, the 275-member parliament elected a speaker and on October 10 
2004 Somali held their Presidential elections in Nairobi where Abdullahi Yusuf 
Ahmed was elected as Somalia’s President. The President was sworn in and chose a 
Prime Minister as well as a cabinet.  
 
Though this has been achieved, the country is still far from realising lasting peace 
with the warlords in Somaliland and Puntland have refused to recognise the new 
government. The Republic of Somaliland claims the territory of the former British 
Somaliland Protectorate, which merged with Italian Somalia in 1960 to form the 
Somali Republic, and it declared itself independence from the larger Somalia in May 
1991.The Puntland on the other hand is an autonomous administration that sees itself 
as a future federal Somali republic. At the same time, there are other many warlords 
who are posing a security risk to the country and hindering the enactment of peace in 
the country. Thus, it should be emphasised that it is only through the enactment of 
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lasting peace in Somalia that the threat of terrorism can be minimised if not 
eradicated. Currently, that is not the case. 
 
4.4 The treatment of Kenyan Muslim population 
The Muslim population in Kenya comprise 7-15% of the total population169 and they 
are concentrated in the Coast and North Eastern Provinces. The Somali and Swahili 
are the main ethnic groupings in these regions and they are deeply Muslim. A third 
indigenous Muslim people are the Digo but they are not a huge population like the 
Somali and Swahili. Muslim communities are also found throughout the interior of 
Kenya, in all the major towns and in a number of rural villages, but nowhere in the 
interior are they the dominant population. 
 
The Kenya government has had a good relationship with Muslims and although 
Kenya is a secular state, it has acceded to Muslim demands in the fields of education, 
law, dress code and freedom of worship in schools. However, Muslims still perceive 
that many of their social and educational needs are disregarded, that their cultural and 
religious values continue to be threatened, if not disrespected, and that they have been 
neglected and marginalized politically and economically in the modern Kenya 
state.170 Indeed, the Coast and North Eastern Provinces are less well integrated into 
the modern economy, and are the least developed provinces in the country. 
 
In order to have a voice in government, several Muslims in 1993 formed the Islamic 
Party of Kenya (IPK). The party was led by Sheikh Balala and its aim was to 
propagate the ideals and principles of Muslims as well as run for electoral office. The 
government refused to register it on the grounds that the constitution does not allow 
religious groups to form political parties.171 The party leaders and their supporters 
engaged in demonstrations calling for the party to be registered but the government 
was categorical that IPK would not get a licence and to-date it has not been registered. 
Muslims have never forgotten the violence that was meted out on them by police 
during the demonstrations and many times, memories of IPK are revived when 
politically contested issues arise and they argue that if they had a party of their own 
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they could benefit like other tribes.172 Though the party died naturally, its activities 
for the three years it existed created more radicalisation of Muslims in Kenya. 
 
In 1999, a number of MP’s from the Coast Province touted for the creation of an 
Islamic state or majimboism,173 where Sharia laws would prevail. This 
recommendation was perceived as growing radicalisation of Islam in the region and 
Non-Muslims complained that there are "deliberate attempts to Islamise" Mombasa 
and Coast Province, and that the clamour for majimbo is part of that scheme.174 
Among the leaders calling for majimbo was Shariff Nassir who sees it as inevitable 
and has declared that all the people of Coast Province support majimbo, while 
warning non-coastal people to "keep away" from the politics of the region. 175 The 
government refused to consent to these demands but since they had been openly 
expressed and got support from Muslims in the province, it could form a ground for 
radicalisation of Muslims in the region to agitate for their own state. Furthermore, this 
is a fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalist groups to recruit and operate. 
 
Technology has made the world a global village and this has enabled Kenyan 
Muslims to know and identify with what is happening to other Muslims especially in 
the Middle East. The mosques have been centres of dispatching information about 
injustices done to their brothers in Afghanistan and Palestine, and argue against the 
Bush administration's stance on Iraq, easily quoting UN resolutions, past US 
statements, and oil statistics.176 By identifying with the fate of their fellow Muslims, 
Kenyan Muslims are attracted to join terrorist groups and support their struggle e.g. in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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At the same time, Kenya has allowed the establishment of U.S. and British military 
bases and training grounds in the predominantly Muslim Lamu district in the Coast 
and Northern parts of the country. This has angered Muslims who see this action as a 
direct attack on them as they view the U.S. and British as enemies. The British 
soldiers have been accused of raping women in areas they are situated and the Kenyan 
government has not done any investigations on these accusations nor demanded an 
explanation from the British government. This has angered the Muslim population, 
who see the government as not being concerned about their plight and wanting to 
please their Western allies. 
After the terrorists attacks, Kenya’s economy greatly suffered and more so the 
tourism sector in the Coast province. This was further worsened by the travel 
advisories that most countries issued warning that it was unsafe to travel to Kenya. 
The travel advisory warnings in the long run are having a negative effect since they 
not only slow down the recovery of the Kenyan economy and hence increase poverty 
levels, but they have also inflamed the anti-American sentiments. This is because 
since tourism is hurting mostly people at the Kenyan coast, which harbours a huge 
Muslim population, rising unemployment in this region is likely to be interpreted as 
an economic sanction by Americans. Most hotels at the coast have suffered massive 
loss of bookings and excess capacity resulting in massive lay offs.  
 
The Kenya Tourism Board (KTB) in a study noted that before the US travel warning, 
tourist arrivals in 2003 were showing growth of 22 per cent against 2002. After the 
travel ban tourist arrivals fell by 42 per cent against the 2002 level of 23,196 in the 
period between May and December of each year. The overall effect of the US travel 
ban is that less that half the tourists that had been budgeted for visited Kenya in 
2002.177 Another study conducted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya details the 
impact of the travel advisories on Kenyan tourism. The study estimates that the direct 
impact of the travel ban imposed by the UK government alone cost the economy 
UK£108 million. This is equivalent to 1.6 per cent of Kenya’s national wealth. Apart 
from tourism sector, the horticultural industry lost UK£3.5 million as a result of being 
unable to export fresh produce due to flight cancellations and the expense associated 
with premium freight costs. The ban has also caused Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) 
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to lose an estimated at nearly UK£7 million, which represents around 10 per cent of 
KWS’s annual revenue.178 
 
Thus, Kenya has suffered the effects of being surrounded by Somalia and Sudan, 
which have harboured terrorists. This has had an effect on Kenya in that terrorists 
could easily enter into Kenya and establish cells there.  In addition, the high 
unemployment rate and misrule by the government as well as neglect of Muslim 
populated areas has all contributed to a crisis of identity and a search for authenticity 
among the Muslim population. Together with these is the ineffective security system 
that is not only inadequate in terms of personnel, underpaid and demoralised but is 
rife with corruption. These formed an environment for a breeding ground for terrorist 
cells to grow in the country and carry out terrorist activities. 
 
4.5 Al-qaeda comes to town 
On  August 7, 1998 at 10.30am, the U.S. embassy in Kenya was bombed by terrorists 
leading to the death of 247 people including 12 Americans while over many others 
were injured.179 The blast, which occurred at Ufundi Co-operative House between the 
American Embassy and Co-operative House, was heard miles around the city and 
blew glass windows and doors of buildings in a radius of several kilometres. Ufundi 
Co-operative House was completely flattened while Co-operative House, the 
American embassy and the adjoining buildings were severely damaged. Nearby 
vehicles were also extensively damaged and also some buildings had their roofs 
blown off or windows shattered.  
 
Immediately, after the blast, rescue workers were mobilized from South Africa, Israel, 
France, Germany, Britain and the United States and frantically started searching for 
survivors. The area around the embassy was blocked off as a crime scene as FBI 
agents, Kenya Police, anti-terrorism specialists and explosive experts searched for 
forensic evidence. In addition, the U.S. sent a warning to all it embassies in the region 
and around the world to be on high alert.  The U.S. increased its physical security at 
their embassies, missions and military facilities. At the same time, the then U.S. 
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President Bill Clinton promised “to use all the means possible to bring those 
responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it takes.”180 The Kenya police force 
erected roadblocks along major highways and checked all vehicles leaving the city, as 
it was alleged that four people suspected to be of Arab origin were spotted inside a 
yellow van parked in the vicinity of Cooperative House and the American embassy 
moments before the blast.181  
 
A few hours after the bombing took place, a group calling itself the "Islamic Army for 
the Liberation of Holy Places" claimed credit for the attacks.182 Though it was 
contentious about the existence of the group, two suspected Al-qaeda operatives 
arrested after the bombing mention the group in a home video made shortly before the 
bombing. In the video, the two men "celebrate their anticipated 'martyrdom' in a 
bombing operation against U.S. interests."183 At the same time, Osama did not claim 
responsibility for the attacks, though he supported the action. 184 However, in its 
findings, the FBI was of a different view and put the blame of the attacks on Osama. 
 
A week after the embassy bombings, police alleged they had arrested five people in 
connection with the bombing, with one of them having been arrested after the blast 
and the others were tracked down and arrested during the week.185 The investigations 
were carried out in conjunction with the FBI who in a declassified executive summary 
of status and findings of their report concluded that sometime in 1993 to early 1994, 
individuals associated with al-Qaeda, began to locate to Kenya, specifically in Nairobi 
and Mombasa.186 One of the first to relocate Wadih El-Hage, a Lebanese Christian by 
birth, who later became a naturalized American citizen and converted to Islam. Others 
included Fazul Abdullah Mohammed aka Harun Fazhl and Muhammed Sadiq Odeh 
aka Mohammed Sadiq Howaida. According to the FBI report, other people involved 
in the attack were Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah aka Saleh, Fahad Mohammed Ally aka 
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Ally, Abdul Rahman, Mohammed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, and Jihad Mohammed 
Ali aka Azzam. Each person had a distinctive role in planning and excuting the 
bombing attacks. While Saleh is described in the report as the "mastermind" of the 
attacks, Odeh is an "explosives consultant" and trained architect. Ally was the owner 
of a pick-up truck subsequently believed to be used by Harun to lead the bomb 
delivery truck to the rear of the US Embassy in Nairobi. Rahman is described to be a 
bomb technician. The report notes that the suspected people were at one time or 
another associated with Kenya based non-governmental organizations (NGO's), 
ostensibly created for the purposes of humanitarian relief and aid work. At the same 
time, they were said to have set up other businesses in Kenya. 
 
The FBI report records that initial planning of the attacks against the US embassy in 
Nairobi seems to have begun in spring 1998, when key Al-qaeda operatives settled in 
the country. In May 1998, Harun rented a house at Runda estate, an upscale 
residential neighborhood outside the center of Nairobi. The home was isolated by 
high walls that surrounded the property, making it nearly impossible for any person to 
observe activity in and around the house. Moreover, the gate driveway was large 
enough to accommodate trucks, as was the garage. The FBI believed that the bomb 
used to destroy the US Embassy at Nairobi may have been constructed and actually 
stored at this location. 
 
Two vehicles were used to carry out the mission. The FBI report notes that in the first 
vehicle was Harun, while the second vehicle was a truck, containing the passenger Al-
Owhali and Azzam as the driver. Al-Owhali was armed with a pistol and a number of 
homemade stun grenades and he was to "scare away" people in the vicinity of the 
embassy compound in order to allegedly reduce the number of potential Kenyan 
casualties. The FBI was of the view that Al-Owhali was also to manually detonate the 
bomb in the event that the detonation device malfunctioned. The report however notes 
that upon exiting the bomb delivery vehicle at the U.S. Embassy, Al-Owhali forgot 
his pistol in the truck and was left only with the stun grenades. Instead of returning to 
the bomb vehicle, Al-Owhali brandished a stun grenade before throwing it in the 
direction of a security guard and then fled the scene. At about the same time, Azzam 
who was the driver manually detonated the bomb and he is believed to have died at 
the spot. Al-Owhali was subsequently arrested and rendered to the United States on 
  
 69 
August 27, 1998. Odeh was arrested by Kenyan police on August 14th, 1998 and 
rendered to the United States on August 28th, 1998. 
 
The international community condemned the Embassy bombings, with U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan terming the acts as "heartless terrorism."187 On August 11 1998, 
the U.N. Security Council condemned the attacks as criminal acts and two days later, 
it passed and adopted resolution 1189 (1998) that called on upon “all states and 
international institutions to cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the 
ongoing investigations in Kenya, Tanzania and the United States to apprehend the 
perpetrators of these cowardly criminal acts and to bring them swiftly to justice.”188 
The resolution also asked state parties to adopt, “in accordance with international law 
and as a matter of priority, effective and practical measures for security cooperation, 
for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of 
their perpetrators.”189 
 
In retaliation, the U.S. on August 20, 1998 bombed selected targets in Afghanistan 
and Sudan accusing them countries of harbouring and supporting Al-qaeda.  In 
Afghanistan there were six targets and one of them was Aswa Kali al Batr base, South 
of Kabul, which according to the US had trained terrorists in ‘hundreds if not 
thousands’. Clinton described the Afghan facility as "one of the most active terrorist 
bases in the world" and home to groups linked to Osama, while other targets were 
support complexes and training camps.190 The target in Sudan was the El Shifa 
pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, which the US claimed was producing chemicals 
used for VX nerve gas, a chemical and biological weapon. 191  The VX nerve gas kills 
by coming in contact with the skin or by being inhaled. A single drop will result in 
vomiting, involuntary defecation, convulsions, and a complete paralysis of the central 
nervous system that ends in death. From contact to death the time elapsed is about ten 
minutes.192 
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Though the US government stated that these targets were linked to Osama, there were 
doubts about his connection with the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. The Sudanese 
government said the building was a privately owned pharmaceutical company that 
produced vital goods vital for the country. 193 However, this did not deter America 
from freezing the assets of the pharmaceuticals owner Salah Idris, accusing him of 
sponsoring Osama. Idris then sued the U.S. treasury and in a twist, his assets were 
unfrozen 18 months later and he was effectively cleared of any terrorism charges.194 
In addition, the U.S. government put up a reward of US$5 million for information 
leading to the arrest of eight suspects, including Osama.195 Others with a price on their 
heads are Muhammad Atef,196 Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil, Khalfan Khamis 
Mohamed, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani,197 Fahid Mohammed Ally, Sheikh Ahmed Salim 
Swedan and Haroun Fazi who were all suspects of the embassy attacks. 
 
Kenyans were at first angry with the violence committed but also were of the view 
that they were being used as an arena between Americans and Islamic 
fundamentalists. Demonstrations were held in Nairobi city condemning the bombings, 
but the people also called upon the American government to take responsibility due to 
its foreign policy, which they said was breeding animosity and hatred among the 
Muslims hence the terrorist activities. Al-qaeda had struck Kenya when the country 
was experiencing political turmoil. The country had just come from its second multi-
party elections that were mired by rigging, large scale political violence and 
international observers regarded them as not being free and fair. The opposition 
parties had lodged petitions in the high court challenging the election of President 
Daniel Moi but the bombings brought together politicians including President Moi 
and opposition parties together as they demonstrated against terrorism. The political 
anger that was prevalent then was turned against the terrorists. 
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The choice of carrying out the embassy attacks on August 7 has relevance. On that 
date in 1990, U.S. troops went into Saudi Arabia in response to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. This was an offensive to Osama and other fundamentalist followers of the 
Sunni school of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia who viewed it as disgracing the holy 
Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina.198 It is a fact that Osama refers to repeatedly 
when he says of the need to drive the "American enemy out of the holy land."199 In 
addition, it is suspected that the bombings were in retaliation against the 1993 U.S. 
involvement in Somalia. On October 3, 1993, in an operation dubbed "Operation 
Restore Hope," about 100 U.S. soldiers and elite delta fighters were mobilized to 
round up fighting Somali warlords in an effort to help restore peace in the country. 
Instead of achieving its intended mission, American troops were set upon by an angry 
mob of armed Somalis, leading to the death of 18 U.S. marines and four of their 
bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Three of the suspected Al-
qaeda men indicted as taking part in the embassy bombings are accused of having 
trained some of the Somalis who led this assault.200 
 
The bombings were not carried out without prior warning. On June 12, 1998, the U.S. 
state department warned that Osama was threatening "some type of terrorist action in 
the next several weeks."201 The U.S. heightened security at several U.S. embassies but 
apparently, the Kenyan embassy was not considered a "high risk."202 On August 4, 
1998, three days before the attack, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad that is suspected to have 
ties with Al-qaeda, issued a statement threatening to retaliate against America for its 
involvement in rounding up three of its members helping Muslim forces fighting in 
Albania.203 The warnings however were not seriously considered by American 
authorities hence the terrorists had an easy time to plan and execute the attack. More 
lives were to be lost four years later in another bomb attack at the Coast province. 
 
4.6 The Kikambala bombing 
On the morning of November 28, 2002, an explosive laden car drove into and 
detonated a bomb inside the Israeli owned Kikambala Paradise hotel in Mombasa 
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killing 15 people and injuring 80 others. Among the dead were 12 Kenyans, three 
Israelis and three terrorists.204 At the same time of the hotel bombing, another group 
of terrorists were firing two missiles at an Israeli plane carrying 260 Israel bound 
tourists as it took off from Mombasa’s Moi international airport. The missiles, which 
were fired at Jomvu near the offices of the Zakhem Construction Company, and only 
100 metres from a police booth narrowly missed their target. 
 
Hours later, a group calling itself the ‘Army of Palestine’ claimed responsibility, 
saying it carried out the attacks to ‘make the world hear once again the voice of 
Palestinian refugees, and to cast light on Zionist terrorists in the West Bank and 
Gaza’.205 The attacks were also intended to mark the 55th anniversary of the UN 
resolution to partition Palestine, which occurred on November 29 1947 leading to the 
creation of the Israeli state.206 The relation between the group and Al-qaeda has been 
discounted because there has been little proof of direct links between Palestinian 
groups and Al-qaeda.207 This is because Palestinian groups have a nationalistic agenda 
and if they get antagonised with Osama’s religious fundamentalism, they might lose 
their local focus and concentrate in Al-qaeda’s global agenda.208 At the same time, a 
group calling itself the ‘Al-qaeda political office’ posted on the internet a message 
claiming responsibility for the Kikambala bombing saying it was a Ramadhan present 
to the Palestinian people.209 The group also boasted that ‘at the same place where the 
Jewish crusader coalition was hit four years ago, here the fighters come back once 
again to strike heavily against that evil coalition. But this time it was against Jews.’210 
This was apparently in reference to the 1998 embassy bombings and America believes 
the statement from the Al-qaeda political office to be authentic. 
 
To give more credence to the suspicion that Al-qaeda carried out the attacks, the 
pattern and mode of operations pointed to the group. The serial number of the missile 
launcher used in Mombasa was from the same batch used in 2002 in a failed Al-qaeda 
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attack on a U.S. warplane in Saudi Arabia.211 Also, the organisation is known to carry 
out simultaneous attacks similar to the embassy bombings and the attack showed that 
Al-qaeda cells are still active in Mombasa. In addition, intelligence sources believe 
Somali militia Al ltihaad that is affiliated to Al-qaeda played a part in organising the 
Kikambala attacks.212 
 
The Kikambala bombing opened a new frontier in international terrorism. It was the 
first time that Al-qaeda openly targeted Israelis and their interests even though Osama 
has always viewed Israel as an enemy, which he compares to the Crusaders who were 
eventually pushed out of the holy land by the Muslim warrior Saladin.213 The attacks 
thus appear to be an answer to what has been termed as the “anger” in the Arab world 
that Israel had not been touched until the Kikambala bombing. 214 If this clearly 
marked the entry of Israel into the Al-qaeda targets and their first operation occurred 
in Kenya, it shows two distinctive features of country. One is that there are still active 
Al-qaeda cells in Kenya thus it partly acts as a terrorist hub and secondly, it is still an 
easy target for terrorists’ activities. 
 
The Israeli Mossad, the FBI and Kenya Police worked together to find the 
perpetrators of the attacks. Security was beefed up in all embassies, airports and 
international hotels while the Kenya police mounted roadblocks on major highways to 
inspect vehicles. The police were specifically looking for one of the two Pajero four 
wheel vehicles used to carry out the bombing. The first Pajero was a green one and 
driven by the terrorists who actually denoted the bomb and it was reduced to a shell at 
the hotel, while the other one was a white Pajero seen near the airport when the 
missiles were fired and they used it as a getaway vehicle.215 
 
Reacting to the attacks, the then President Daniel Moi accused the international 
community of not helping Kenya in the fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, he said 
the country would continue with its fight against terrorism but warned that the country 
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had done what it could “within her resources to combat terrorism.”216 The Council of 
Imams and Preachers in Kenya was of the view that the country was attacked for a 
second time because of its active campaign against terrorism. The council however 
called for extra measures to be put to end the attacks.217 In addition, the Supreme 
Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)218 condemned the bombing saying the 
perpetrators "were enemies of Islam and Muslims of Kenya."219  Generally, Kenyans 
were angry that the country was once again an arena for terrorists’ activity and were 
more concerned about the effect this would have on the economy since tourism is the 
biggest foreign exchange earner in Kenya. Before the bombing, the tourism industry 
was on an upward trend and the general feeling of the stakeholders had been to see a 
completely revamped industry after the 1997 politically instigated Likoni clashes.220 
The bombing attack consequently triggered panic and losses in the Kenyan tourist 
circuit with many tourists cancelling their bookings.221 
 
A week after the bombing, police announced they had arrested 13 suspects. Two of 
them were being detained over the missile attacks, while another is said to be the 
owner of the car used in the suicide bombing at the hotel and claims to have sold the 
vehicle to two men of Arab origin. In the group of the other 10 people were  at least 2 
Somalis and six holders of Pakistani passports said to have been issued in Mogadishu 
even though Pakistan does not have a diplomatic mission in Somalia.222 It also 
emerged that two of the three suicide bombers were fugitives linked to Al-qaeda who 
were also involved in the 1998 embassy bombings. They were named as Abdullah 
Ahmed Abdullah, who allegedly supervised Al-qaeda's operations in East Africa, and 
Faed Ali Sayam, a Kenyan. 223 Eventually, four men were charged with murdering 15 
people during the bombing of Paradise Hotel. They are Aboud Rogo Mohammed, 
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Mohammed Kubwa, Omar Said Omar and Swaleh Nabhan Mohammed and their case 
is still proceeding at the Nairobi high court. 
 
Similar to the 1998 embassy bombings, the terrorists had given prior warning about 
the eminent attack. Leader of the London based Al Muhajiroun group that is affiliated 
to Al-qaeda said that a week before the bombing, Islamic fundamentalist groups had 
warned of an attack on Kenya through Internet chat rooms and e-mails and they 
mentioned Israelis.224 Though the groups did not identify themselves, they said they 
were Islamic fighters who support Al-qaeda.225 In addition, two weeks before the 
bombing, Germany and Australia had issued travel warnings to their citizens warning 
that they had intercepted information of terrorist threats to Mombasa. The information 
however was not specific on the timing, location or method of the possible attacks.226 
The Israeli and American governments though they had also the same information, 
they did not consider it as a potential threat to warrant issuing travel advisories.227 In 
addition, the Kenyan intelligence was alerted about the intended attacks but they did 
not put up anti- terrorism measures to prevent the attacks.228 
 
Kenya thus has for various reasons twice suffered the brunt of transnational terrorism 
leading to loss of many lives, injuries and destruction of property. Though Kenyans 
sympathised with the loss of innocent lives, they saw the problem as belonging to 
America and repeatedly passed that message in demonstrations against terrorism in 
the country. The government also accused the international community of leaving the 
country on its own to track down the terrorists with its meagre resources that could 
not achieve much. Thus, when terrorists hit America, it was time for it to take a role in 
Kenya’s efforts to combat terrorism. 
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Chapter five 
September 11 attacks and the “war on terror.” 
The date September 11 has become synonymous with terrorism and Al-qaeda. This is 
because after the terrorist attacks in America, issues of terrorism moved to top the 
agenda of the world politics and it has remained so with the onset of the “war on 
terror.” This “war” has had an impact on the promotion of fundamental human rights 
and implementation of legal standards worldwide and Kenya specifically. 
 
This chapter analyses the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the events that followed 
the attacks. It starts by tracing how the attacks occurred and how the Bush 
administration reacted. Next, it interrogates the onset of the “war on terror” and the 
various guiding principles that inform the “war.” It also analyses the efforts of the 
U.N. Security Council in regarding to the attacks and the various resolutions passed in 
response to September 11 that governments have used to develop anti-terror 
measures. Thereafter, the chapter analyses Kenya’s reaction to September 11 attacks 
and the “war on terror.” 
 
5.1 Al-qaeda hits America 
On September 11 2001 Al-qaeda operatives hijacked and flew aeroplanes into the 
Pentagon and World Trade Centre in Washington and New York cities. At 8.45 A.M., 
a hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines flight 11 out of Boston, Massachusetts, 
crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center, tearing a gaping hole in the 
building and setting it on fire. 15 minutes later, a second hijacked airliner, United 
Airlines flight 175 from Boston, crashed into the south tower of the World Trade 
Center and exploded with the twin towers collapsing within 90 minutes. At 9.37 a.m. 
another flight slammed into the western side of the pentagon and 30 minutes later, a 
fourth airliner crashed in a field in Southern Pennsylvania and it is suspected it was 
headed to White house or United States Capitol. In the end, over 45,000 people died 
in the attacks and hundreds more were injured. 
 
Suddenly, the whole world came to a near standstill as it was clear that America was 
under terrorist attack. A few minutes after the attack, America’s President George 
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Bush addressed Americans to reassure them that the government was working to 
assist local authorities to save lives and to help the victims of these attacks.229 He also 
promised that his government was going to hunt down and punish those responsible 
for the attacks saying all appropriate security precautions had been taken to protect 
the American people. At the same time, all American embassies around the world 
were placed on high alert status.230  Within hours, the FBI launched what has become 
the biggest manhunt and investigation in U.S. history, with more than 4,000 FBI 
agents involved, with 3,000 support staff and more than 400 laboratory personnel. 
 
On September 12, the U.N. Security Council met and unanimously adopted U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) that condemned the terrorist attacks in the 
United States of America. Two weeks later, the Security Council passed Resolution 
1378 (2001), which apart from condemning the terrorist attacks called on states to 
work together to bring justice to the perpetrators of the terrorist activities.231 At the 
same time, the Security Council committed itself to take any necessary steps to 
combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the charter.232 The resolution also 
established a Committee Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor the resolution’s 
implementation and called on all states to report on actions they had taken to that end 
no later than 90 days from the passing of the resolution. 233 The Security Council 
voiced its concern about the close connection between international terrorism and 
transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering and illegal movement 
of nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials. Hence, it urged countries 
to enhance the coordination of national, sub-regional, regional and international 
efforts to strengthen a global response to that threat to international security. 234 The 
U.S. permanent representative to the Security Council at the time John Negroponte 
called the UN “a unique partner in troubled times” and the Resolution “the single 
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most powerful response in the war on terrorism.”235 This was because it globalised the 
war on terrorism by involving other U.N. member states.236 
 
Confusion reigned as to who was responsible for the attacks even though the U.S. 
government suspected it was the work of Osama and Al-qaeda. Initially, the 
Palestinian group Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine took responsibility, 
but this was denied by a senior officer of the group soon after. Next in line to claim 
responsibility were Taliban of Afghanistan but the Taliban government denounced the 
attacks and claimed that it was not connected to Osama. Although Osama did not at 
first claimed responsibility, he praised the attacks but two months later, he admitted 
responsibility for the attacks saying the people who died were "not civilians" but were 
working for the American system. 237 
 
It also emerged that U.S. intelligence officials had several warnings that terrorists 
might attack inside the U.S. using airplanes. According to a report of a joint inquiry of 
the House and Senate intelligence committees, as early as 1994 the U.S. government 
had information that international terrorists were going to use airplanes to carry out 
terrorist attacks.238 The report revealed that in 1998, U.S. officials received reports 
that Al-qaeda was trying to establish an operative cell in the United States and that 
Osama was attempting to recruit a group of five to seven young men from the United 
States to travel to the Middle East for training in conjunction with his plans to strike 
U.S. domestic targets. In the same year, U.S. intelligence officials received 
information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosives-laden 
airplane into the World Trade Centre but the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
found the plot highly unlikely given the state of the terrorists originating country's 
aviation program.239 The FAA also believed a flight originating outside the United 
States would be detected before it reached its target inside the country and 
consequently, the FBI took no action. Just a month before September 11, the CIA 
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alerted the FAA warning of a possible hijacking "or an act of sabotage against a 
commercial airliner by Pakistanis based in South America.240 Though the information 
was not clear on when or what Al-qaeda is going to strike, it shows that Osama started 
plotting the attacks as early as 1998. 
 
5.2 Onset of the “war on terror” 
On October 8th 2001, Bush launched a campaign to track Osama and followers of his 
Al-qaeda group, who were responsible for the attacks in what he called the “war on 
terror.” In the speech, Bush declared Al-qaeda a criminal group, thus making it and its 
activities illegitimate. This is an important gesture since it justified any action the 
government was going to take against the illegitimate group and those who support 
it.241 On the same day, America started bombing Afghanistan with an aim of toppling 
the ruling Taliban government, which supported Al-qaeda.242 The Taliban 
government was finally ousted and in late 2001, major leaders from the Afghan 
opposition groups and diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, and agreed on a plan for the 
formulation of a new government. Hamid Karzai was eventually installed as the 
President on 22 December 2001. 
In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush declared that Iran, 
Iraq and North Korea were “rogue states” and alleged that the three countries were 
developing weapons of mass destruction. Bush feared that terrorists would use these 
chemical and biological weapons to attack other countries, more so American 
interests and hence measures had to be taken before the weapons got into the hands of 
terrorists. 
After the Taliban government was toppled, Bush and his coalition of willing next 
vowed to oust government of Saddam Hussein which was suspected of having 
chemical and biological weapons and also being linked to Al-qaeda. Most countries 
however opposed this move urging them to first give the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNIMOVIC) time to inspect if Iraq still 
possessed the chemical and biological weapons. In addition, the coalition was asked 
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to draft and present a resolution to the UN Security Council allowing it to carry out a 
military operation against Iraq. However, a resolution allowing America to attack Iraq 
was not passed after France threatened to veto it but America and the coalition of the 
willing went ahead with their plans of toppling Saddam.243  
In situations tha t a government abuses in a large scale human rights of its citizens or 
in cases where there is clear threat of international peace, international law allows the 
U.N., a regional actor or a strong state to intervene in that country. Westphalia’s 
principle of unconditional sovereignty has over the years changed after governments 
misused it to suppress political opposition and hence commit gross human rights 
violations. The international community thus has made sovereignty conditional on a 
myriad of qualifications, key among them respect of human rights and the U.N. 
charter has balanced both the idea of sovereignty and intervention. 
Article 2(4) of the charter notes, “a ll members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of  force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.244 Thus, it makes it clear that it prohibits the 
threat of force or aggression of any country against another. Nevertheless, there 
are two exceptions in this regard. First, the use of force can only be allowed 
when it has been authorised by the U.N. through the Security Council and 
secondly, when the use of force is in self-defense245 for example when the U.S. 
bombed the pharmaceutical company in Sudan after the 1998 bombings, 
justified it as acts of self-defence. Article 39 empowers the Security Council to 
“determine if there is a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.” If 
it determines so, then it can authorise the use of force against the offending state 
under article 42. This was the basis for the toppling of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan after September 11 and hence the war had a basis under 
International law. Intially, the U.S. and its coalition of the willing started 
bombing Iraq without the consent and support of the U.N. saying Saddam was a 
threat to world peace since it was suspected he was possessing chemical and 
                                                 
243 On April 9, 2003 the regime of Saddam Hussein was toppled and he was later captured on December 14, 
2003. Osama is still on the run.  
244Charter of the United Nations 1945; see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-chp1.htm 
245 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-chp7.htm 
  
 81 
biological weapons.246 When the weapons could not be found, U.S. and its 
coalition said that Saddam was abusing Iraqis human rights and stiffling 
political oppostion hence they had a legitimate concern to install a democratic 
governmnet. This was done so that they could justify their actions of invading 
Iraq. 
 
Richard Falk argues that intervention depends on geopolitics and a country will 
intervene when it stands to gain more than it loses after the change of regime.247 This 
he warns is a dangerous indulgence likely to intensify conflict among states without 
really helping victims of human rights abuses.248 The underside is that when the 
country falls outside the strategic interests, it is not likely to mount strong pressure for 
humanitarian intervention e.g. the U.S. and U.N. were very reluctant to intervene 
during the mid 1990’s humanitarian disasters in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo since 
they were of little strategic importance.249 
Events surrounding the “war on terror” have put in cross purpose the human rights 
discourse and this has had an implication for the advancement of human rights. In its 
quest to have partners in the war, America has allied with countries that have for long 
been accused by international human rights groups, U.N and even America in its State 
Department report for gross abuse of human rights e.g. Pakistan, Sudan and Saudi 
Arabia. These countries have thus continued to abuse rights but their activities are no 
longer under scrutiny as microscope of human rights has changed with the advent of 
“war on terror.”250 For example, Pakistan authorities in 2002 handed over more than 
400 people to America without adequate human rights safeguards, in breach of 
domestic legislation regarding extradition and without determining the danger of 
torture or ill treatment from the Pakistanis.251 In addition, America has showed little 
inclination to confront such governments as Russia, China, and Israel that used the 
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fight against terrorism to intensify repression aimed at separatist, dissident, or 
nationalist movements that were themselves often abusive.252 
Secondly, despite America’s declared policy of supporting human rights, Roth notes 
that the Bush administration in fighting terrorism refused to be bound by human rights 
standards.253 This was seen when it rejected to apply the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War for prisoners from the war in 
Afghanistan and at the same time it is trying the suspected terrorists in military 
commissions where they do not have access to independent lawyers and their trials 
are being held in secrecy. 254 According to the third Geneva Convention article 5, 
captured combatants are to be treated as prisoners of war until a “competent tribunal” 
determines otherwise. Hence, under the convention, the detainees who were former 
Taliban soldiers would almost qualify as POWs, while many of the detainees who 
were members of Al-qaeda probably would not. But the administration refused to 
bring any of the detainees before a tribunal and unilaterally asserted that none 
qualified as POWs.255 However, the United States Supreme court later ruled that 
terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo bay must have access to the country’s courts 
hence the suspects would get a chance to argue their cases.256 
America treated the suspects as “enemy combatants,” a concept applied to detainees 
regardless of the circumstances in which they were captured or taken into custody 
arguing that it was “at war” with Al-qaeda.257 Thus, it meant that America could 
detain the “enemy combatants” until the “war” ended, which could be indefinite and 
without the rights afforded to prisoners of war or criminal suspects. As Roth notes, 
America fights the “war on terror” as if human rights were not a constraint and this 
willingness to compromise human rights to fight terrorism is not only counter-
productive, but it also sets a dangerous precedent.258 This is so because of the 
leadership role that the U.S. government has so often played in promoting human 
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rights other countries will be tempted to compromise rights in quest for national 
security, yet both of them are mutually reinforcing.259 
President Bush and his coalition of the willing in his effort to combat terrorism have 
been guided by the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). One of the measures that 
the NSS advocates for is the doctrine of pre-emption, which has been a key feature of 
the “war on terror.” As U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell explains, the concept of 
pre-emption is explicit for obvious reasons. One reason was to reassure the American 
people that once the American government recognised a clear and present threat it 
uses its power to first strike it using military power or any other means at their 
disposal. 260 In the context of transnational terrorism, it means that America will not 
allow future attacks to happen again before they took action and this was the reason 
why they led the war to oust Iraq’s Saddam Hussein since he not only celebrated 
September 11 attacks, but America suspected he supported Al-qaeda and had weapons 
of mass destruction. A second reason for including the notion of pre-emption in the 
NSS was to convey a message to terrorists and those who protect them, both state 
actors and non-state actors, to stop their activities. This, America hopes will create 
anxiety in terrorist groups thus increases the likelihood they will cease activity or 
make mistakes and be caught.261 In the course of “war on terror,” President Bush has 
repeatedly warned that countries harbouring terrorists to stop doing so and take 
measures that will stop terrorist activities. Hitherto, countries like Sudan that America 
termed as a rogue state and at one time gave Osama refuge have become American 
allies in the “war on terror”.262 
 
The NSS authorizes America to create a working partnership with other countries, 
which involves economic and political empowerment to make weak governments 
stronger so that they are not used as hubs for terrorism.263 In addition this partnership 
involves the U.S. giving countries money to upgrade their intelligence facilities so 
that they can be able to detect terrorist cells in their respective countries before they 
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attack. To accomplish this mission, emphasis is placed on international action by 
working with the willing, enabling the weak, persuading the reluctant, and compelling 
the willing.264 As Powell notes, “the logic of this dual approach rests on the fact that 
terrorism threatens the world order itself -- and thus creates a common interest among 
all powers that value peace, prosperity, and the rule of law.”265 
 
Though calling upon other states to support it in the “war on terror,” Kenya is going 
to be driven by several things so that it could undertake this initiative. It is going to 
evaluate the threat posed to it by terrorists, Kenya’s relations with the U.S., any 
incentives U.S. offers for the co-operation, the domestic opinion and the enhanced 
counterterrorist measures on its domestic interests.266 However, these may change 
with time and circumstances for example if Kenya is attacked again, it may be easier 
for parliament to pass the draft anti- terrorism bill.  
 
However, Kenya has continued to be a key partner and lends high- level support in the 
global “war on terrorism.” There has been ongoing law-enforcement cooperation and 
sharing of information between the United States and Kenya concerning suspected 
terrorists. Kenya also participates in the US Terrorist Interdiction Program and is a 
party to 11 of the 12 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols.267 In 
the wake of September 11, America greatly increased its military support for Kenya 
since the country was identified as a strategic ally in the war against terrorism. 
Although it received no Foreign Military Financing (FMF)268 from 1991 to 2001, in 
fiscal year 2002, $15 million was allocated to the Kenya. In fiscal year 2003, Kenya 
was granted $1.5 million in FMF and $600,000 in International Military Education 
and Training (IMET).269 In the fiscal year 2004, Kenya was to receive $6.5 million in 
FMF, $600,000 in IMET and $8 million through the Emergency Support Fund 
(ESF).270 In addition, Kenya is also to receive a portion of the $15 million designated 
                                                 
264 ‘U.S. measures for combating terror,’ East African Standard, July 14, 2003 
265 Powell, Colin, opcit Pg 28 
266 Pillar, A. Paul, ‘counterterrorism after Al-qaeda,’ Washington Quarterly, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies. Summer 2004  pg 106 
267 Ted Dagne ‘Africa and the War on Terrorism’, Washington: CRC Report for Congress, January 2002. p.8 
268 The FMF provides countries with grants and loans to purchase U.S. produced arms, defense services and 
military training. 
269 IMET is provided to foreign militaries to make them professional, effective and reflective of U.S. values. The 
use of IMET for fighting terrorism is a new focus. 
270 Garcia, Victoria. ‘Kenya: Responding to terrorism,’ in www.cdi.org/kenya/friendlyversion 
  
 85 
for a new regional counterterrorism program known as the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA). This program, a modified 
version of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) that limited training to non-
lethal peacekeeping, will now provide offensive training and equipment for 
peacekeeping operations.271 This increased military funding complements the military 
training offered to Kenya soldiers by the U.S. 
 
 
5.3 Kenya’s reaction to September 11 and “war on terror” 
Having being hit twice by Al-qaeda, Kenyans naturally were sympathetic to America 
but at the same time, there were voices that argued that it was time the U.S. directly 
suffered the brunt of terrorism. This was aptly captured by Consolata Wanjiru Mugo 
who felt that “it was time Americans got a taste of what Kenya went through and feel 
what it was like to be attacked by terrorists."272 Kenya's President Daniel Moi 
condemned the September 11 attacks calling them “heinous and evil” but hours later 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement calling for the creation of an 
independent Palestinian State.273 This clearly meant that it saw the attacks as a 
political problem emanating from U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East as the 
statement called for an evaluation of America’s role in the Middle East. At the same 
time, a task force was set up to assist Kenyans in getting information about their 
relatives in New York and Washington. Security was also heightened in major 
highways, international hotels and Embassies in Nairobi.274 It is noteworthy that the 
Kenya government supported the U.S. led war in Afghanistan but it was at categorical 
that it could only support the Iraq war if it was sanctioned by the U.N. Security 
Council.275 
 
In an opinion column, John Kamau was of the view that the September 11 attacks was 
due to America’s foreign policy, which he says must pull its act together and “stop 
living in the ivory tower of politics, where it listens only to itself …time has come for 
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it to sit down with its traditional archrivals and settle for peace.”276 It was the same 
message that the editorial of the Daily Nation was passing across when it said “almost 
all terrorist movements can be traced to real or perceived social injustices on the 
Palestinians.”277 The editorial continued to blame the Bush government for the 
bombings, whom it said, was made of “swashbuckling right-wingers” and asked it to 
reconsider its role in the Middle East. While sympathizing with Americans, Christian 
religious leaders asked the U.S. to restrain itself in seeking out the terrorists.278 At the 
same time, politician Shariff Nassir, who had been calling for Mombasa to be ruled 
using  sharia law, called on the American government to enter into dialogue with the 
rest of the world to curb acts of terrorism, saying terrorism should not be associated 
with any race or religion. 279 
 
Two days after America and its allies started the bombing Afghanistan, Kenyans 
including Muslims in Nairobi and Mombasa demonstrated against these actions. 
Demonstrations organised by Muslims occurred after their Friday prayers and the 
demonstrators were carrying pictures of Osama whom they termed a hero.280 
Demonstrators marched to President Daniel Moi's office and handed in a demand that 
the government condemns US and British "acts of terrorism and aggression against 
the innocent people of Afghanistan". 281 The demonstrations continued for several 
weeks into the Afghanistan war. 
 
America’s bombing of Iraq was met with the same protests as the Afghanistan case 
and the Kenya government was categorical that it would support America if the war 
was sanctioned through the U.N. Security Council and argued that “full scale war 
could have been avoided through dialogue.” Kenyans once again protested through 
street demonstrations with the Muslim community being the most vocal as they were 
supporting their Muslim brothers who said the protest was “to support the fight to end 
all forms of injustices against the Iraqi people and to press for an end to the US 
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occupation of Iraq.”282 Muslims were also of the view that since America had failed to 
prove to the world that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, it must therefore be held 
accountable for the destruction and compensate all Iraqi families killed or injured as a 
result of the war.283 
 
It has been noted that Kenya agitated for America and its coalition to engage in any 
military intervention through the U.N. The Kenyan government also viewed 
America’s foreign policy in the Middle East as the cause of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks and it urged the U.S. to reconsider its foreign policy if terrorism was to be 
realistically tackled. That is why the government did not support America’s military 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan despite Kenyans sympathizing with the victims 
of September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, as the “war on terror” progressed, the Kenya 
government started putting together measures aimed at combating terrorism in order 
to fulfil UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). These efforts will be analysed 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter six 
The missing debate on the “war on terror.” 
6.1. Introduction 
Striking the appropriate balance between combating terrorism and protecting human 
rights is the challenge facing governments in the world. While some governments 
have hurriedly enacted laws and other measures to curb terrorism, some of these 
actions have challenged the doctrine of human rights and caused some people to 
question if this is the end of human rights era.284 Human rights organisations 
recognise the legitimate security concerns of States and their duty to protect citizens 
from terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the concern is whether this is being done while 
respecting human rights. In this regard, the U.N. in various resolutions and in the 
Charter has provided guidelines. 
  
The U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 2002 adopted resolution 57/219 which 
specifically focuses on the need to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism.285 The resolution affirmed that states must ensure that any 
measure taken to combat terrorism complies with their obligations under international 
law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.  It 
stressed that non-derogable rights must be fully observed at all times, and that where 
states derogated from their other obligations, they must meet the strict requirements of 
international law. The resolution also asked the U.N. High Commissioner for human 
rights to monitor the protection of rights in the fight against terrorism and to make 
recommendations to governments and U.N. bodies. In addition, the U.N. secretary-
general is to submit reports to both the U.N. Commission on human rights and the 
General Assembly on the implementation of the resolution. 286 A resolution with 
similar approach was adopted on April 25, 2003 by the Commission on human rights 
at its 59th session.287  
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Kenya has been engaged in various ways of fighting terrorism. However, these efforts 
were initiated after the September 11 attacks, yet the country had first been attacked 
three years before then. The government has established the anti-terrorism police unit, 
increased vigilance across the borders and is corroborating with other international 
law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism. This has led to police swoops in the 
country in an effort to track down suspected terrorists. This chapter interrogates these 
efforts by the government in an effort to see how they have had an impact on the 
human rights situation in Kenya. 
 
In this regard, it is noted that Kenya’s bill of rights is enshrined in Chapter V of the 
Constitution and it aims to protect citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms. This is 
done by affirming both substantive and procedural rights, together with political and 
civil liberties. In addition, the Constitution is clear that its primary objectives are to 
establish constitutional structures which provide for individual freedoms and 
guarantees, while also giving the government power to implement fundamental 
reforms and social reconstruction. The rights as outlined in the bill of rights however 
are subject to limitations that ensure equal enjoyment of rights. 
 
International human rights law has sought to strike a fair balance between legitimate 
national security concerns and the protection of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. This balance is reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which Kenya ratified and acceded to on May 1, 1972, and 
also the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights which she is a party. The 
ICCPR in article 4 recognizes that some rights can be derogated from in time of 
public emergency but at the same time, it outlines other rights that cannot be 
suspended under any circumstances. These are the right to life; freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, being held in servitude; in countries which have not 
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most 
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force when the crime was committed and 
the penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 
competent court. However, the African Charter does not allow derogation of rights as 
does the ICCPR. What it notes is that rights as outlined in the Charter shall be 
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exercised with due regard to the rights of other, collective security, morality and 
common interest. 
 
Article 4 of the ICCPR notes that derogation from rights is only permitted in special 
circumstances and any measure taken must be of exceptional character, strictly 
limited in time and to the extent required by the emergency. Furthermore, the 
emergency situation and derogation is subject to regular review, consistent with other 
obligations under international law and must not discriminate any people in 
whichever way. In addition, the state is obliged to inform the U.N. Secretary-General 
of the provisions from which a state has derogated and the reasons for such 
derogation. The U.N. and African charters require that when such actions are taken 
they should be proportional to the emergency that a country faces.  
 
This chapter discusses Kenya’s measures of tackling terrorism against this 
background of derogation of rights outlined in the ICCPR and its bill of rights. To 
effectively do this, the chapter first gives a historical outline of the struggle for 
democracy and human rights in Kenya from Independence until present. Then it 
analyses the government’s efforts of combating terrorism viz a viz the gains made in 
establishing a human rights culture in Kenya. 
 
6.2 Short history of Kenya’s road to democracy 
Kenya gained independence on December 12, 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as the first 
President and Oginga Odinga as the vice-president. Being a newly independent 
country, Kenyatta propagated the philosophy of nationalism, with agenda of fighting 
hunger, ignorance, and disease. It should be noted that the country’s constitution was 
a multiparty one and apart from Kenya African National Union (KANU) which was 
the ruling party, the other parties were Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) 
and the African People’s Party (APP). In 1964, KADU, in which Daniel Arap Moi 
was the chairman, dissolved itself and crossed the floor to KANU and APP followed 
suit hence there was no opposition party in parliament. Moi was then appointed vice-
president in 1967, a position he held until 1978 when he became President. He retired 
in 2002 and Mwai Kibaki became the third President of Kenya. 
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Okoth Ogendo argues that from their experience under colonialism, newly 
independent African governments had realised it was easy to control national 
institutions and convert national economy into personal interests. The independence 
constitutions were not geared to prevent this from happening and hence the new 
ruling elite had the power and will of ‘legitimately’ subverting the constitution. 288 In 
this regard, they politicised the Constitution and declared it a liability and 
subsequently converted it into a political instrument. One of the ways of doing this 
was extending the authority of the President to all offices in the Public Service 
including Constitutional ones like the Attorney General and Judges. A second manner 
was to subject the process of recruitment at all levels to strict party sponsorship and 
this in a way hastened the way towards a one party state. Thirdly, states used their 
power to derogate extensively from the bill of rights. This was done through 
weakening parliamentary role of being a watchdog over the executive to more of a 
‘rubber stamp.’289 As a result, a rush to amend the constitution whenever a political 
crisis emerged became increasingly attractive and limitless. As seen later, all these 
facets are relevant to an analysis of Kenya’s road to democracy. 
 
During Kenyatta’s reign, various constitutional amendments were made which had a 
negative impact on Constitutionalism, human rights and democracy in Kenya. A 
constitutional change in 1966 brought a preventive detention law, which allowed the 
government to detain persons or restrict their movements if the Minister of Home 
Affairs "is satisfied that it is necessary for the preservation of public security." 
Charges against such persons needed not to be revealed, nor are such persons 
guaranteed the right to communicate with lawyers or family members. There is no 
guaranteed recourse to the courts, and the length of detention is not limited by law. 290 
Between 1966 and 1969, thirteen people were detained under this act, all of whom 
were associated with the Kenya Peoples Party (KPU), the opposition party led by the 
former vice president, Oginga Odinga.291 Odinga had fallen out with Kenyatta and he 
formed the party but it was banned by the government hence the detention. This was 
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despite the fact the Constitut ion guaranteed existence of other political parties except 
KANU. To curtail activities of KPU, the government pushed through parliament a 
constitutional amendment that made the post of vice president rotational in the eight 
provinces. Furthermore, another constitutional amendment was enacted that forced 
party defectors to seek fresh mandate from the electorate.292 This created an uneven 
field for the opposition since the government owned the electoral machinery and 
could easily manipulate it. 
 
In 1965 the constitution was amended to abolish the federal system of governance, 
ostensibly to unite all Kenyans. This effectively made Kenya a centrally governed 
country, and it was a matter of time before the leaders amassed central powers. In 
1966, the Civil Service was put under the Ministry of the Office of the President, thus 
cutting of any political ambitions of civil servants. This was largely to curtail their 
involvement in opposition politics as they will be loyal to the government of the day, 
which is their employer. In 1975, a Constitutional amendment was passed, which 
gave powers to the President to pardon a politician for electoral malpractice. This 
amendment was passed to favour Paul Ngei, a politician who had been imprisoned 
with Kenyatta during the Mau Mau war for independence but had being barred from 
contesting elections for committing electoral offences. Consequently, Kenyatta 
pardoned him and he was allowed to run for 1975 elections. 
 
During Kenyatta’s reign, politicians who were deemed a threat to the Presidency were 
assassinated. First was Pio Gama Pinto, an Indian who was involved in the struggle 
for independence who was killed on February 24, 1965. In 1969, politician Tom 
Mboya was assassinated in the streets of Nairobi and in 1975, Josiah Kariuki was 
killed and his body found in a forest in the outskirts of Nairobi. 
 
By the time he died in August 1978, Kenyatta's political realm was dominated by 
small elite from his Kikuyu tribe and specifically from Kiambu, his home district. 
This group undermined his nationalist and populist background, alienating other 
ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming Kikuyus.293 It ensured that the Kikuyu 
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from the Kiambu district dominated the governmental bureaucracy in the civil service, 
the banking system, the parastatals and other corporations that the government had a 
stake294 Daniel Arap Moi took over from Kenyatta, having served as vice-president 
from 1967. 
 
After taking over the Presidency, Moi in December 1978 released all twenty-six 
political detainees most of whom had been languishing in jails for years. At the same 
time as Angelique notes, he also reassured Kenyans that the government would not 
condone drunkenness, tribalism, corruption, and smuggling, problems that already 
were deeply entrenched in Kenya.295 Public officials accused of engaging in 
corruption resigned, a gesture that indicated dawn of a new era of adherence to 
accountability, democracy and human rights.296 
 
However, this policy of good governance changed within a short time when Moi 
started consolidating his power and stifling dissidents. He popularised his philosophy 
of "love, peace and unity", that “later turned out to be a strategy geared toward the 
achievement of specific objectives, namely, the control of the state, the consolidation 
of power, the legitimization of his leadership, and the broadening of his political base 
and popular support.”297 In short, the philosophy had little respect of human rights and 
this marked the foundation for a dictatorship and innumerable human rights violations 
by his administration. 
 
In 1982, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Moseti Anyona sought to register a 
socialist opposition party. The government refused to register it and soon after this 
attempt, Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act, Number 7 of 1982, was brought to 
parliament that made Kenya a de jure one party state, effectively killing any active 
oppositional political activity or mobilisation. After making Kenya a one party state, 
Moi ultimately usurped other powers of the Judiciary and put other measures to 
ensure he retained total influence and power in the legislature. He did this by 
rewarding patronage and loyalty with cabinet posts, government jobs or contracts 
among other things. In addition, members of his Tugen tribe got a lot of jobs in the 
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government without merit. These actions did not go down well with some Kenyans 
and on August 1 1982 there was an attempted military coup by some junior Kenya Air 
Force officers in protest over the centralisation of power. Government forces crashed 
the coup but it only gave Moi a chance to consolidate his power in the executive, 
leading to over-bureaucratization of life and increasing marginalization of civil 
society. 298 
 
In his tenure, Moi managed to change the constitution to suit his own political needs; 
for example a few days after releasing all political detainees a bill was passed in 
parliament granting him all emergency powers. This was the first time for such a 
thing to happen in Kenya's post-independence history. Apart from this, detention laws 
which had been suspended in 1978 were reinstated through Act 14 of 1988, which 
allowed police to detain perceived and real opposition members for fourteen days 
without access to a lawyer. Other colonial era laws, like the Chief's Authority Act, the 
Public Order Act, the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Public Order Act, and 
the Penal Codes, that gave the President the right to suspend individual rights were 
retained in the constitution giving him unfettered powers. Furthermore, the Provincial 
Administration became operatives of ruling party KANU and they were used to 
review and clear party meetings throughout the country and to isolate dissenters. 
Since they got their powers from the President, it meant they now had the power to 
prevent an elected member of parliament from addressing his or her own 
constituents.299 In addition, patronage and loyalty to the President became mandatory 
for one's political survival as well as promotion. 
 
In 1986 parliament enacted Act No. 14 followed in 1988 by Act No.4, that imposed 
limitations on the independence of the judiciary and this had an effect on the 
protection of human rights in Kenya. These constitutional amendments provided for 
the removal of security of tenure of the Attorney General, the Controller and Auditor 
General, the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Thus, the President 
became the sole person to hire people to serve in the Judiciary and this consequently 
meant they owed him total loyalty. That parliament did not oppose these amendments, 
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it showed the influence that Moi had over the body. The result was that there were no 
checks and balances on the Presidency and as Korwa Adar et al notes, between 1964 
to 1990, twenty-four constitutional amendments were enacted by parliament all 
intended to strengthen the presidency at the expense of civil rights.300 
 
Any form of political agitation was not tolerated. Three years after assuming power, 
Moi had banned all ethnic based associations including workers unions like the Civil 
Servants Union and the Nairobi University Academic Staff Union (UASU). Over the 
years, many of the other organisations became affiliated to KANU for example 
Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO), a national non-governmental 
organization for women officially changed its name to Kanu Maendeleo ya 
Wanawake organisation. Furthermore, the Central Organization of Trade Unions 
(COTU) which is the umbrella body for most of the trade unions in Kenya became an 
extension of the ruling party. 
 
The next victim of democracy was free and fair elections. In 1986, the secret ballot 
voting system was replaced by the queue system where the electorate lined up behind 
their candidates. This system encouraged electoral rigging and intimidation of 
candidates as well as supporters. Many of the times, candidates who were loyal to 
Moi but received short queues were declared winners and there was little if any 
chance of appeal. This is because election disputes were often refereed to the 
President personally as the final judge since KANU was the only political party and 
Moi was the chairperson. Ultimately, there were no free and fair elections in Kenya 
until 1990 when the system was abolished.  
 
The repression reached its peak in the 1980’s after Moi had totally consolidated his 
power and detentions, torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality became the order 
of the day. This was not so much unexpected since Moi perceived human rights “as 
alien and euro centric conceptions inconsistent with African values and culture…the 
pro-democracy and human rights as unpatriotic, disloyal, and ungrateful individuals 
influenced by what he called foreign masters.301 The government started cracking 
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down on perceived and real dissidents, whom he accused of belonging to an illegal 
underground movement called Mwakenya.302 
 
In his book Kenya: A Prison Notebook, Maina Kinyatti claims Mwakenya was formed 
in the 1970s.303 He writes that originally it was referred to as the 'December Twelfth 
Movement', before it changed to Mwakenya. It also published and distributed 
Mpatanishi (bringing together/hold together) and Pambana (struggle) pamphlets that 
called for an end to the ruling of President Daniel Moi and KANU and restoration of 
multi-party democracy. These gave the government a justification to crackdown and 
prosecute its members since it was treasonous to make such statements. Suspects were 
rounded up, tortured and accused of various clandestine activities ranging from being 
members of Mwakenya to publishing and possessing the "illegal'' Mpatanishi and 
Pambana. In most cases the suspects were taken to courts after working hours, 
charged and jailed, all in a day, and without an opportunity to seek legal 
representation. Jail terms ranged from 15 months to more than 12 years. 
 
The crackdown was ruthless and it reached its peak in 1986 when a KANU Governing 
Council meeting under the Chairmanship of former President Moi condemned all 
those behind the "subversive'' movement.304 The meeting instructed branches 
countrywide to be vigilant in detecting the "dissidents'' and accused the movement of 
aiming at "retarding development in the country'' and gave the government "fullest '' 
support in dealing with the menace. In the crackdown, university students, lecturers, 
journalists, hawkers among people from other professionals were arrested and 
tortured before being taken to court.305 It should be noted that Moi used the same 
tactic when he denounced the February Eighteenth Movement (FEM) which he 
accused of planning attacks on Kenya to be launched from Uganda in the early 1990s. 
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The repression did not end with political parties and politicians, but even clergymen 
who were critical of the authoritarian regime were not spared.  Anglican Bishop 
Alexander Muge was killed in a mysterious car accident in 1990 when he dared a 
cabinet minister to curtail his movements in the country. When coming from a service 
at the cabinet minister’s hometown, he had an accident and he died. Other clergy 
people like Timothy Njoya were routinely arrested for speaking out against the 
government. 
 
Though the repression was supposed to silence the growing opposition, it had the 
opposite effect. In 1989, calls for the country to return to a multiparty State 
intensified. They were led by the Clergy whom the government had been unable to 
repress together with politicians, lawyers and activists who nevertheless were 
arrested, tortured, harassed and imprisoned. In 1990, for the first time, the 
international community took notice. However, it should be noted this was after the 
cold war and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed. All along, U.S. 
and Western Europe had supported corrupt regimes all over Africa in their attempt to 
keep communism from the door. Kenya was an ally of the West in East Africa during 
the cold war since Tanzania had turned socialist under Julius Nyerere while Uganda 
under Obote adopted the People Charter which was a socialist one. Somalia was also 
led by socialist policies of Siad Barre as well as Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile 
Mariam. Thus, it was not hard for U.S. and other Western countries to overlook 
Kenya’s violation of human rights since they wanted to keep the country free from 
communists. 
 
Apart from the international community, other institutions like the World Bank also 
started urging for countries to embrace credible legal framework that ensured 
governments’ accountability to the citizens and respect of human rights. In this 
regard, donors in 1990 froze aid to Kenya demanding the government be accountable 
for the human rights violations. The US Congress passed the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Re lated Programs Appropriations Act of 1991 that required the 
government to "charge and try or release all prisoners, including any persons detained 
for political reasons; cease any physical abuse or mistreatment of prisoners; restore 
the independence of the judiciary; and restore freedoms of expression." before it could 
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disburse $15 million in economic and military aid to the country. 306 The Scandinavian 
countries that were among the biggest donors to the country stepped up the pressure 
for good governance and this gave morale to the local human rights activists who 
engaged in civil disobedience. 
 
In the end, Moi and KANU had to give in to the pressure. On December 1990, 
Section 2 (A) was repelled allowing the formation of other political parties, but Moi 
warned that this would lead to chaos. It should be noted that the 1990 Constitutional 
amendments was a process that was initiated by the Executive and the ruling elite. As 
Clive Napier argues, such a process is initiated from the centre due to pressures from 
below for change. Consequently, the President appoints a Commission to look into the 
grievances put forward and the body’s recommendations are either accepted or 
rejected. In addition, constitutional conferences or referendum are not generally 
employed to legitimise the Constitutional amendments. In Kenya’s case, Moi had 
appointed a KANU review committee to look into how KANU should be reformed. 
Many of the people who made submissions to the committee chaired by then Vice-
President George Saitoti, did not want to be confined to suggesting ways to improve 
KANU and instead spoke out on how Kenya should be governed. Most of the 
fundamental demands from the citizens including the resignation of the government, 
introduction of a multiparty political system and a limited presidential tenure, were 
not noted adhered to by the state. Instead, the government conceded to ending the 
queuing system for general elections, stopping the expulsion of party members as a 
disciplinary measure and restoration of security tenure to sections of the judiciary and 
civil service. Although these concessions won praise from both the U.S. and Britain, 
Kenyans were not contented. Thereafter, KANU held a National delegates conference 
where Moi announced that Section 2 (a) should be scrapped despite opposition from 
other KANU members.  
 
At the same time, these new constitutional dispensations that Kenya experienced at 
the time had an international outlook and were driven by three elements. One of them 
is that there arose a globalisation of political traditions that did away with 
authoritarian and one-party systems instead adopting multi-party mode of 
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government.307 In this regard, democratic institutions like Constitutional courts, truth 
and reconciliation commissions and tribunals investigating gross human rights abuses 
were set up. Secondly, there developed an imperative for international human rights 
that was propagated by the international human rights movement; leading thirdly to 
particular national struggles that led to the creation and implementation of a new 
constitutional order based on human rights and rule of law. 308 
 
The first multi-party elections after the reintroduction of pluralism were set to be held 
on December 27 1992 and were characterised by politically instigated violence in Rift 
valley Province. This was viewed as a response to Moi’s warning that Kenya would 
plunge into chaos if it reverted to multi-party politics. The same violence erupted 
before and after 1997 elections and spread to Nairobi and Coast Provinces. Various 
human rights groups that investigated the violence concluded that it was instigated by 
KANU to intimidate and disenfranchise opposition supporters. The reports implicated 
many KANU politicians for funding and starting the clashes but no one was arrested 
and charged for the violence.309 The Kenya Human Rights Commission estimates that 
over 4,000 people were killed during the clashes and over 600,000 people displaced. 
It is noteworthy that even after the onset of multi-partism, detention, arbitrary arrests 
and torture continued since the laws authorising the actions were still in operation. 
The laws were especially used to intimidate and harass the opposition members of 
parliament and their supporters. KANU continued manipulating the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya and thus easily won the elections. 
 
Another step towards realising democracy was realised before the 1997 general 
elections when the opposition and the church started calling for a review of the 
constitution. This was because it was clear that despite Kenya being a multiparty, 
KANU still used the same authoritarian laws to stifle political activity. In addition, the 
country was going to the second multiparty elections with an uneven playing field that 
was tilted in KANU’s favour. Once again, civil disobedience was used to agitate for 
reforms and it was led by the now vibrant civil society and church. The donors and 
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international community also increased pressure on the government. In November 
1997, a month before elections, the Preservation of Public Security Act, sections of 
the Penal Code dealing with sedition and treason, the Public Order Act, the Chiefs 
Authority Act, the Administration Police Act and the Societies Act were repealed in 
what was known as the IPPG reforms.310 These reforms enabled greater freedom of 
assembly and association but this was largely on paper as police still used different 
reasons to disperse opposition meetings. One of the laws retained was that the police 
are authorized to stop and prevent the holding of a meeting if no notice has been given 
or if another meeting in the same venue presents clear or imminent dangers of the 
breach of peace or the public order. Since it was left to the police to determine the 
danger, when they want to disperse a meeting called by the opposition, they cite this 
provision of the law. 
 
The period between 1998 and 2000 saw the government return to business as usual 
but the civil society and the opposition renewed their concerted efforts to put together 
a comprehensive constitutional review body that would not be controlled by the 
political centre. These efforts bore fruit with the enactment of the Constitution of 
Kenya amendment Act (2001) that created the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission (CKRC) which was mandated to come up with a new Kenyan 
constitution. 
 
In 2002, Kenya held its first free and fair multi-party elections where the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) won with a majority vote.311 The political transition of 
2002 represented an important opportunity for Kenya to improve human rights in the 
country since the new government was elected on a platform of good governance and 
accountability. While Moi and KANU demonstrated unwillingness to uphold the 
sanctity of human rights, the new government was wiling to adhere to respect the rule 
of law and human rights. For example, a few months after assuming office, President 
Mwai Kibaki appointed a committee to look into modalities of establishing a truth, 
justice and reconciliation commission to address the historical injustices in the 
country. At the same time, the government operationalised the Kenya National 
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Commission on Human Rights, which guides the government in enacting sound 
policy on human rights. 
 
In addition, Kenya has signed and ratified all the major international human rights 
treaties but it has not fulfilled its reporting obligations to international bodies. At the 
same time it has not yet domesticated all international covenants.312 However, it is 
hoped that when the new constitution is enacted, it will secure the protection of all 
human rights.313 
 
Thus, with the new government, it was a chance to consolidate the human rights gains 
and at the same time realise more of them. However, the measures that the 
government has enacted in tackling terrorism have had an implication in the 
protection of human rights and tend to roll back the gains already made. 
 
 
6.3 Fighting terror or human rights? 
a) Establishment of the anti-terrorism police unit  
One of the things that the Kenyan government has done is to establish the anti-
terrorism unit. The unit started operating in February 2004 and is a branch of the 
police force. Members of the unit are selected from serving police officers and only 
‘those who display exemplary acumen in investigations and anti- terrorism are 
considered.’314 In addition, candidates have to do a month long special course on anti-
terrorism. Those who do well are picked and taken for further training locally, at the 
CID Training School, and internationally in countries like Israel, Egypt, United States 
and also at an American base in Botswana.315 
 
The anti- terrorism unit has been behind raids in areas suspected to have terrorist cells. 
The unit’s head, Andrew Kabetu says that the continuing arrests and prosecution of 
suspects attests to their success of the squad in the “war against terror”316 but suspects 
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who have been accuse the police of torturing them to extract information. At the same 
time, KHURINET has accused the unit of detaining and carrying out investigations in 
disregard of the law and respect of human rights. 
 
b) Treatment of “terrorist” suspects 
KHURINET observes that since the government started its campaign against 
terrorism, cases of torture, harassment, detention, intimidation and arbitrary arrest 
have increased. Though there are no statistics to prove this statement, the body argues 
that there has been an increase in reported cases of detention and torture from 
suspected terrorists. This is through reporting by the media or through fact-finding by 
their respective human rights organisations. 
 
In a press statement dated 21 October 2003, KHURINET specifically notes that the 
security apparatus by design or not has been engaged in arresting people at the Coast 
or in the North-Eastern part of the country, where many people are Muslims. 
KHURINET notes that suspects are hooded after arrest, put into a fast moving 
vehicle, then to an aeroplane and flown to distant places for interrogation. In addition, 
they accuse police of intimidating the suspects, holding them incommunicado, 
torturing them and denying them access to their relatives and lawyers. These 
accusations have been given credence by the testimonies of suspects. 
 
Abud Rogo Mohammed is one of the people charged with the 2002 Kikambala 
bombing.317 He was arrested on April 2, 2003 and taken to Mombasa central police 
station but was then shifted to Port police station where he was booked but the 
occurrence book was written, ‘not to be seen.’ When the family enquired his 
whereabouts from Mombasa police station, the police said he had gone home to bring 
his passport and his identity card. He was booked at Port police station but at around 
11.30p.m, he was put into a police vehicle which had armed police officers and 
camera. They then cocked their guns and told him that he has to tell them where a 
certain Abud Karim was. They then gave him a board written ‘terrorist’ and told him 
to hold it in front of his chest. He was then taken to Hadi police station in Karen 
                                                 
317 He gave his statement to People Against Torture (PAT), an NGO that researches, monitors and does advocacy 
work on issues to do with torture. 
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where he was constantly threatened with death if he did not say the whereabouts of 
Abud Karim and for three days he was not given food. 
 
After a few days, the officers came with three other plainclothes police who were 
introduced as FBI officers but in his statement, he says they had a Jewish accent. He 
refused to answer their questions and five days later, he was arraigned before Nairobi 
high court and charged with harbouring an unlawful person in Kenya. In court, it was 
the first time he was seeing his lawyer and family members since he was arrested and 
was released on a Kshs300,000 bond. However, he was immediately rearrested 
together with two other people - Mzee Kubwa and his son Councillor Mohamed - and 
later charged with murder, which according to Kenya’s law is not bailable. Their case 
is still continuing but they are the only people who have been arrested and arraigned 
on court in terrorism related charges. It should be noted that murder charges were 
preferred since Kenya does not have a terrorism law. 
 
The same scenario befell Akhmed Mohamed Surur who was arrested when going 
home from a mosque.318 After being arrested, Surur was pushed into a police car and 
a black hood was put on his head and it was only removed when they arrived at a 
residential place and his fingerprints were taken. The days that followed were full of 
beatings and interrogation by people who he claims had an American accent. His 
interrogators accused him of being a member of al-qaeda. When he refused the 
charges he was subjected to more beatings and torture including being subjected to 
electric shocks. He refused to sign some papers they were giving him and this led to 
more electric shocks.319 After three days, he was released and no charges were laid on 
him. 
 
The above cases provide a scenario of what suspects are undergoing under the hands 
of police officers. Torture, intimidation and threats characterise the interrogation 
methods. Though Kabetu avers that the suspects get access to their families and 
lawyers320 this has not been the case according to the suspects. They have to spend 
many days and most see their families when they are released from custody either by 
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to the police cannot be used as evidence in the case. This was done to eradicate torture. 
320 Interview with Andrew Kabetu, Nairobi July 2004 
  
 104 
the lawyers filing for habeas corpus in the court or being cleared after being tortured. 
As Beatrice avers, “most of the suspects are taken to courts when their lawyers 
intervene by obtaining a court order that calls upon the Police Commissioner to 
release the suspect or produce them in Court.”321 On keeping them long in custody 
more than the law allows, Kabetu is of the opinion that sometimes it takes time to 
interrogate suspects. However, this only serves to give police time and space to 
continually torture them. Furthermore, Kavetu noted that in cases where they have 
realised that they have arrested the wrong suspects, they have apologised to them. 
This however does not seem to be the case since no suspect interviewed talked about 
apologies from the police. In the case of Surur, the American embassy released a 
statement denying that the FBI were involved in torturing him saying they had no 
authority to carry out arrests in Kenya.322 
 
While the aim of torture is to extract confessions, it should be noted that it flourishes 
is situations of impunity and secrecy. Thus, it is hard for suspects to prove that they 
were tortured or get to know who tortured them. The torture and illegal detention have 
brought forth memories of the one-party state when people were routinely tortured to 
confess to crimes that they did not commit. Many innocent people were jailed in this 
manner. At the same time, police are acting with impunity following the start of the 
fight against terrorism. All these have a negative implication of human rights in 
Kenya as the gains made since over the years are being rolled back. The detentions 
and torture are in contrary to the U.N. resolution that calls on States to uphold human 
rights while combating terrorism. In addition, the police are supposed to be 
accountable to the law and should be prosecuted when they torture and illegally detain 
people. 
 
This culture of impunity, illegal arrests and detention is worrying the Muslim 
population that is living with fear of being arrested, confined and tortured. At the 
same time, the selective application of anti-terrorism measures has led to growth of 
Islam-phobia. 
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c) Growth of Islam-phobia 
It is noted that the operations of police swoops and arrests have only targeted Muslim 
populated areas. While it can be argued that Al-qaeda operatives will operate well in 
areas where there is a huge Muslim population, this only seeks to discriminate against 
the Muslim population. However, it also shows the influence of America’s “war on 
terror” since as Makau notes, the “war” is mainly focused on certain Islamic 
traditions.323 These actions have led to growth of xenophobia especially to people 
with Arabic features or attire. For example, a tourist to Nairobi from Dubai had gone 
to book a room at Panafric hotel, which is owned by an Israeli and is situated behind 
the Israeli embassy. The attendants refused to book him and called police on suspicion 
of being a terrorist since he was wearing a Muslim robe and had Arabic features. He 
was arrested and held in secret for seven days and when the police could not find any 
evidence linking him to terrorism, he was deported back to his country. 324 
 
In addition, some of the questions asked by the interrogators point that Islamic 
members are being targeted. Most of the suspects say they are asked by interrogators 
why they wear Muslim robes, the Islamic caps and why they grow long beards. Others 
are asked why they chose to help Madrassas (Muslim schools) and where they get 
their funding from. 325 These actions discriminate against the Muslim population and 
are against the U.N. charter that calls for States to carry out anti-terrorism measures 
without discriminating against minorities. 
 
That the Muslims feel being discriminated upon has led to them being suspicious of 
any assistance, especially from Western countries. In February 2004, Muslims refused 
an offer by the American government to fund Islamic religious schools (Madrassas) in 
Kenya.326 Muslim leaders expressed fears that the initiative could be a ploy by the US 
intelligence to manipulate the curriculum in the schools as part of its international 
anti-terrorist campaign. 327 It later emerged that the Ministry of Education had issued a 
directive requiring all madrassas in Kenya to be counted and to disclose their source 
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of funding. Muslims were suspicious of this directive since it was not applied to other 
institutions that were allied to religious organisations like the Catholic Church or 
Anglican. Furthermore, they suspected that the interest was based on suspicions that 
terrorist organisations had infiltrated religious schools on the Coast. Their argument 
was that the madrassas were being funded by NGOs that the Kenya government had 
banned for being suspected of terrorism links and called for them to be unbanned.  As 
the next section discusses, the banning of NGOs has implications for advancement of 
human rights in Kenya. 
 
d) Banning of NGO’s 
The Civil Society has played a big role in the quest for democracy and human rights 
in Kenya. As discussed earlier, it was through its mobilisation efforts and agitation for 
rights that the government started respecting human rights of Kenyans. NGO’s in 
Kenya are registered by the NGO coordination board, which was formed by the NGO 
co-ordination Act, 1990. Apart from getting their legitimacy from the people they 
serve, NGO’s are protected by the right of association enshrined in the Constitution. 
During the one-party era, most of the NGO’s that the government deemed as a threat 
were deregistered e.g. CLARION, was deregistered  and accused of disseminating 
material of a political character.328 In the wake of Kenya’s anti-terrorism efforts, 
Muslim NGO’s have been deregistered for suspicion of being linked to terrorist 
groups. 
 
In a letter to the diplomatic corps, the Supreme Council of Kenya and Council of 
Imam and Preachers raised concerns that Muslim NGO’s have been closed down yet 
they were providing humanitarian Aid in the Northern Province. The closures they 
say are done through various ways for example intimidation, threats of closure or 
asking them to expose their sources of funding. 
 
On September 1998, a month after the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in 
Nairobi, the NGO co-ordination board deregistered five Muslim NGO's for allegedly 
supporting terrorism. The board did neither detail the charges or give the NGO’s a 
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chance to defend themselves.329 Many Muslims severely criticized the closures and 
sought redress from the high court, which stayed the board's decision. However, three 
NGO’s appealed against the ruling and in December 1998 they were reinstated. 
 
Another banned organisation is Al-Haramain, which according to Kenyan Muslim 
leaders was supporting orphans and destitute children at Dadaab, Ifo Dagahle and 
Hagardeera camps.330 However, the US Treasury Department says the Al Haramain 
Islamic Foundation's branches in Tanzania, Indonesia, Pakistan and Kenya are used to 
provide financial, material and logistical support to Osama as well as other suspected 
terrorist organisations.331 The Kenya government also banned Al-Muntada Al-Islami, 
which had been funding several madrassas and health facilities in the country. Its 
Sudanese director, Sheikh Muawiya Hussein, was deported in January after the 
government questioned his status. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth has been 
having offices in Nairobi since the 1970’s was also banned. Others are AI-Ibrahim 
foundation and the Wakalatul-Rahmah offices in Nairobi. The AI-Najah Islamic 
Centre in Garissa town with its headquarters in Qatar is also on the verge of closure 
since it has not been able to remit the centre’s sponsorship funds due to US pressure 
to investigate its possible terrorism links. 
 
While financing terrorism is an issue that requires concerted efforts to arrest, the 
banning of NGO’s only seeks a short term solution and it is discrimination when it 
targets only those ran by a particular religious group. The concern is that the Kenya 
government may be tempted to ban NGO’s that it deems are a threat to the system for 
example in 1998, the government issued a circular indicated that NGOs sponsoring 
civic education are a threat to the security of the state and their activities must be 
curtailed. The fear is that the same could happen particularly in the light of the anti-
terror laws, where the government could say some NGO’s are linked to terrorists yet 
they were just calling on the government to be accountable to the people. In order to 
preserve the freedom of association and the place of civil society in democracy, the 
government should enact money laundering laws that will effectively expose where 
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the terrorist finances are going instead of banning the NGO’s. This ensures that the 
rule of law takes place and the NGO’s are subjected to a hearing before a court of law. 
 
6.4 Postscript 
As earlier noted, Kenya’s transition on December 2002 presented one of the best 
opportunities for Kenya to improve human rights in the country since the new 
government was elected on a platform of good governance and accountability. 
Despite NARC’s willingness to uphold the sanctity of human rights, its actions as 
discussed above have served to take the country steps backward in its quest for full 
realisation of democracy in Kenya and growth of human rights. 
 
Several reasons can explain this. To start with, while enacting the anti-terror 
measures, Kenya was following the provisions of UN Security Resolution 1375 
(2001) that called upon member states to take any necessary steps to combat all forms 
of terrorism. This resolution should be seen in accordance with the U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 57/219 which specifically focuses on the need to protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Thus, Kenya is obliged 
to observe human rights while countering terrorism but this has not been the case. 
This can be due to the fact that the country is being influenced by the international 
political culture, which is shaping the “war on terror.” Some countries have been 
abrogating from their human rights responsibilities while fighting terrorism and 
Kenya can be said to be emulating them. This is because there are no sanctions of 
retribut ions that they are suffering by doing this. 
 
At the same time, the International “war on terror” seems to be focused on the Muslim 
communities. Most of the international arrests of terrorism suspects have been 
Muslims and the fact that all of those who committed the attacks of September 11 are 
Muslims attests to the notion that Muslims are the ones engaged in international 
terrorism. In this respect Kenya has not engaged in enacting countrywide measures 
that arrest terrorism, but it has concentrated its efforts in Muslim dominated areas. 
Police swoops and arrests have been carried out in Muslim areas and the NGO’s 
banned have been the ones ran by Muslims. This clearly shows the international 
influence of the “war on terror” on Kenya as it has served to target Muslims and 
Kenya likewise does so. 
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It is thus clear that Kenya’s effort to address terrorism threaten the very foundation of 
democracy in Kenya, namely the preservation of human rights and the rule of law. In 
addition, counter-terrorism measures targeting specific ethnic or religious groups are 
contrary to human rights and would carry the additional risk of an upsurge of 
discrimination. The same scenario emerges with an analysis of Kenya’s draft anti-
terror bill, the Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003. 
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Chapter seven 
 
The draft Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003 
The September 11 attacks and the “war on terror” have had an impact on the 
promotion and implementation of international legal standards including international 
humanitarian law and the fundamental instruments of human rights and refugee law. 
When a state has been attacked by terrorists, it has a right to prevent further attacks 
and its primary duty is to safeguard national interests. This is especially so when the 
terrorists are beyond the reach of its national jurisdiction and one of the ways to do 
this is to enact anti-terror legislation.  
 
International law allows the suspension of certain rights in times of emergencies. 
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides that a State in situations threatening the life of a nation, may issue formal 
declaration suspending certain human rights guarantees. However, scholars have 
argued that most governments in times of emergencies like terrorist attacks have 
hurriedly moved to enact anti-terror legislations, which override both established 
process and rational action thus having a negative effect on the vulnerable and 
disenchanting sections of society.332 In addition, Derep notes that some governments 
abuse this prerogative through continuous invocations of “special powers” to pass 
“national security” legislations providing for administrative detention with limited, if 
any, judicial review thus making them part of criminal law. 333 
 
This chapter analyses Kenya’s draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 as legislation 
arising from emergency conditions that have been created by terrorist activities of 
September 11. To do this, the chapter traces the place of law in society and the 
various mechanisms of creating a viable law. Furthermore, it interrogates various 
notions of power that are manifested in society and how the law regulates and 
formalises them. It then proceeds to interrogate the contentious provisions in the draft 
bill and analyses how they impact on the human rights situation in Kenya. 
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7.1 Law as an arena for struggle 
Law is an arena for contestation as well as a social phenomenon and a part of life that 
permeates all realms of social behaviour.334 Since the early times, law has been used 
in society to regulate behaviour and ensure good co-existence of members in a 
society. Therefore, law grows out of societal mores and shades into them but it 
acquires a higher pedestal than mores since it is backed by the state.335 However, law 
most of the times tries to limit these mores and bring it into direct conflict with the 
people’s interests and as it will be discussed later, Kenya’s anti-terror draft bill is in 
direct conflict with the rights of people by trying to limit operations of their lives. 
Thus, in assessing the role of law in society it should be noted that it is a product of 
social and cultural contestation that is subject to various kinds of interpretation and 
manipulation. 
 
Early Marxist theories stressed that law is a device for repression and “its importance 
is as an agency of direct class power, controlled by or acting on behalf of the 
dominant class.”336 Thus, they viewed law as a tool of coercion and ideological 
domination where it is used to protect the private property of capitalists. The thrust of 
the Marxist arguments is that law is made by the ruling class whose ideas dominate 
them and the courts and judges are elites. As such, they will tend to perpetuate the 
ideas of the ruling class over the rest of the people and continue dominating them. In 
order to cover up the domination, the courts offer small victories to the dominated 
people so that they can feel they are a part of the system. However, this notion has 
been challenged since law provides the avenue for protecting private property by 
criminalising attacks on them, thus defending the interests of the existing order. 
Furthermore, a capitalist system cannot be maintained through repression and 
coercion alone.337 At the same time, law provides a legitimate ground of which 
workers can mobilise and associate through trade unions and other labour 
organisations where they can agitate for their rights. If there was no law, these 
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grounds of legitimacy would be lacking. Hence, law is a battle ground where different 
class struggles take place and legitimise the actions of the oppressed when they rally 
against the ruling class demanding their rights. In essence, the law affects all the 
facets of the workers lives and does not just serve as a source of domination. 
 
Since law is a point of contestation, it is clear that sound legal doctrine emerges from 
the social action, disputes and political conflict involving the people. Therefore, the 
law written at any one time “is no more than a static representation of a process which 
is always continuing…and it acquires meaning and significance only in relation to the 
social conditions in which it is developed, interpreted and applied.”338 In addition, the 
government before formulating a new law should carry out a preliminary survey of 
the social setting and communicate to people why there is a need for new 
legislation. 339 This will make the entire process be legitimate and ensure there are no 
handles in implementation. 
 
At the same time it should be borne in mind that law is both an expression of power 
relations and an important mechanism for formulating and regulating such 
relations.340 When people need to exercise their power, they depend upon the law and 
legal structures to organise and provide the avenue. These structures are borne out of 
political and social struggles and thus can be used to challenge and sustain power 
relations for example the Constitutional courts. Due to the law’s ability to exercise its 
own power by regulating relations and legitimising the actions of various actors, it has 
two distinct features: it serves as a source of domination and also it provides 
possibilities where the domination can be challenged. As such, the concern therefore 
should not be that law is shaped and serves the elite but also is an instrument for 
organisation and extension of power relations.341 This is due to the fact that law 
protects the powerless by directing the power over them into relatively predictable 
forms.342 Nevertheless, the question of how power is possessed and consequently 
exercised has been a point of contestation. 
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7.2 Law and contestation of power 
According to Thomas Hobbes, power is static and is derived from an authority that 
reserves the right to exercise it.343 Writing after the England civil war, Hobbes argued 
that the Monarch had the power to restore order in the country. In this regard, he was 
of the view that the State is always right, as long as it is capable of maintaining civil 
peace. Furthermore, Hobbes saw law as being dependent on power. Thus, a law 
without a credible and powerful authority behind ,it is just simply not a law in any 
meaningful sense. In essence, he propagated the notion of legal positivism, which 
means that justice is whatever the law says it is.344  
 
Marx Weber, holds the view that power is when one person has the capacity to carry 
out his own will against the wishes of the other for example person A has power over 
person B. this notion of power has been called the distributive approach to power 
since it assumes the gaining of person’s A power leads to the decrease of person’s B 
power. In contrast, Talcott Parsons conceives power as a property of social systems. 
He views power in terms of casual effect on social agency but notes that the origin of 
the effect is not another social agency, but rather a social subsystem. According to 
Parson’s view of power, it “is a specific mechanism operating to bring about the 
changes in the action of other units, individual or collective, in the process of social 
interaction.”345 In order for the system to work, it is assumed that social systems are 
open, and engaged in continual interchange of inputs and outputs with their 
environments. Moreover, the different internal subcomponents are also continually 
involved in processes of interchange.346 Thus, power is divided and allocated along 
the subsystems, and it is a collective feature. This means that person A and B may co-
operate and enhance their power over person C. The distributive and collective forms 
of power though are important dimensions of phenomena of power they are not the 
only ones. 
 
Stephen Luke holds that social actors shape the actions and wants of other people and 
these actors act according to structurally determined limits. However, it should be 
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borne that the actors have relative autonomy in the sense that they could have always 
acted differently. 347 This means that even though the structure will determine how a 
person wields power, he has the option of changing this and thus Luke privileged the 
agency over the structure. Luke also argues that contestation of power takes place not 
only in overt and covert conflicts, but also in latent conflicts, which he calls the third 
force of power.348  
 
In the overt conflict, it involves making decisions over issues where different 
individuals or groups express different policy preferences and as such, there is direct 
conflict among the people. For example, when the government proposes a law, it may 
be contentious and the people may protest against it. However, the government may 
take it to Parliament and coerce members of parliament to pass it and this way, power 
lies with the government. The covert or non-decision making conflict of power 
involves using power to prevent certain decisions or discussions from being made. 
Using the same example of a government, it may not draft a particular bill arguing 
that it wants the citizens to publicly debate whether there  is need to legislate over the 
issue or not. Hence, it makes the public feel that they are being involved with the 
running of the country yet the government is using its power not to draw up the bill, 
which might threaten its own interests. The conflict thus is hidden by those in power 
and hence to understand it, interests and issues have to be identified that either gain or 
are systematically excluded from the political agendas. 
 
The latent conflict of power occurs when potential issues are kept out of politics, 
whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through 
individual decisions. This conflict mostly occurs in disempowered communities 
where the people have been oppressed for a long time such that they do not have any 
sense of making demands or resisting. Thus, these people are empowered and start 
resisting oppression and start demanding the government to rightfully cater for their 
needs. Through empowerment, the people thus are able to invoke the rights language 
that will enable the authorities to note their demands and act upon them. It is noted 
that the overt and covert conflicts are a direct consequence of grievances, but in the 
case of latent conflict there are no articulated grievances and the people are just 
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empowered, they become aware of their true interests and hence the notion of third 
force. This idea of power falls within Foucault’s arguments that power is not 
individually possessed but exercised through small proportions and can be analysed 
from bottom-up.349 Thus, power strategies are guided by a series of aims and 
objectives, which cannot be mastered by an individual subject.350 That is why during 
emergencies, the state can use its power to suspend certain rights but at the same time, 
the citizens can challenge this through mobilisation and agitation for their rights. This 
kind of power shows that power is not vested in one place and is exercised by micro-
structures, leading to small instances of resistances of subordination. 
 
The next section interrogates Kenya’s draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 
employing Foucault’s notion of power and as well noting that law is a point of 
contestation. It observes that even though law can be used to acquire human rights, it 
can also be used to deprive the same rights and hence it is an arena of struggle over 
power. However, through contestation and agitation for human rights at the local 
levels, society can achieve the desired change that is not being guaranteed by the law. 
This is so because human beings are not just victims of an ever-expanding power, but 
can also exercise power in their own way and the concept of agitation for human 
rights is a measure of doing so. This entails embracing the idea of law as an arena of 
struggle over power and the agitation of rights is a reason in this regard. 
 
 
7.3 Exegesis of the bill 
Kenya’s Attorney General Amos Wako on April 30, 2003 published in the Kenya 
Gazette the draft Suppression of terrorism bill, 2003. The bill is set to introduce an 
Act of parliament to provide measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist 
activities; to amend the extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act and the 
extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries) Act; and for related purposes.351 The 
draft bill was in line with fulfilling the requirements of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) that called upon member states to take any necessary steps to 
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combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the charter.352 However, it should be 
noted that the government drafted the bill without consulting relevant organisations 
like human rights groups. The Law Society of Kenya (LSK)353 and Kenya Human 
Rights Network (KHURINET)354 immediately after the draft bill was published 
faulted the government that it did not consult them or any other concerned parties 
while drafting the bill yet this was the expected practice. 
 
a) Problem of definition 
In trying to define terrorism, the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003, provides a 
general and narrow definition of ‘terrorism’ and what constitutes ‘acts of terrorism.’ 
Section 3(1) of the bill states that,  
“terrorism” means the use or threat of action where …action used or 
threatened involves serious violence against a person; involves serious 
damage to property; endangers the life of any person other than the 
one committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health or safety 
of the public or a section of the public. 
The draft bill does not define what constitutes an “act” of terrorism or a threat of 
terrorism, leaving it to law enforcement agencies and the State to decide what an “act” 
or “threat” of terrorism entails. At the same time, Section 3(1) (a) of the draft bill 
takes ordinary criminal acts of assault, damage to property (malicious or otherwise), 
public health, and criminal trespass and classifies them as “terrorism” hence a person 
who has maliciously damaged property can be imprisoned for life when charged 
under this law. 
 
Sections 3 (1) (b) and (c) of the draft bill further defines terrorism as,  
“the use or threat designed to influence the government or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public; the use or threat is 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.”  
The draft bill however does not define what is the politically, or religiously correct 
ideology. This leaves the State and police to interpret what consists of political and 
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353 LSK registers and licenses all practicing lawyers in Kenya 
354 This is the umbrella body of the Human Rights organizations in Kenya 
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religious activities that will amount to terrorism. If a person is convicted of terrorism, 
one is liable for life imprisonment. 
c) State sovereignty 
The draft Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 section 3(2) (d) defines a “government” 
as “the government of Kenya or of a country other than Kenya”. This means that if 
the draft bill is enacted it would apply even to other countries and not only Kenya. 
Furthermore, Section 3(2)(c) of the draft bill says, “a reference to the public includes 
a reference to the public of a country other than Kenya.” Hence under this draft, the 
threat to be addressed does not have to be against Kenyans only, but also of another 
foreign country. 
In line with section 3 (2), section 34(1) of the draft bill states that, 
“where a foreign State makes a request for assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of an offence related to terrorism, or for 
the tracking, attachment or forfeiture of terrorist property located in 
Kenya, the Attorney General shall execute the request; or inform the 
foreign State making the request of any reason for not executing the 
request forthwith or for delaying the execution of the request.”  
This means that the Kenya government is required to extradite any person requested 
by another country for terrorism charges as soon as the request is made. However, the 
process of extradition is not spelt out. Furthermore, the Attorney General does not 
bear responsibility for anything that person undergoes in the foreign country. Besides 
this, the draft bill allows foreign security agents to operate in the country and arrest 
Kenyans without the government being involved. 
 
c) Right to secure protection of the law 
Section 9 of the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 gives the Minister in charge 
of National Security unfettered power to declare any organization that he deems, a 
terrorist organization. There is no criterion listed that he can employ to arrive at a 
declaration that an organization is a terrorist organization but only needs to publish 
the declaration in the Kenya Gazette. If a particular organization is declared to be a 
terrorist organisation, it effectively means that it is an offence to take part in any 
affairs of the said organization. Hence, according to section 10 (1) of the draft bill, a 
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person who belongs or professes to belong to a terrorist organisation is at once guilty 
of an offence by the fact that the Minister has proscribed the organisation. In addition, 
it becomes an offence to support the banned group in any manner or address members 
of the group and if one is holding a private meeting with one of the members, he has 
to prove to the court that the meeting was not for terrorism purposes. 
 
Furthermore, the draft bill in section 6(3) (a) and (b) state that,  
“if, in proceedings for an offence under this section it is proved that an 
article was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or was on 
premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually 
used otherwise than as a member of the public, the court may assume 
that the accused possessed the article, unless he satisfies the court that 
he did not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no 
control over it.”  
Thus, a person who is caught with goods suspected to be used for terrorism purposes 
has to prove to the court that he was not aware that they were for terrorism purposes 
or had no control over them. 
 
 
d) Freedom of speech, assembly and association 
The whole of section 3 of the draft bill which defines terrorism puts into cross 
purpose the freedom of speech, assembly and association. As I will show later, the 
section puts into threat the existence of lobby groups and social movements since the 
Minister of National Security can declare them terrorist organisations and hence they 
cease to operate. 
 
Under section 12(1), the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 limits what a person 
can wear. The section states, 
“a person who, in a public place wears an item of clothing; or wears, 
carries or displays an article, in such a way or in such circumstances 
as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a members or supporter of 
a declared terrorist organization.”  
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The draft bill does not elaborate what is “reasonable suspicion” or spell out the attire 
of terrorist organisations. It is left to the discretion of police to judge what consists of 
terrorist clothing or any other clothing that arouses suspicion. 
 
e) Right to protection of property 
Sections 13 up to 23 of The draft Suppression of terrorism bill, 2003  give security 
officers permission to seize your property any time when they have “reasonable 
grounds to suspect” that the property is for terrorist activities. In particular, section 
21(3) and (4) of the draft bill, says that an authorised officer only needs to suspect a 
person of being a terrorist and without any criminal proceedings pending against a 
suspect, proceed to seize the property and cash. Furthermore, section 26(1) of the 
draft bill gives police officers authority to search suspect’s premises without a court 
warrant. The sections says,  
“where in the case of urgency, communication with a judge to obtain a 
warrant would cause delay that may be prejudicial to the maintenance 
of public safety or public order, a police officer of or above the rank of 
Inspector may, notwithstanding any other Act, with the assistance of 
such other members of the police force as may be necessary, (a) enter 
and search any premises or place, if he has reason to suspect that, 
within those premises or that place and offence under this Act is being 
committed …(b) search any person or vehicle found on any premises 
or place which he is empowered to enter and search under paragraph 
(a); stop, board and search any vessel, aircraft or vehicle if he has 
reason to suspect that there is in it evidence of the commission or 
likelihood of commission of an offence under this Act;….(e) arrest and 
detain any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed 
or of being about to commit an offence under this Act.” 
 
Even though section 21(4) introduces the need for a court order to make the seizure 
legal, the property has already been seized and then the officer goes to seek the High 
Court’s ex parte order to detain the money. This means that it is only the authorized 
officer who goes to court in the first instance, and he can plead his case before the 
Judge concerning the suspicion of the seized cash being “terrorist property”, without 
the accused or his lawyer being there to be heard. 
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e) Protection from torture, inhuman treatment and extrajudicial killings 
Section 26 (1, e) and (2) of the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 allows 
detention and possible torture of suspects since when under detention a person is at 
the mercy of the police. It says that police can “arrest and detain any person whom he 
reasonably suspects of having committed or of being about to commit an 
offence…may be detained by a member of the police force until the completion of 
investigations.”  Alongside this, section 30 provides that a suspect can be held 
incommunicado without contact or access to a lawyer, doctor, spouse, relative or 
friend for 36 hours. 
Furthermore, section 40 (2) and (3) of the draft bill allows the police to use 
“reasonable” force for the purpose of enforce the bill when in becomes law. However, 
the police officer will not be held liable in case of death or injury of suspects; damage 
or loss of property. 
f) Right to privacy 
Under section 27 of the draft bill, the Second Schedule is given effect that a police 
officer can require a financial institution to provide him with information about a 
particular customer for the purposes of investigation. The institution is obliged to give 
the information in any manner that the officer desires and it is an offence for the 
financial institution not to give the information. Consequently, the police officer is 
authorised under section 40(2) to use reasonable force to get the information. At the 
same time, the draft bill in section 33 - 35 authorizes the Attorney General and Police 
Commissioner to divulge to foreign state information relating to the tracking, 
attachment or forfeiture of terrorist property located in Kenya as long as they make a 
request on this regard. With the information obtained from the financial institutions, a 
police officer can then proceed to declare such an account holder’s cash held by the 
bank terrorist property, whereupon he can seize it, and the bank would have 
absolutely no choice but to give the police officer the money. 
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7.4 Human rights concerns arising from the draft Suppression of Terrorism 
Bill 2003 
One of the concerns arising from the draft bill is that it gives the police unfettered and 
unchecked powers over citizens. Since the definition of terrorism is not clearly 
defined, the police have just to prove that there exists a “threat” of the described 
situations. The nature of envisaged “threat” is also not outlined in the draft bill and 
this gives the police and other people leeway to do anything to prove that there is a 
“threat” or a particular action is an “act” of terrorism. The implication of this for 
human rights in Kenya is that the broad definition of terrorism can include legitimate 
forms of political protest. If passed in its current form, the draft bill can be used to 
prosecute people holding demonstrations against government policies, striking 
workers, and people opposing land grabbing or engaging in a civil disobedience 
campaign. The concern is that the government can use its power to victimise people 
or organisations that are against its policies. It should be borne in mind that Kenya 
achieved independence and multi-party democracy through acts of civil disobedience 
and mass action that the draft bill will render as “acts of terrorism” hence proscribe 
organisations propagating such ideologies. 
 
Hence, it is vital that a precise and relevant definition of what consists of terrorism or 
acts of terror is made to protect Kenyans from the police or other authorities who may 
use the draft bill to stifle political agitation. In other words, the draft bill gives law 
enforcement agencies a wide choice of possible criteria and circumstances to pick and 
choose which one might best suit the event to inescapably classify any kind of mildly 
unlawful act as “terrorist acts.” 
 
Furthermore, the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 does not define what is the 
politically, or religiously correct ideology, leaving the state and police to interpret 
what consists of political and religious ideologies that will amount to terrorism. This 
clause would also impede churches from preaching about politics since it would be 
termed as propagating terrorism. Section 78(1) of the Constitution of Kenya clearly 
allows a person enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, freedom of thought and of 
religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, to manifest and propagate his 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The draft 
Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 therefore goes against the Kenyan constitution by 
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muzzling the freedom of religion since it tries to dictate what religion a person should 
belong to and what should be preached. 
 
The fear of police misusing their powers stems from Kenya’s experience during the 
colonial era and one party state when the law enforcement agencies were extensively 
used to harass people agitating for pluralism. As Atsang’o Chesoni notes, “the 
colonial purpose of the Kenya police and other security apparatus was to protect the 
British and their interests. The post-colonial Kenyan regimes have never addressed 
this philosophical genesis…and the purpose of the police was and remains…to 
contain the “natives” particularly troublesome democratic elements and protect the 
Mzungu’s (whites) property.”355 Thus, the same thing might happen, especially in the 
case where the Minister in Charge of National Security has the absolute powers to 
declare an organisation as a terrorist organisation. Under Kenyan law, the Police are 
answerable to the Minister in Charge of National Security hence they will do what he 
commands them to do. 
Kenya has the option of passing legislation that narrowly defines terrorism and 
thereby limits acts of terrorism to those offences already described in existing U.N. 
conventions or it can strengthen existing laws to target activities like drug trafficking 
and proliferation of small arms.356 If, however, the government insists on going for a 
broader definition, then it should ensure that there are exclusion clauses to limit the 
impact of the definition. This would include protests, demonstrations, strikes and 
advocacy, provided they are not intended to endanger persons, cause harm or damage 
to property or pose a risk to public health and safety. 357 
Another human rights concern that emanates from the draft bill is that Kenya’s 
sovereignty is going to be undermined if the draft bill is enacted the way it is. The 
draft bill provides for foreign security agents to work in the country, sometimes 
without the assistance of Kenya police. This is an avenue that can be used to harass 
people and instil fear in them especially the minorities and vulnerable in society.  The 
draft bill also calls upon the government to extradite a terrorist suspect to any country 
                                                 
355 Chesoni, Atsang’o, ‘International terrorism and problems of emergency responses, Security Issues and 
economic consequences,’ Unpublished paper presented at the Eastern and Southern African Colloquim on 
measures to combat and eliminate terrorism on July 4-6, 2004 
356 Kagari Michelle, ‘Home-grown anti-terror bill best option,’ Daily Nation, April 3, 2004 
357 ibid 
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that requests this to be done and if the Attorney General does not do this in the 
required time, he should explain the delay. The implication of this for human rights is 
that the government can extradite a Kenyan wanted in another country for terrorism 
charges without it being held responsible for anything that he/she undergoes in the 
foreign country. International human rights law provides that a government should not 
extradite a suspect if it believes the suspect is going to undergo torture or ill treatment 
in the country he is going to be taken. This appears not to be considered in the draft 
bill as the Attorney General is required to extradite the suspect as soon as he gets the 
request. At the same time, the due process of extradition which the Attorney General 
will have to follow is not outlined in the draft bill. 
In addition, section 3(2) provides that the draft bill if it becomes law can operate in 
and outside Kenya. However, this is not enforceable since Kenya’s courts have no 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, unless the Constitution is amended to widen their 
jurisdiction. The draft bill thus violates section 1 of the Kenyan Constitution, which 
states that Kenya is a sovereign republic meaning the Kenyan laws can only apply to 
Kenyans and not any other nationals, expect in cases where foreigners have 
committed crimes within the country. The implication for human rights if the draft bill 
is passed with this section is that the country will have given away its sovereignty to 
other countries. 
The draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 undermines the right to secure protection 
of the law in that the police are given powers of arresting a suspect or conducting a 
search without having a warrant. In addition, they can seize property and cash and 
keep it until the time a suspect proves that he is not a terrorist. Section 9 of the Penal 
code, Cap 63 of the Kenyan Constitution, guarantees that any person charged with a 
criminal offence, shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded 
guilty. Furthermore, section 75 of the Kenya Constitution guarantees property rights 
and clearly stipulates the procedure to be followed if at all such property is to be 
compulsorily acquired by the State, and the police must have a warrant. The draft bill 
thus goes against the present Constitution in that it takes the presumption of 
innocence away and places the accused the onus of proving innocence in a court of 
law, meaning one is pronounced guilty before being heard. In the same manner, it 
goes against the provisions of section 75 on how the seizure of property is to be done. 
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The implication of this for human rights is that innocent people will be taken to court 
on terrorism charges and when they cannot prove their innocence, they are hauled to 
jail for not more than ten years or a fine or both. 
 
Furthermore, the draft bill does not provide an avenue for the suspect to appeal 
against the detention of property or an unfair court ruling. Even though section 21(4) 
introduces the need for a court order to make the seizure legal, the property has 
already been seized and then the officer goes to seek the High Court’s ex parte order 
to detain the money. This means that it is only the authorized officer who goes to 
court in the first instance, and he can plead his case before the Judge concerning the 
suspicion of the seized cash being “terrorist property”, without the accused or his 
lawyer being there to be heard. In this regard, there is no fair treatment of the accused 
as he is not given any hearing and the Judge has to rely on one side of the evidence to 
give the order. It is a miscarriage of justice and deprivation of the right to a fair trial. 
With this clause, the purpose of courts will be to sanction what the executive has ruled 
to be right or wrong and not serve to check its exercise of power. When police are 
given these unchecked powers to seize property at will and detain it, the worry is that 
it is a provision that can be used to harass and intimidate people. In addition, the 
police may put evidence on the suspect’s property as they are known to do when they 
do not find proof when conducting searches. Furthermore, the draft bill does not 
address the issue of compensation to those suspects who have been innocently 
prosecuted. Therefore, sufficient Constitutional safeguards are required to protect the 
suspect. 
The seizure of property may be seen in line with the provision of accessing a 
suspect’s bank account. The draft bill provides unlimited access by police to a 
suspect’s bank account and financial deals. As earlier noted, if the bill becomes law, 
when the police ask details from the bank about a particular client, the bank is 
supposed to give the information immediately or the police would use reasonable 
force to get the information. The implication of this is that despite being an 
infringement of the right to privacy under section 70(c) of the Kenyan constitution, 
police again would be given unlimited powers to get information from financial 
institutions.  Kenya does not yet have an anti- laundering law and Section 19 of the 
draft anti-terror bill seems to cater for this. It is noted that the UN General Assembly 
  
 125 
resolution 51/210 of 1996, paragraph 3(f), called upon all states to take steps to 
prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of 
terrorist activities and together with terrorist organisations, whether such financing is 
direct or indirect through organisations which have or claim to have charitable, social 
or cultural goals. However, the problem arises where it is not clear that the money is 
being used for terrorist activities yet the police have already frozen it. 
The implication for human rights is that apart from convicting the suspect before trial, 
the suspect has no chance of appeal and the police can keep the cash frozen until the 
time they are sure it is not been used for terrorist activities. The draft bill does not 
provide a framework of how long the police can detain the cash, leaving it up to them 
to decide the timeframe. This is a provision that is bound to be abused by harassing 
people whom the government wants to curtail their political activities. It would also 
create a climate of fear and it will be hard for NGO’s to exist as they will be always 
expected to account where they get their funding from and where it is channelled. 
Some may close down as the government scrutiny may make the donors who may not 
be comfortable in funding them, especially those who wish to remain anonymous. At 
the same time, the provision may be used to harass NGO’s led by Muslims and they 
can be accused of getting finances from terrorists. 
 
The draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 if enacted the way it currently stands, 
will take away the vibrancy of social movements, lobby groups and other institutions 
that agitate for democracy and accountability of the government. This is so because 
when they become very active, the government may be tempted to curb their activities 
by labelling them terrorist groups hence ban them. This concern is due to the fact that 
the declaration of the terrorist status of an organization is unilateral and vested 
absolutely in the Minister in charge of national security. Hence, the potential for 
abuse of these declarative powers is diverse especially for political purposes. At the 
same time, the act of the Minister declaring an organization a terrorist one is in 
disregard of the due process of justice that entitles suspects innocence before being 
judged and also entitles one to a full hearing before a competent impartial court of 
law. Since according to section 11 (1) it will be a crime to associate with a group that 
has been declared a terrorist organisation, this puts into risk lawyers and activists who 
may want to challenge the ban since they cannot openly lobby for the unbanning of 
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the “terrorist” organisation without being accused of being terrorist themselves. The 
draft bill thus contravenes section 80 of the Kenya Constitution, which guarantees an 
individual’s right of association, free assembly and association, as well as freedom to 
form or belong to trade unions or other associations. It should be noted that Kenya’s 
independence and multi-party democratic space was realized through agitation 
through trade unions, lobby groups, churches and other associations. 
 
The draft bill makes it an offence for someone to wear an article of clothing which 
gives rise to reasonable suspicion that the article can be used for terrorism purposes. 
The onus is placed on police to determine what constitutes an item that can be used 
for terrorism purposes, and this provision can be abused to implicate Muslims and 
their loose attire (Kanzu or women’s Hijab). It only requires a police officer to say 
that the Muslim attire arouses reasonable suspicion that the wearer belongs to a 
terrorist organisation. Applied this way, it leads to discriminations against Muslims. 
Furthermore, this section if enacted will make it illegal for a person to wear or display 
an item of clothing that will be deemed politically incorrect, for example T-shirts and 
caps with political inscriptions. Therefore, this would be an abrogation of the right to 
free speech. The implication is that this will effectively stifle political opposition and 
agitation for the fear of being branded terrorists, eroding freedom of thought and 
conscience. 
 
Though the 1997 Constitutional reforms outlawed police detention, the draft bill 
provides for police to detain suspects indefinitely giving leeway for possible torture. 
The draft bill while allowing police to detain suspects also provides that in case a 
suspect dies in the course of investigation for terrorist purposes, police will not be 
liable for prosecution. At the same time, under the draft bill a suspect is neither 
allowed access to a personal doctor nor a lawyer. This directly contravenes 
International law and Kenyan laws that provide a suspects right to a private doctor 
and counsel. It should be noted that the history of Kenya’s government doctors is that 
most of the times they have been compromised by the state and do not implicate 
police officers who have tortured suspects. Thus, they are accomplices to torture and 
most of the times they cannot be relied upon to give an independent report on the 
treatment of suspects while in custody. This was the case during the 1980’s at the 
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height of political repression.  358 By allowing detention and possible torture, the 
government does not show the connection between the powers given to police, the 
emergency inherent or the results they are going to achieve. It is what Derep warns 
when he notes that in case of emergencies, states may be tempted to suspend the due 
process and fair trials and create situations that lead to contribute to violations of non-
derogable rights.359 
 
The draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 sanctions impunity when it absolves the 
police of any liability of suspect’s death who is being investigated for terrorism. The 
implication of this for human rights is that police can shoot and kill people or torture 
them to death and not be charged for murder. This will lead to legitimisation of extra-
judicial executions and it can be an easy way of settling scores where the police will 
shoot people and brand them terrorists. For example, opposition leaders and other 
people who are perceived dissidents could be killed after being branded terrorists and 
the police will not be answerable. This is counter to the provision of section 71 (1) of 
the Kenyan Constitution that says no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally. 
In line with this, the draft bill does not address the issue of compensation to those 
suspects who have been innocently prosecuted.  Thus, the government should put 
mechanisms to ensure compensation for terrorist victims and this as Cotterrell notes is 
an incentive for the people to use the legislation360 since they are benefiting from 
getting damage awards or compensation. 
 
After the draft bill was published, there were protests from KHURINET, LSK and 
religious groups as well as other Kenyans who viewed it as a backward step back of 
the gains made in enacting a human rights culture in the country. KHURINET 
immediately launched a campaign pressuring the government to withdraw the draft 
while the LSK warned the government that the bill was against the Kenya Bill of 
Rights and would be successfully challenged in the Constitutional Court. At the same 
time, the LSK and KHURINET faulted the government that it did not consult the 
                                                 
358 During the 1980’s, suspects who were tortured were examined by government doctors who issued reports that 
most of the injuries were self-inflicted thus absolving the police from blame. However, many of the suspects when 
released sought medication abroad and some were permanently paralysed, a situation that could have been 
avoided if the torture wounds were attended to properly when they were still fresh. See also Kenya Human Rights 
Commission, Mission to Repress, KHRC, 1998 
359 Jinks, Derep, opcit  pg 363 
360 Cotterrell, Roger, opcit pg 63 
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body or any other concerned parties while drafting the bill hence that is why it fell 
short of expectations.  
 
In its campaign, KHURINET constantly issued press statements and paid up 
advertisements in the media highlighting the faults of the bill. It at the same time 
petitioned MPs, organised protest rallies and demonstrations urging the government to 
reconsider the draft bill. Though condemning terrorism as a violation of human rights 
and pledged support for any positive government efforts to curb terrorism, 
KHURINET feared that the proposed law will draw back the gains made in the 
struggle to achieve democratic rights as it threatens the rights of all Kenyans.361 In an 
opinion column, Makau Mutua termed the proposed draft bill as “a draconian piece of 
legislation that, if enacted, would create a republic of fear, violate a broad range of 
basic human rights and effectively repeal the Bill of Rights in the constitution.”362 
Human rights lawyer Ng’ang’a Thiong’o summarised the bill as “an assault on 
Kenya’s sovereignty and dignity as it takes away all that Kenyans have so dearly 
fought for in the last 30 years in terms of human rights and fundamental individual 
freedoms.”363 
 
KHURINET was of the view that the draft bill did not serve Kenyans interest and 
suspected that it was being pushed for enactment by foreign countries. As Beatrice 
Kamau who was heading the campaign says, "while the US Patriot Act is crafted in 
such a manner that targets foreigners and preserves the fundamental rights of 
American citizens, our own legislation seeks to reinvent the suppression of the 
fundamental rights and throws the bill of rights out of the window."364 Makau takes 
the debate further when he says the draft bill was not drafted by Kenyans or based on 
Kenya’s needs but it originated in Britain. 365 He adds that both Britain and the U.S. 
are intimidating and coercing Kenya into enacting unnecessary law into their hands.366 
The drafts people at the Attorney General’s office who were interviewed expressed 
                                                 
361 The Kenya Human Rights Network statement to the press on “The suppression of terrorism bill 2003” issued on 
November 16, 2003. 
362 Mutua, Makau, ‘Kenyans must reject anti-terrorism bill,’ Daily Nation, July 2, 2003 
363 Interview with Ng’ang’a Thiong’o in Nairobi. He is a human rights lawyer and chairperson of Release Political 
Prisoners lobby group. 
364 Interview with Beatrice Kamau, Nairobi. 
365 Mutua, Makau, ‘Kenyans must reject anti-terrorism bill,’ Daily Nation, July 2, 2003 
366 ibid 
  
 129 
the same sentiments saying they were dictated as to the contents of the bill. Though 
they did the actual drafting, the extent to which they went into proposing measures to 
curtail human rights in the fight against terrorism, “even left the foreign embassies 
amazed”367 
 
In the meantime, the LSK set up a committee to draw up an alternative anti-terror bill 
that was going to cater for the human rights concerns that it felt were not present in 
the bill. In addition, the Kenyan National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) 
which is the government human rights implementing organ offered to draw an 
alternative bill that will arrest the human rights concerns. 
 
By engaging in the campaign, KHURINET and other organisations were able to shape 
power relations in Kenya by mobilising and agitating people to fight for their rights 
guided by the aim of protecting rights that were under threat from the provisions of 
the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003. This kind of power shows that power is 
exercised by micro-structures, leading to small instances of resistances of 
subordination. In essence, it means that the group did not rely only on legal strategies 
to ensure protection of rights, but it also engaged in mobilisation and considered 
litigation as one of the strategies for acquiring rights. This entailed employing 
counter-hegemonic strategies, where legal rights for example freedom of assembly 
and association were used to agitate and mobilise for rights that were threatened by 
the draft anti- terror bill. This is possible because of the law’s ability to disguise 
domination by its invocation of neutrality, autonomy and formal equality before the 
law. 368 
 
Gramsci argues that hegemony is exercised in political, cultural, and economic 
domains through consent and coercion and it changes as class interests and material 
conditions change.369 Hence to engage in counter-hegemony, one has to reclaim and 
re-appropriate the myth that has being propagated to create the hegemony. This is 
because the myth helps to organise a collective will and has the capacity to produce 
                                                 
367 The drafts people requested to remain anonymous. 
368 Van Huyssteen, Elsa The Constitutional Court, Human Rights and Democracy in South Africa: A sociological 
analysis, University of Witwatersrand, PHD Thesis, 2003 p 76 
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action, which in turn affirms the “truth” in the myth. 370 In this case, the “myth of 
rights” that human rights can only be realised by laws is reoriented and used to 
mobilise people, where legal rights were used in mobilisation e.g. right to freedom of 
assembly makes it easy for the organisations to meet with their members and 
articulate their concerns. Though the government did not agree that the draft bill had 
human rights flaws, KHURINET was able to articulate them through peaceful 
demonstrations, a right provided by the constitution as freedom of assembly and 
speech. In this way, the organisation mobilised and voiced their concerns within the 
law but employed other counter-hegemonic strategies. At the same time, through 
successful mobilisation and agitation for rights, KHURINET was able to alter power 
relations in that the government withdrew the draft bill and ordered that it be redrafted 
taking into account the human rights issues raised. It is yet to be brought to 
parliament. 
 
7.5 Whither a new bill  
Despite opposition to the draft bill, there is emerging consensus that the country needs 
to enact a sound anti-terror law that will curb terrorism activities. By promising to 
issue alternative draft bills that reflect the human rights concerns is a sign in this 
regard but the Muslim community have constantly voiced opposition to any bill 
whatsoever, saying it will serve to discriminate them.371 KHURINET though not 
opposing a new bill was of the opinion that anti-terror law should not instil fear in the 
citizens but should cover the existing loopholes in the Penal Code so tha t terrorists’ 
offences are well defined372. In an opinion column, Michelle Kagiri, was of a similar 
opinion, arguing that the large number of acquittals in Kenya’s courts “is not for lack 
of any laws but for lack of proper utilization – lack of proper investigation and 
prosecution, and lack of adequate number of courts to try the offences. Unless this 
root problem is redressed, adopting draconian laws will only lead to their grave 
misuse"373 
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In its campaign, KHURINET has been engaged with the Muslim community who 
perceive that the bill is aimed at them. The Secretary of the Council of Imams and 
Preachers of Kenya Sheikh Mohammed Dor voiced Muslims concerns when he said 
that since the “war on terror” began, it has targeted only the Muslims and this had 
created bad blood between them and non-Muslims.374 The same views were expressed 
by the Parliamentary Committee on the Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs 
Committee which opposed the bill fearing that it would “tear apart the very fabric of 
the nation and could offer fertile ground for inter-religious animosity and suspicion". 
Consequently, the committee, which deals with legal affairs at Parliament called for 
what they called “political solutions since terrorism is a political crime.”375 The 
government however has continually insisted that the bill is not aimed at Muslims but 
protecting the general population against terrorism. However, this is not reflected in 
the government’s actions aimed at curbing terrorist growth in the country e.g. police 
swoops and arrests of suspected terrorists since they have targeted Coast and Northern 
parts of Kenya as well as Eastleigh area in central Nairobi, which are populated by 
Muslims.  
 
Scheingold argues that employing counter hegemonic strategies can lead to a 
realisation of politics of rights, which is form of political activity made possible by 
the presence of rights.376 This essentially involves using the already acquired rights to 
mobilise for political reasons and takes three forms. The first involves political 
activation, which is educating and informing the people about their rights which are 
under threat; secondly it involves tying the mobilisation to a particular legitimate 
group and thirdly it entails getting support from politicians hence make the rights 
political issues. By making the rights claimed a political issue, it ensures that many 
people get to know about it hence derive many sympathisers who will support them. 
In its campaign, KHURINET were able to successfully mobilise and agitate for rights 
within the framework provided by law. In addition, they were able to lobby politicians 
to reject the draft bill and this led to the campaign getting support from the 
Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs Committee. This ensured that the rights 
they claimed became political issues and having got support from this committee, it 
                                                 
374 Mango, Caroline, ‘Muslims insist terror bill is aimed at them,’ East African Standard, July 14, 2003 
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was a sign that the draft bill even if taken to parliament will not be able to get required 
support for it to be passed as law. 
 
The U.N. charter urges countries to exercise proportionality while enacting 
emergency powers but this seems to have faded in the draft Suppression of terrorism 
bill 2003. This is because the threat of terrorism posed to Kenya does not account for 
the powers given to the security agencies. Proportionality may include a strict focus 
on the legitimate aim of the measures, which is the prevention of further terrorist 
attacks and these measures are supposed to be reviewed periodically when the 
perceived security threat has lowered. If this does not happen, there may be a clash 
with fundamental human rights norms since the emergency powers become 
permanent, leading to derogation of rights even when it is not necessary. Furthermore, 
as Zoller discusses, the enactment of anti-terror laws that restrict human rights will 
lead to a higher level of national security is highly problematic. This is because 
security is not defined on a normative level but on a factual basis, meaning that 
security measures are enacted in connection with specific threats and activities.377 
This is difficult when operating with groups like Al-qaeda that are highly 
unpredictable. This means that the factual character of security can’t be balanced 
against the normative character of the basic rights and it has resulted to national 
security prevailing over other basic rights. 
 
 As earlier indicated, laws that are realised through agitation and reflect the society’s 
needs are more relevant to a particular society and applicable since they record the 
interests that have been successfully pressed upon for recognition and protection as 
well as those that have been rejected. The draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 
thus cannot be said to relate to Kenya since it does not reflect the country’s struggle 
with terrorism. It is bound to legislate what has been termed as “crimes without 
victims,” which are offences where the law aims at enforcing particular moral 
principles in private life irrespective of whether offenders acts can be shown to cause 
harm to others or even to the offender.378 At the same time, it does not seek to give 
solutions to Kenya’s terror problem that apart from being a hub and victim of 
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terrorism, the country has a weak security and intelligence apparatus that is 
ineffectual and ill prepared to track down and apprehend terrorists before they attack. 
 
Furthermore, the hallmark of an effective legislation is that it must be expressed in 
terms of its compatibility and continuity with established cultural and legal 
principles.379 However, the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 falls short of this 
as it not only goes against the Bill of Rights enshrined in Kenya’s Constitution, but it 
also “does not take into account the general Kenyan statutory regime of Criminal 
Procedure and it’s at variance with the Penal Code system.”380 Another lawyer, 
Harrison Kinyanjui takes the debate further and says the draft bill “purports to 
override Constitutional protections of personal liberties and fundamental rights, 
negating the very right to life and freedom that is the bedrock of the Constitution. It 
even eliminates the line between domestic and foreign acts of terrorism, which is not 
only a violation of international law, but an implicit overthrowal (sic) of the doctrine 
of sovereignty of states.”381 
 
Despite these concerns, Kenya surprisingly in a report to the U.N.’s Counter-
Terrorism Committee dated March 4, 2004, reported that all measures that she had 
undertaken to combat terrorism were in compliance with international law and that the 
draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 had only elicited various comments from 
stakeholders which could be cured by building consensus. Furthermore, the report 
stated that these measures were in consistent with the Constitution and that there were 
no constitutional challenges that have been voiced against the measure enacted.382 
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Chapter eight 
Conclusion: A human rights agenda for thought and action in Kenya. 
Acts of terrorism are a global threat to the rule of law, democracy and fundamental 
human rights. In addition, terrorism poses a serious threat to national and international 
stability and security and makes it virtually impossible for a state to effectively 
protect its citizens. However, the security threat posed by terrorism should not 
obscure the importance of human rights. Many countries including Kenya are 
increasingly giving powers to the security forces, in the process implying that 
terrorism is being directly addressed. This however is far from the reality since these 
efforts are eroding human rights, which provide a long term agenda for protecting the 
citizens, while the effectiveness of such strategies is still unclear. 
 
The Kenyan constitution guarantees respect and protection of human rights by the 
government. However, as this study has shown, the anti-terror measures being 
undertaken by police for example police swoops and tracking down terrorist funding 
are going against this provision since they have resulted to unfair and arbitrary arrests 
especially of Muslims. Thus, the Kenya government should adopt an anti-terrorism 
policy that does not ignore human rights including any legislative or procedural 
mechanisms. This is because when anti terror laws are enacted that trump on the 
human rights of Kenyans, this will undermine the public support needed to defeat 
terrorism. Furthermore, any measures that the government adopts must be in 
accordance with international law as prescribed in the U.N. charter; should be 
proportionate to the emergency at hand, and be reviewed periodically to ensure that 
application of the emergency measures is necessary. 
 
At the same time, Kenya’s anti-terrorism measures should seek to build strong 
international norms and institutions on human rights, which will be used to guarantee 
national security. One way that the government can do this is by not discriminating 
against Muslims. Rather, they should be seen as allies in anti-terrorism and the 
Kenyan government should seek their input in this regard. Furthermore, suspects 
should be regarded as criminals for the purposes of arrest and prosecution and entitled 
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to the rights afforded to them at time of arrest. This will mean not torturing, detaining 
or threatening them while under interrogation. 
 
This research report argued that upholding fundamental human rights in Kenya’s anti-
terror measures can contribute to challenging power relations within the state and 
between the government and the citizens. This can be achieved by decentralisation of 
power within the state and the separation of powers, which provides a ground for 
power relations to be challenged in the courts. In this case, absolute power is not 
given to security forces and when they go beyond their mandate while dealing with 
terrorism, their actions can be challenged in a court of law. This in essence means that 
the state will not be able to wage arbitrary powers, which they can invoke when faced 
with political situations that threaten the status quo for example mass action calling 
for better governance. This will ensure that the marginalised and minority people can 
be able to express their opinions and the citizens can be able to question some 
political decisions made or laws enacted. 
 
Seeds of social discord and insecurity are sprouting between non-Muslims and 
Muslims in Kenya. As it has been discussed in this report, this is due to the 
discriminatory policies that the government has employed in the “war on terror,” 
which largely seems to target Muslims and people with Arabic features. This policy 
has been accelerated by the global political rhetoric about “good and evil” or “you are 
with us or against us”. Thus, it is not lost that Muslims view the draft Suppression of 
terrorism bill 2003 as targeting them hence increasing the polarisation. In fact, it is 
easier for a non Muslim Kenyan citizen, posing the same security risk as an Islamic 
fundamentalist to freely conduct business in Kenya, but a Muslim of person with 
Arabic features can be locked up with no charge or subjected to torture. It is worse for 
foreigners who are deported back to their home countries just by the mere suspicion 
of being terrorists. This kind of stigmatizing in society is a source of danger, 
encouraging a climate in which xenophobia and racism flourishes. 
 
This study in its analysis noted that the challenge of upholding human rights in the 
“war on terror” is an uphill task that is fraught with tensions and emotions. However, 
it has argued that it is from these contestations that individual countries can be able to 
enact sound legislations that reflect their social and political struggles as well as 
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protect minorities and the vulnerable groups. Thus for it to be relevant, Kenya’s draft 
Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 should reflect the country’s democratisation 
process as well as its struggle for human rights and safeguarding national security. It 
has been noted in the study that Kenya’s draft anti-terror bill fails to observe the 
established rule of law and human rights. It seeks to curtail the freedoms and rights 
that Kenyans secured when the country returned to multi-partism in 1991 at the behest 
of fighting terrorism. The draft anti- terror bill creates a general climate of fear and 
suspicion in which the State and law enforcement agencies are vested with coercive, 
intrusive, and intimidating powers and no area of private activity is spared. Unless the 
contentious human rights concerns are addressed, the draft Suppression of terrorism 
bill 2003 will serve to marginalise minorities and vulnerable people who will be at the 
mercy of the police and in the end will not serve the ultimate purpose of tackling 
terrorism. 
 
Kenya is faced with the challenge of coming up with anti-terror legislation which 
strikes a balance between the need for national security and the protection of human 
rights. As it currently stands, the proposed bill poses a bigger threat to civil and 
political liberties thereby carrying some elements of the history of human rights abuse 
under the one-party regime. Kenya’s history of gross violation of human rights 
perpetrated by the state through manipulating the Constitution and enacting draconian 
laws is still fresh in Kenyans’ memories. Hence, the government must engage in 
finding out why the country is both a victim and hub of terrorist activities. The 
Kenyan government should address the problem of discriminating against Muslims in 
the country that has led to the growth of fundamentalism. It should engage with them 
to find out their social and economic pressures, frustrated political aspirations, and 
why they are a ground for recruitment by terrorist groups. This will enable it to find 
local solutions to the terrorism.  
 
At the same time, the government should consider enacting an anti-terror law that 
reflects Kenya’s history and aspirations as regards terrorism. This is important 
because such laws note the citizens’ interests that have been successfully pressed 
upon for recognition and protection as well as those that have been rejected. In 
addition, the Kenyan government must stand firm against any pressure to pass the 
draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 in its current form. 
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Kenya’s human rights movement has a task to engage in a battle of ideas and 
challenge directly the claim that national security trumps human rights and make the 
human rights agenda as the best guarantor of national security. 383 It should not rely 
only on legal strategies in social change, a notion that Sheingold termed as “myth of 
rights,” but it should be vibrant and use litigation as one of the avenues to protect 
human rights in the “war on terror.” In pursuit of this, it means employing other 
alternative strategies for protecting rights in the context of the “war on terror”, where 
rights have largely being sacrificed for national security. As earlier noted, by 
engaging in the campaign against the draft Suppression of terrorism bill 2003 the 
human rights movement has shown that it is not relying only on courts to guarantee 
human rights and it should take these efforts a notch higher. It is by doing this that the 
human rights movement will move from “denunciation alone to engagement, working 
with local activists, and with the parts of the government that will listen, moving these 
societies back from the precipice.’384 
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